13 sept 2010
IDF Officer Accused of Manslaughter in Cast Lead
IDF Officer Accused of Manslaughter in Cast Lead

IDF officer, C.S., accused of manslaughter for murdering unarmed Palestinian women holding white flags during Cast Lead
The Israeli military prosecutor has filed the most serious charge ever against an IDF officer regarding the Gaza massacre, Operation Cast Lead.
The charge of manslaughter against the Givati staff sergeant known only by the initials, C.S., (from his light-skinned complexion and blond hair, he appears to be of Russian origin) in the military indictment as released to the public, comes two years after the war and in the aftermath of the Goldstone Report. In fact, one could say the officer is the equivalent of the Yom Kippur goat sent to Azazel, a sacrificial victim whose guilt will assuage international pressure and prevent the indictment of higher-ups who, by right, are the ones who really should be in the dock.
Not that C.S.’ behavior is anything worth defending. The accusation is that while positioned next to his commanding officer he shot two Palestinian women holding white flags and that he did so without authorization from the commander.
Here is the victims’ family’s account of the incident from Ynetnews:
Youssef Abu Hajaj will never forget the day he lost his mother and sister. In the early hours of January 4, 2009, his family’s home near Gaza City was shelled. “My 13-year-old niece was injured so we rushed through the trees and bushes to the Safadi family’s home. We were looking for a hiding place a little further from the tanks,” he told Ynet.
Then came the incident over which an Israel Defense Forces soldier is slated to stand trial for Operation Cast Lead’s most severe violation, and is likely to face charges of manslaughter.
Hajaj said residents of the neighborhood were instructed to evacuate the area in the afternoon. “My sister Majda and Ahmad Safadi, the man who we were staying with, were waving white flags that were cut from sheets. We walked some 400 meters and then we were fired at.
“We fled again in the direction of the Safadi family home, but some 300 or 400 meters later, as we were returning in a group of 27 people, half of which were children – they opened fire at us again.”
He said his 35-year-old sister Majda, who was carrying a white flag, was hit in the shooting. “The fire was so intense that we had to leave her behind. My mother shouted, ‘Majda has fallen, Majda has fallen’. We prayed for her and kept going. Some 100 meters on there was another blow of fire, and this time, the bullets hit my mother Raya, 64-years-old, in her chest. She collapsed and we were forced to leave her behind as well.”
Hajaj said there was nothing unusual about their movement. “We were in a completely open area, but they still opened fire. We returned to the Safadi family’s home until the end of the war, and all attempts to coordinate the removal of the bodies were unsuccessful. Only at the end of the war, over two weeks afterwards, did we bury my mother and my sister.”
In his defense, the officer claims he felt the group of unarmed Gaza civilians waving white flags and walking toward him were a potential threat to his comrades and that he fired at their lower body. The mother who was killed was shot in the chest.
C.S. was only questioned about the incident by investigators in 2009, doubtless as a result of the Goldstone Report. Were it not for that and the testimonies compiled by B’Tselem of this and other incidents, the officer would’ve gotten away with impunity. A lieutenant colonel and captain will also be disciplined in this incident. Most likely their membership in the officer’s club will be suspended for a week (that’s a joke, I realize there likely isn’t an IDF officer’s club).
Sergeant C.S. must feel gratified to know that there is a Facebook group established to defend his honor, Alone Against All: Supporting S. in His Legal Fight. One commenter on the Wall notes they explored NGOs that might help but that “there weren’t many whose mission was to help soldiers in this type of trouble.” Hmmm. I wonder why. Perhaps they haven’t heard of Honenu, which is right up their alley. Settler Assassin? Call Honenu. Killed an Arab or prime minister in cold blood? Call Honenu. Committed a war crime? Call Honenu.
Ynet misleadingly labels this the worst case from Cast Lead, when in reality it is the worst one in which charges have been filed. Goldstone and B’Tselem have identified other cases even worse (notably the Samouni massacre, the mosque bombing, and the UNWRA white phosphorus attack) but no charges have yet been filed in those cases.
Reasonable people will feel a sense of gratitude to Israeli NGOs like B’Tselem without which this case would’ve gone unnoticed. For right-wing Israelis however, this is precisely the reason such NGOs should be driven out of existence. I know which side I’m on.
http://bit.ly/cf5nAr
young woman accused of stealing more than 2,000 classified IDF documents during her army service will not be charged
According to negotiated deal, young woman accused of stealing more than 2,000 classified IDF documents during her army service will not be charged with trying to harm state security.
State Prosecutor's Office officials and attorneys representing Anat Kam, who was accused of stealing classified military material, are in the midst of advanced negotiations ahead of a possible plea bargain, Ynet learned Monday evening.
Drafts of the proposed plea bargain are expected to be exchanged by the end of the week.
The initial report on the negotiations was aired on Channel 2.
About six months ago Kam was accused of stealing over 2,000 classified military documents while serving in the IDF's Central Command in 2007 and then transferring them to "Haaretz" newspaper reporter Uri Blau.
According to the proposed plea bargain, the amended indictment will still charge Kam with serious espionage, but without intent to harm state security.
She will also be charged with gathering and possessing classified materials.
Kam said she was not aware of any plea bargain. Her attorney, Avigdor Feldman, refused to comment.
The indictment against Kam was filed in January. The prosecution claimed she had admitted to the allegations.
http://bit.ly/9asgNX
The Israeli military prosecutor has filed the most serious charge ever against an IDF officer regarding the Gaza massacre, Operation Cast Lead.
The charge of manslaughter against the Givati staff sergeant known only by the initials, C.S., (from his light-skinned complexion and blond hair, he appears to be of Russian origin) in the military indictment as released to the public, comes two years after the war and in the aftermath of the Goldstone Report. In fact, one could say the officer is the equivalent of the Yom Kippur goat sent to Azazel, a sacrificial victim whose guilt will assuage international pressure and prevent the indictment of higher-ups who, by right, are the ones who really should be in the dock.
Not that C.S.’ behavior is anything worth defending. The accusation is that while positioned next to his commanding officer he shot two Palestinian women holding white flags and that he did so without authorization from the commander.
Here is the victims’ family’s account of the incident from Ynetnews:
Youssef Abu Hajaj will never forget the day he lost his mother and sister. In the early hours of January 4, 2009, his family’s home near Gaza City was shelled. “My 13-year-old niece was injured so we rushed through the trees and bushes to the Safadi family’s home. We were looking for a hiding place a little further from the tanks,” he told Ynet.
Then came the incident over which an Israel Defense Forces soldier is slated to stand trial for Operation Cast Lead’s most severe violation, and is likely to face charges of manslaughter.
Hajaj said residents of the neighborhood were instructed to evacuate the area in the afternoon. “My sister Majda and Ahmad Safadi, the man who we were staying with, were waving white flags that were cut from sheets. We walked some 400 meters and then we were fired at.
“We fled again in the direction of the Safadi family home, but some 300 or 400 meters later, as we were returning in a group of 27 people, half of which were children – they opened fire at us again.”
He said his 35-year-old sister Majda, who was carrying a white flag, was hit in the shooting. “The fire was so intense that we had to leave her behind. My mother shouted, ‘Majda has fallen, Majda has fallen’. We prayed for her and kept going. Some 100 meters on there was another blow of fire, and this time, the bullets hit my mother Raya, 64-years-old, in her chest. She collapsed and we were forced to leave her behind as well.”
Hajaj said there was nothing unusual about their movement. “We were in a completely open area, but they still opened fire. We returned to the Safadi family’s home until the end of the war, and all attempts to coordinate the removal of the bodies were unsuccessful. Only at the end of the war, over two weeks afterwards, did we bury my mother and my sister.”
In his defense, the officer claims he felt the group of unarmed Gaza civilians waving white flags and walking toward him were a potential threat to his comrades and that he fired at their lower body. The mother who was killed was shot in the chest.
C.S. was only questioned about the incident by investigators in 2009, doubtless as a result of the Goldstone Report. Were it not for that and the testimonies compiled by B’Tselem of this and other incidents, the officer would’ve gotten away with impunity. A lieutenant colonel and captain will also be disciplined in this incident. Most likely their membership in the officer’s club will be suspended for a week (that’s a joke, I realize there likely isn’t an IDF officer’s club).
Sergeant C.S. must feel gratified to know that there is a Facebook group established to defend his honor, Alone Against All: Supporting S. in His Legal Fight. One commenter on the Wall notes they explored NGOs that might help but that “there weren’t many whose mission was to help soldiers in this type of trouble.” Hmmm. I wonder why. Perhaps they haven’t heard of Honenu, which is right up their alley. Settler Assassin? Call Honenu. Killed an Arab or prime minister in cold blood? Call Honenu. Committed a war crime? Call Honenu.
Ynet misleadingly labels this the worst case from Cast Lead, when in reality it is the worst one in which charges have been filed. Goldstone and B’Tselem have identified other cases even worse (notably the Samouni massacre, the mosque bombing, and the UNWRA white phosphorus attack) but no charges have yet been filed in those cases.
Reasonable people will feel a sense of gratitude to Israeli NGOs like B’Tselem without which this case would’ve gone unnoticed. For right-wing Israelis however, this is precisely the reason such NGOs should be driven out of existence. I know which side I’m on.
http://bit.ly/cf5nAr
young woman accused of stealing more than 2,000 classified IDF documents during her army service will not be charged
According to negotiated deal, young woman accused of stealing more than 2,000 classified IDF documents during her army service will not be charged with trying to harm state security.
State Prosecutor's Office officials and attorneys representing Anat Kam, who was accused of stealing classified military material, are in the midst of advanced negotiations ahead of a possible plea bargain, Ynet learned Monday evening.
Drafts of the proposed plea bargain are expected to be exchanged by the end of the week.
The initial report on the negotiations was aired on Channel 2.
About six months ago Kam was accused of stealing over 2,000 classified military documents while serving in the IDF's Central Command in 2007 and then transferring them to "Haaretz" newspaper reporter Uri Blau.
According to the proposed plea bargain, the amended indictment will still charge Kam with serious espionage, but without intent to harm state security.
She will also be charged with gathering and possessing classified materials.
Kam said she was not aware of any plea bargain. Her attorney, Avigdor Feldman, refused to comment.
The indictment against Kam was filed in January. The prosecution claimed she had admitted to the allegations.
http://bit.ly/9asgNX

Dangot: Political system under attack
In ongoing aftermath of Goldstone report, IDF assigns brigade commanders in field media advisors, humanitarian aid officers. Four generals give their perspectives, discuss media war embroiling Israel
Four senior generals sat around the table. "I came back from a public relations stint in Europe a month ago," said IDF Spokesman Brig. Gen. Avi Benayahu. "I who never shot a bullet, who never did officers course at Bahad 1 officers' school, who doesn't even have a weapon slung over my shoulder went around there for an entire month with 24-hour security and an alias."
An official PR tour under a fake name, I asked him. That bad?
"That bad," Benayahu answered. "And this isn't an isolated case. I remember when the chief of staff was supposed to go to a NATO conference and the plane was late. They looked for an alternate route for him, and a debate started here they will arrest him, here they won't.
In ongoing aftermath of Goldstone report, IDF assigns brigade commanders in field media advisors, humanitarian aid officers. Four generals give their perspectives, discuss media war embroiling Israel
Four senior generals sat around the table. "I came back from a public relations stint in Europe a month ago," said IDF Spokesman Brig. Gen. Avi Benayahu. "I who never shot a bullet, who never did officers course at Bahad 1 officers' school, who doesn't even have a weapon slung over my shoulder went around there for an entire month with 24-hour security and an alias."
An official PR tour under a fake name, I asked him. That bad?
"That bad," Benayahu answered. "And this isn't an isolated case. I remember when the chief of staff was supposed to go to a NATO conference and the plane was late. They looked for an alternate route for him, and a debate started here they will arrest him, here they won't.

Benayahu: Planned campaign against Zionist enterprise
"We have to look at everything from a birds-eye view to see that an organized, planned, funded, and timed campaign of de-legitimization is being waged against Israel, against the IDF, and I'm not embarrassed to say so, against the Zionist enterprise."
Benayahu is not the only one reading the map differently and identifying a 21st century battle of new forces, no less significant than combat soldiers, along the artillery lines and the wingspans of innovative aircraft.
War 2000
In February, following the lessons from Operation Cast Lead, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) Maj. Gen. Eitan Dangot was instructed to set up a layout of humanitarian aid officers that will accompany the battalions in the field.
"These officers," according to Dangot, "are in contact with the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria and with representatives of the aid organizations in the Gaza Strip and are meant to coordinate between them and the forces in the field and to indicate the locations of sensitive facilities such as hospitals, schools, and UN aid centers."
This put the number of officers who have the field commander's ear but are not part of the combat layout at three: a media advisor, or, in military language, an IDF Spokesperson Unit representative, a legal advisor, or, put otherwise, a representative of the Military Prosecution, and an advisor for humanitarian affairs, a representative of the COGAT.
Each of these advisors, separately and together, are meant to ensure that the fighting in the territories will look better and sound better, and, mainly, will prevent the next Goldstone report.
"We have to look at everything from a birds-eye view to see that an organized, planned, funded, and timed campaign of de-legitimization is being waged against Israel, against the IDF, and I'm not embarrassed to say so, against the Zionist enterprise."
Benayahu is not the only one reading the map differently and identifying a 21st century battle of new forces, no less significant than combat soldiers, along the artillery lines and the wingspans of innovative aircraft.
War 2000
In February, following the lessons from Operation Cast Lead, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) Maj. Gen. Eitan Dangot was instructed to set up a layout of humanitarian aid officers that will accompany the battalions in the field.
"These officers," according to Dangot, "are in contact with the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria and with representatives of the aid organizations in the Gaza Strip and are meant to coordinate between them and the forces in the field and to indicate the locations of sensitive facilities such as hospitals, schools, and UN aid centers."
This put the number of officers who have the field commander's ear but are not part of the combat layout at three: a media advisor, or, in military language, an IDF Spokesperson Unit representative, a legal advisor, or, put otherwise, a representative of the Military Prosecution, and an advisor for humanitarian affairs, a representative of the COGAT.
Each of these advisors, separately and together, are meant to ensure that the fighting in the territories will look better and sound better, and, mainly, will prevent the next Goldstone report.

Mandelblit: Conflict is asymmetrical
The officers in the field were not exactly enthusiastic about the idea.
"The idea is a correct one," a lieutenant colonel told me. "In the future battlefield, media, legal, and humanitarian dilemmas can dictate how the force will behave even more than topographical demands. But to say it makes it easier for us? Not at all. Even worse. In my opinion, it won't even spare us the next media onslaught."
Has the IDF read the map of the new battlefield correctly by understanding that victory does not lie solely in the hands of the soldiers, as skilled and determined as they may be, or that it is a futile effort at best and a fig leaf at worst? That war will forever be the same horrid, bleeding occurrence spawning commissions of inquiry time after time here and abroad?
'Other side ignoring interntional law'
Yedioth Ahronoth gathered four officers for a discussion on the matter: Military Advocate General Maj. Gen. Avihai Mandelblit, COGAT Maj. Gen. Eitan Dangot, IDF Spokesman Brig. Gen. Avi Benayahu, and Judea and Samaria Commander Brig. Gen. Nitzan Alon.
"This isn't the future battlefield," said Mandelblit already at the beginning of the discussion. "This is the current battlefield. And it's not happening only in Israel, but in all countries in a similar type of conflict.
"It is an asymmetrical conflict, but not in the sense that one side has more power and the other less. This is a mistake. The conflict is asymmetrical because one side is acting according to universal rules, according to international law, fighting like cultured countries do, and the other side is ignoring these rules."
The matter is made worse, said Mandelblit, when the conflict takes place in a crowded urban area. "The most basic rule of international law addresses distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants with an emphasis on avoiding harm to civilians. We are trying to uphold this as much as possible, even when the other side is not acting according to these rules. On the contrary, the other side is attacking our civilians indiscriminately in hopes that we will return fire indiscriminately and hit their civilians.
"For them, it's a win-win situation. If you don't attack because you are concerned about hitting civilians, you are in a big problem. If you attack and hit, you lost legitimacy, and most certainly heavy pressure will be exerted against you to stop the fighting. This happened in the Second Lebanon War when Hezbollah stored strategic rockets in residential buildings and after this in Gaza with Hamas, which bases its fighting in urban areas."
It's an old story. In the Vietnam War, the Americans already were confronted with these dilemmas, as did we starting with the First Lebanon War, the first intifada and the second intifada.
"For us, this has been seen since the war that broke out in 2000."
War?
"Yes. Excuse me for correcting you, but that wasn't an intifada. It was a war."
Dangot: "Operation Defensive Shield was a turning point. The internalization of the implications manifest in this type of fighting came later. We institutionalized the use of coordinating officers, for instance, as a lesson from Operation Cast Lead once it became clear that officers who were there were very effective and prevented targeting civilian targets that would have incurred a lot of damage for us. As of today, these officers undergo organized and structured training."
Mandelblit: "The previous military advocate general, Menachem Finkelstein, was the first to define it as armed conflict and as a war from our perspective. This definition was accepted by the Supreme Court, even though there was a disagreement in the world whether it is correct to deem actions against terrorist organizations as armed conflict."
What is the significance of the definition?
"It gives additional tools to the military. For instance, targeted assassinations, which is a legitimate tool according to the laws of war. Let's say we discover a rocket warehouse in the basement of a house where civilians live. This is a legitimate military target. Just in order to avoid targeting civilians, it is best to warn them the building is about to be bombed. We call on the phone or make an announcement. If they don't answer, we fire a missile from a military chopper with light ammunition in order to make the point clear."
Did this work?
"Yes."
And we still received the Goldstone report?
Benayahu: "Because they are looking for a way to get us."
Because the whole world is against us?
Mandelblit: "Not the whole world. The UN Human Rights Council. The UN is divided. There is the General Assembly, and then there is the Human Rights Council, which is hostile towards Israel."
Alon: "For years already. Not just today."
Mandelblit: "But now they have a lot more power."
A few days in jail. Or in a hotel
"In this asymmetric war," said Brig. Gen. Nitzan Alon, "The other side understands that part of the battle is actually to fire a Qassam at Sderot or a Katyusha at Ashkelon or a Grad at Tel Aviv in the next war. But some of the battle is also to prevent us from attacking and not allow us to defend ourselves. Then we create our deterrence with a targeted assassination in Jabalya, and they try to create their deterrence with the Goldstone report and articles in the press."
Benayahu: "The incitement campaign against us is being waged on a number of fronts simultaneously: the international legal system, conventional media, new media, such as Facebook. It is being waged full force on campuses in the US and in Europe in a planned and organized fashion. It is being waged on the economic plane with boycotts."
Alon: "One of our brigade commanders was supposed to go for a year of studies at a certain location. On the eve of his departure, after he had already rented out his home here, he decided to abide by the military advocate general's advice not to fly there. Instead, he flew to Washington."
Do these stories affect your decisions regarding the future of your career? You may be the next one not allowed to travel.
Alon: "Could be. I'm not saying it doesn't have an effect."
Benayahu: "Not just him. Nearly all of us are in the same position."
Alon: "In any case, what is important for me is that I feel comfortable with what I am doing that my actions are in line with my moral, personal, and inner outlook. If I won't be able to go and study in London, for instance, because of this situation, I'll study somewhere else. In Tel Aviv."
Mandelblit: "Despite it all, the situation isn't that bad. From my perspective, the most distressing part of the Goldstone report is the assertion that the legal system in Israel has no chance of serving justice. The British, the French, the Germans they are our friends. They think we have a good legal system, a good military system, that upholds moral codes. I am in contact with all of them. I know.
"The problem is that private individuals can use an honest court system in a crooked way to come to a magistrate judge, show him a few pictures, and after Goldstone he will issue an arrest warrant. Later, it will probably be withdrawn, but in the meantime, you have to spend a few days or weeks in jail."
Benayahu: "In a hotel."
The officers in the field were not exactly enthusiastic about the idea.
"The idea is a correct one," a lieutenant colonel told me. "In the future battlefield, media, legal, and humanitarian dilemmas can dictate how the force will behave even more than topographical demands. But to say it makes it easier for us? Not at all. Even worse. In my opinion, it won't even spare us the next media onslaught."
Has the IDF read the map of the new battlefield correctly by understanding that victory does not lie solely in the hands of the soldiers, as skilled and determined as they may be, or that it is a futile effort at best and a fig leaf at worst? That war will forever be the same horrid, bleeding occurrence spawning commissions of inquiry time after time here and abroad?
'Other side ignoring interntional law'
Yedioth Ahronoth gathered four officers for a discussion on the matter: Military Advocate General Maj. Gen. Avihai Mandelblit, COGAT Maj. Gen. Eitan Dangot, IDF Spokesman Brig. Gen. Avi Benayahu, and Judea and Samaria Commander Brig. Gen. Nitzan Alon.
"This isn't the future battlefield," said Mandelblit already at the beginning of the discussion. "This is the current battlefield. And it's not happening only in Israel, but in all countries in a similar type of conflict.
"It is an asymmetrical conflict, but not in the sense that one side has more power and the other less. This is a mistake. The conflict is asymmetrical because one side is acting according to universal rules, according to international law, fighting like cultured countries do, and the other side is ignoring these rules."
The matter is made worse, said Mandelblit, when the conflict takes place in a crowded urban area. "The most basic rule of international law addresses distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants with an emphasis on avoiding harm to civilians. We are trying to uphold this as much as possible, even when the other side is not acting according to these rules. On the contrary, the other side is attacking our civilians indiscriminately in hopes that we will return fire indiscriminately and hit their civilians.
"For them, it's a win-win situation. If you don't attack because you are concerned about hitting civilians, you are in a big problem. If you attack and hit, you lost legitimacy, and most certainly heavy pressure will be exerted against you to stop the fighting. This happened in the Second Lebanon War when Hezbollah stored strategic rockets in residential buildings and after this in Gaza with Hamas, which bases its fighting in urban areas."
It's an old story. In the Vietnam War, the Americans already were confronted with these dilemmas, as did we starting with the First Lebanon War, the first intifada and the second intifada.
"For us, this has been seen since the war that broke out in 2000."
War?
"Yes. Excuse me for correcting you, but that wasn't an intifada. It was a war."
Dangot: "Operation Defensive Shield was a turning point. The internalization of the implications manifest in this type of fighting came later. We institutionalized the use of coordinating officers, for instance, as a lesson from Operation Cast Lead once it became clear that officers who were there were very effective and prevented targeting civilian targets that would have incurred a lot of damage for us. As of today, these officers undergo organized and structured training."
Mandelblit: "The previous military advocate general, Menachem Finkelstein, was the first to define it as armed conflict and as a war from our perspective. This definition was accepted by the Supreme Court, even though there was a disagreement in the world whether it is correct to deem actions against terrorist organizations as armed conflict."
What is the significance of the definition?
"It gives additional tools to the military. For instance, targeted assassinations, which is a legitimate tool according to the laws of war. Let's say we discover a rocket warehouse in the basement of a house where civilians live. This is a legitimate military target. Just in order to avoid targeting civilians, it is best to warn them the building is about to be bombed. We call on the phone or make an announcement. If they don't answer, we fire a missile from a military chopper with light ammunition in order to make the point clear."
Did this work?
"Yes."
And we still received the Goldstone report?
Benayahu: "Because they are looking for a way to get us."
Because the whole world is against us?
Mandelblit: "Not the whole world. The UN Human Rights Council. The UN is divided. There is the General Assembly, and then there is the Human Rights Council, which is hostile towards Israel."
Alon: "For years already. Not just today."
Mandelblit: "But now they have a lot more power."
A few days in jail. Or in a hotel
"In this asymmetric war," said Brig. Gen. Nitzan Alon, "The other side understands that part of the battle is actually to fire a Qassam at Sderot or a Katyusha at Ashkelon or a Grad at Tel Aviv in the next war. But some of the battle is also to prevent us from attacking and not allow us to defend ourselves. Then we create our deterrence with a targeted assassination in Jabalya, and they try to create their deterrence with the Goldstone report and articles in the press."
Benayahu: "The incitement campaign against us is being waged on a number of fronts simultaneously: the international legal system, conventional media, new media, such as Facebook. It is being waged full force on campuses in the US and in Europe in a planned and organized fashion. It is being waged on the economic plane with boycotts."
Alon: "One of our brigade commanders was supposed to go for a year of studies at a certain location. On the eve of his departure, after he had already rented out his home here, he decided to abide by the military advocate general's advice not to fly there. Instead, he flew to Washington."
Do these stories affect your decisions regarding the future of your career? You may be the next one not allowed to travel.
Alon: "Could be. I'm not saying it doesn't have an effect."
Benayahu: "Not just him. Nearly all of us are in the same position."
Alon: "In any case, what is important for me is that I feel comfortable with what I am doing that my actions are in line with my moral, personal, and inner outlook. If I won't be able to go and study in London, for instance, because of this situation, I'll study somewhere else. In Tel Aviv."
Mandelblit: "Despite it all, the situation isn't that bad. From my perspective, the most distressing part of the Goldstone report is the assertion that the legal system in Israel has no chance of serving justice. The British, the French, the Germans they are our friends. They think we have a good legal system, a good military system, that upholds moral codes. I am in contact with all of them. I know.
"The problem is that private individuals can use an honest court system in a crooked way to come to a magistrate judge, show him a few pictures, and after Goldstone he will issue an arrest warrant. Later, it will probably be withdrawn, but in the meantime, you have to spend a few days or weeks in jail."
Benayahu: "In a hotel."

Judge Richard Goldstone in Gaza
In other words, even if the heads of state believe Israel is acting in a legal and moral fashion, the citizens on the street are threatening our legitimacy?
Benayahu: "Up until three years ago, there were two superpowers the US and China. Today, Facebook is the third superpower. There are people that live there, get there information from there. One quarter of internet users use the blogosphere at the expense of print. The conventional terms of being a spokesman, public relations, and the media are making room for the huge place of public diplomacy.
"Today, legitimacy to take action is more important than achievements on the battlefield. This legitimacy must be manufactured prior to the action, during the action, and preserve it also after the action.
"A battalion commander who in the past went into action in Gaza or Lebanon would need intelligence, targets, soldiers, ammunition, and motivation. Today, he needs to understand that key foundations of international law. What he is permissible and what is forbidden. And to understand how the media works. Before he decides how to bomb a gas station, the military advocate general will tell him if he is allowed to at all, and I will tell him how to stand in front of the cameras and explain why he did it."
Does the battalion commander know this?
"Yes."
Does he know how to do it?
"We are making an effort. In the IDF, we have a school of communications and a center for communications training. A mobile unit passes through and teaches officers how to use the camera as a weapon, how to send a message in 20 seconds, how not to tell stories.
"Two weeks ago, these topics were deemed by the chief of staff at the end of a General Staff meeting part of the qualifications of relevant officers. To understand that a 10 year old child is filming you from the house across the street or from the mosque's minaret with a camera on his third generation cell phone can become a CNN correspondent within seconds.
"I did an entire information day dedicated to the question of how up-scale technology made in Silicon Valley or in the skyscrapers of Manhattan is applied with such force on the other end of the scale, in the world of darkness and ignorance in Iran. How one picture from a cell phone of the girl with a bullet in her head succeeded in doing damage to the government in Tehran that the US and the entire West together hadn't succeeded in doing.
"US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen said it best when he said that if in the past PR was a supplement to operational forces, today PR is done with an operational supplement."
Berlin Festival battle
These dilemmas are not only coming to light during battles, but also during routine activities.
Alon: "Our conduct against the demonstrations in Naalin and Bilin, for instance, is becoming more sophisticated. It is clear that it is not something that is happening only along the fence between Kiryat Sefer and Bilin, but is part of a larger area of action that stretches from the Berlin Festival to articles published in the New York Times and Al-Quds Al-Arabi.
"On the other hand, there is a soldier there from the Armored Corps expected to prevent any physical damage to the fence. So I set up a team that has legal advisors, IDF Spokesperson Unit representatives, Shin Bet officials, and police investigators, and we look into the possibilities."
And what if the fence is demolished? No one is going to get hit with a rubber bullet?
"We also made a decision like this one. We said, with five years since the start of the protests, we are prepared to sustain damage to the wall in order to show that the claim made by the other side that we don't allow legitimate protest and use violence to this end is incorrect. So we said, let's let them harm the fence, throw some Molotov cocktail at our troops, and we will be prepared to take this."
Really?
"With certain limitations, of course. For instance, we won't allow our soldiers to be put in danger. But let's keep our cards straight. During the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, the ones sitting next to the brigade commander were his intelligence officer and his intelligence commander, not the legal advisor and the spokesperson."
Dangot: "We must remember that the political system in Israel is the target of attack as of today. This started during the First Gulf War. This fact heightens the dilemma the military is in anyhow."
Because public pressure is higher? Say, in light of the rockets being fired at Sderot?
"Yes. Try to imagine a similar situation against tens of thousands long-range rockets. It necessitates that we be focused and effective in a short time."
Does this necessitate the use of a lot of force?
"It necessitates that we reach our target on a much shorter time schedule than in the past. It means we must be prepared, even while carrying out the operation, for defining events within Israel and their implications. For instance, a mass-casualty attack against civilians, a missile in Tel Aviv that hit a hospital."
In other words, the lawyers and media advisors need to move aside?
Alon: "I have three days to achieve my objective and not three weeks."
Or, like the battalion commander whom I spoke with said in the end, I need to take my objective.
Benayahu: "Right. But now he has a legal advisor and a spokesperson as part of the organic headquarters of the brigade commander and a humanitarian officer who will make sure that the neighborhood mosque isn't blown up on the way to taking this target."
And yet, the Goldstone report and the harsh international response still resound.
Mandelblit: "I can't tell the people who are being shelled in Sderot, who lived in shelters for a long period, that I can't attack. We need to fight and win."
In other words, the next battle will either end in a victory or a report.
Alon: "No."
So, a victory and a report?
"That is part of the victory."
You said before that you are prepared to sustain damage to the wall and hold back even though your mission is to secure the wall.
"I said that I am considering additional aspects of the issue."
Mandelblit: "This is part of the price, and this doesn't need to intimidate us. This is precisely their goal to tie our hands behind our backs operationally speaking. So that we won't dare make a decision to make an attack."
That is their weapon. They don't have tanks and airplanes.
"And still, we need to win operationally and protect our values and meet the criteria of international law. This is part of being professional. This is what we have done."
You ordered 500 soldiers be investigated following Operation Cast Lead. Claims were made that you did so only in order to placate international officials even though it was clear that a large part of the investigations would come up with nothing.
"This is an insignificant claim. I don't work for Goldstone, but neither do I work for the lawyers defending the soldiers. I investigate each and every claim. This obligates many people to testify. The fact is that until now, only three criminal indictments were issued until now and another two or three are being put up for disciplinary action."
Do the soldiers and their families feel insulted?
"Quite the opposite. The investigations in many cases revealed that the claims were baseless. In any case, I want to clarify once and for all 500 soldiers were not investigated. If a claim was made that fire was opened at a civilian waving a white flag, I will clarify the matter. In order to do so, I need to take testimonies. So military police investigators will search the force that was there. We need to go through 60 commanders and soldiers. But these people are giving testimonies, not being investigated."
Building legitimacy
Brig.-Gen. Alon, you're the field expert on our panel. Do you have a lawyer, a media advisor, and a humanitarian officer on your head?
Alon: "Not on my head, they help me."
Mandelblit: "During Cast Lead there were sensitive situations, in which I sat with the chief of staff and the commander of the Air Force in order to plan a particular target, because it was an important target, but we had to look at how to do it without causing casualties."
Dangot: "A humanitarian officer can give us information not only on the location of sensitive sites, but also about timing: prayer times, holidays, specific occasions. Maybe postponing or moving up an operation by a day can totally change its media effect."
Benayahu: "In any case, the question is whether in the eyes of the IDF their citizens come before ours."
And the answer?
Mandelblit: "If a battalion commander kills 200 or 300 people on his way to the target he has finished the war for the entire army. Who will back him up? Who will protect him?"
If it were that simple, black and white, we wouldn't need legal counsel or a humanitarian officer.
Benayahu: "True. The sensitivity to the lives of the soldiers does not come at the cost of sensitivity to others, but our soldiers will always come before theirs and our citizens before theirs. And if the dilemma is whether to let a Grad rocket fall on Ashkelon or hit the Grad, even if it entails damage in the Strip or, unfortunately, harm to civilians, I'm telling you there's no dilemma here."
Alon: "There's no dilemma after the fact! Before there is definitely a dilemma, and we face these dilemmas every day. Sometimes they have legal aspects, and sometimes there are aspects of legitimacy. We waited a long time before Cast Lead in order to build up legitimacy for an operation."
Benayahu: "In order to understand how it works and how important legitimacy is, I will go back to Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. I was an advisor to the defense minister back then, Shimon Peres, and he was on an elections tour when we received information that citizens in Kfar Kana had been killed by Israeli fire.
"There wasn't easy access back then to international media like today, and there was no internet, but it appeared on CNN and Sky News. Towards the afternoon, when Peres came back from the north, he made a decision that there is no choice but to halt the operation. A press conference was scheduled for 9 pm, to give the chief of staff enough time to get his forces out of there under fire.
"Only at ten to nine the UN spokeswoman in Geneva announces that they know for certain from UNIFIL that Katyusha rockets had been fired from Kfar Kana in the past. On the way I give him a note with the UN report, he puts it in his pocket, and opens the press conference by reading the announcement, surprising the chief of staff and everyone else by announcing that the operation would go on."
In other words, even if the heads of state believe Israel is acting in a legal and moral fashion, the citizens on the street are threatening our legitimacy?
Benayahu: "Up until three years ago, there were two superpowers the US and China. Today, Facebook is the third superpower. There are people that live there, get there information from there. One quarter of internet users use the blogosphere at the expense of print. The conventional terms of being a spokesman, public relations, and the media are making room for the huge place of public diplomacy.
"Today, legitimacy to take action is more important than achievements on the battlefield. This legitimacy must be manufactured prior to the action, during the action, and preserve it also after the action.
"A battalion commander who in the past went into action in Gaza or Lebanon would need intelligence, targets, soldiers, ammunition, and motivation. Today, he needs to understand that key foundations of international law. What he is permissible and what is forbidden. And to understand how the media works. Before he decides how to bomb a gas station, the military advocate general will tell him if he is allowed to at all, and I will tell him how to stand in front of the cameras and explain why he did it."
Does the battalion commander know this?
"Yes."
Does he know how to do it?
"We are making an effort. In the IDF, we have a school of communications and a center for communications training. A mobile unit passes through and teaches officers how to use the camera as a weapon, how to send a message in 20 seconds, how not to tell stories.
"Two weeks ago, these topics were deemed by the chief of staff at the end of a General Staff meeting part of the qualifications of relevant officers. To understand that a 10 year old child is filming you from the house across the street or from the mosque's minaret with a camera on his third generation cell phone can become a CNN correspondent within seconds.
"I did an entire information day dedicated to the question of how up-scale technology made in Silicon Valley or in the skyscrapers of Manhattan is applied with such force on the other end of the scale, in the world of darkness and ignorance in Iran. How one picture from a cell phone of the girl with a bullet in her head succeeded in doing damage to the government in Tehran that the US and the entire West together hadn't succeeded in doing.
"US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen said it best when he said that if in the past PR was a supplement to operational forces, today PR is done with an operational supplement."
Berlin Festival battle
These dilemmas are not only coming to light during battles, but also during routine activities.
Alon: "Our conduct against the demonstrations in Naalin and Bilin, for instance, is becoming more sophisticated. It is clear that it is not something that is happening only along the fence between Kiryat Sefer and Bilin, but is part of a larger area of action that stretches from the Berlin Festival to articles published in the New York Times and Al-Quds Al-Arabi.
"On the other hand, there is a soldier there from the Armored Corps expected to prevent any physical damage to the fence. So I set up a team that has legal advisors, IDF Spokesperson Unit representatives, Shin Bet officials, and police investigators, and we look into the possibilities."
And what if the fence is demolished? No one is going to get hit with a rubber bullet?
"We also made a decision like this one. We said, with five years since the start of the protests, we are prepared to sustain damage to the wall in order to show that the claim made by the other side that we don't allow legitimate protest and use violence to this end is incorrect. So we said, let's let them harm the fence, throw some Molotov cocktail at our troops, and we will be prepared to take this."
Really?
"With certain limitations, of course. For instance, we won't allow our soldiers to be put in danger. But let's keep our cards straight. During the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead, the ones sitting next to the brigade commander were his intelligence officer and his intelligence commander, not the legal advisor and the spokesperson."
Dangot: "We must remember that the political system in Israel is the target of attack as of today. This started during the First Gulf War. This fact heightens the dilemma the military is in anyhow."
Because public pressure is higher? Say, in light of the rockets being fired at Sderot?
"Yes. Try to imagine a similar situation against tens of thousands long-range rockets. It necessitates that we be focused and effective in a short time."
Does this necessitate the use of a lot of force?
"It necessitates that we reach our target on a much shorter time schedule than in the past. It means we must be prepared, even while carrying out the operation, for defining events within Israel and their implications. For instance, a mass-casualty attack against civilians, a missile in Tel Aviv that hit a hospital."
In other words, the lawyers and media advisors need to move aside?
Alon: "I have three days to achieve my objective and not three weeks."
Or, like the battalion commander whom I spoke with said in the end, I need to take my objective.
Benayahu: "Right. But now he has a legal advisor and a spokesperson as part of the organic headquarters of the brigade commander and a humanitarian officer who will make sure that the neighborhood mosque isn't blown up on the way to taking this target."
And yet, the Goldstone report and the harsh international response still resound.
Mandelblit: "I can't tell the people who are being shelled in Sderot, who lived in shelters for a long period, that I can't attack. We need to fight and win."
In other words, the next battle will either end in a victory or a report.
Alon: "No."
So, a victory and a report?
"That is part of the victory."
You said before that you are prepared to sustain damage to the wall and hold back even though your mission is to secure the wall.
"I said that I am considering additional aspects of the issue."
Mandelblit: "This is part of the price, and this doesn't need to intimidate us. This is precisely their goal to tie our hands behind our backs operationally speaking. So that we won't dare make a decision to make an attack."
That is their weapon. They don't have tanks and airplanes.
"And still, we need to win operationally and protect our values and meet the criteria of international law. This is part of being professional. This is what we have done."
You ordered 500 soldiers be investigated following Operation Cast Lead. Claims were made that you did so only in order to placate international officials even though it was clear that a large part of the investigations would come up with nothing.
"This is an insignificant claim. I don't work for Goldstone, but neither do I work for the lawyers defending the soldiers. I investigate each and every claim. This obligates many people to testify. The fact is that until now, only three criminal indictments were issued until now and another two or three are being put up for disciplinary action."
Do the soldiers and their families feel insulted?
"Quite the opposite. The investigations in many cases revealed that the claims were baseless. In any case, I want to clarify once and for all 500 soldiers were not investigated. If a claim was made that fire was opened at a civilian waving a white flag, I will clarify the matter. In order to do so, I need to take testimonies. So military police investigators will search the force that was there. We need to go through 60 commanders and soldiers. But these people are giving testimonies, not being investigated."
Building legitimacy
Brig.-Gen. Alon, you're the field expert on our panel. Do you have a lawyer, a media advisor, and a humanitarian officer on your head?
Alon: "Not on my head, they help me."
Mandelblit: "During Cast Lead there were sensitive situations, in which I sat with the chief of staff and the commander of the Air Force in order to plan a particular target, because it was an important target, but we had to look at how to do it without causing casualties."
Dangot: "A humanitarian officer can give us information not only on the location of sensitive sites, but also about timing: prayer times, holidays, specific occasions. Maybe postponing or moving up an operation by a day can totally change its media effect."
Benayahu: "In any case, the question is whether in the eyes of the IDF their citizens come before ours."
And the answer?
Mandelblit: "If a battalion commander kills 200 or 300 people on his way to the target he has finished the war for the entire army. Who will back him up? Who will protect him?"
If it were that simple, black and white, we wouldn't need legal counsel or a humanitarian officer.
Benayahu: "True. The sensitivity to the lives of the soldiers does not come at the cost of sensitivity to others, but our soldiers will always come before theirs and our citizens before theirs. And if the dilemma is whether to let a Grad rocket fall on Ashkelon or hit the Grad, even if it entails damage in the Strip or, unfortunately, harm to civilians, I'm telling you there's no dilemma here."
Alon: "There's no dilemma after the fact! Before there is definitely a dilemma, and we face these dilemmas every day. Sometimes they have legal aspects, and sometimes there are aspects of legitimacy. We waited a long time before Cast Lead in order to build up legitimacy for an operation."
Benayahu: "In order to understand how it works and how important legitimacy is, I will go back to Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996. I was an advisor to the defense minister back then, Shimon Peres, and he was on an elections tour when we received information that citizens in Kfar Kana had been killed by Israeli fire.
"There wasn't easy access back then to international media like today, and there was no internet, but it appeared on CNN and Sky News. Towards the afternoon, when Peres came back from the north, he made a decision that there is no choice but to halt the operation. A press conference was scheduled for 9 pm, to give the chief of staff enough time to get his forces out of there under fire.
"Only at ten to nine the UN spokeswoman in Geneva announces that they know for certain from UNIFIL that Katyusha rockets had been fired from Kfar Kana in the past. On the way I give him a note with the UN report, he puts it in his pocket, and opens the press conference by reading the announcement, surprising the chief of staff and everyone else by announcing that the operation would go on."

Operation Grapes of Wrath, 1996
And the lesson?
"International legitimacy is necessary. If you want a recent example, I was with the chief of staff in the US right when B'tselem published the story about the brigade commander in Naalin. We suddenly understood the force of this thing. You meet with the vice president and he keeps asking you about it. You go to the National Security Council and again, the same question. There is a huge effect to all of these stories on CNN on decision-makers."
Once flotilla left port, it won
Did this dictate the mode of operation on the flotilla, with the paint balls?
Alon: "I am not referring to the flotilla in a concrete manner. In principle, you can take mistakes and failures and make them into an ideology, but to say that this is the idea? I actually think the flotilla is the exception."
Meaning?
Alon: "These things are not mutually exclusive. We can climb a hill and prevent Katyusha fire from it without killing 300 civilians on the way. The understanding that we need to plan military missions with limitations is the essence of professionalism. Media, law, and legitimacy are not sub-objectives, they are components of the mission."
And there is another objective: Public refusal to accept casualties.
Alon: "That too, but it's from the same family."
From the same family as building public legitimacy?
Dangot: "During the First Lebanon War, the attack on Beirut and also later, it was a major factor affecting decisions. It's true that the commander's main office is to fight to lead the force to complete the mission but there's no doubt that his toolbox has been altered from the past."
During Cast Lead many Palestinians were hurt because efforts were made to limit our casualties.
"True. It's because of the proximity to the Second Lebanon War, in which there were many casualties. As an aide to the defense minister I saw the sensitivity of state officials to this issue."
Soldier gets beaten by activists on board 'Marmara' flotilla ship
And that of investigation committees.
Benayahu: "The advocate general expressed this at his testimony before the Turkel committee, and there is really a feeling in the army that no matter what we do we somehow fall prey to some investigation."
Mandelblit: "It is the right of the state to probe as deeply as they need to. There was public pressure after the Yom Kippur War, after Sabra and Shatila, and even after the Second Lebanon War. But to establish a committee because of outside pressure?"
Benayahu: "Looking back on all of these investigations we can see that the army always played rather a small part in decision-making but a large part in taking responsibility, though I don't feel this emasculates commanders, in the meantime.
"On the matter of the flotilla you have to understand that once it had left the port, it won. Conflict with the IDF at sea was its goal, and all the rest is just damage control. We never thought for a moment to charter planes with 'Free Gilad Shalit' written on them, or put stickers on our ships and send them out with girls from the Navy dressed in white and carrying flowers. This is not what we do.
"Our goal was to stop this thing. By the way, even where the media was concerned, we succeeded within hours to turn the 'peace activists' into terrorists. The footage on Al-Jazeera, which showed our soldiers being beaten, are our legitimacy for the casualties on deck. If not for this footage, live, in color, I would have had a hard time achieving legitimacy for the necessary actions of our soldiers."
The feeling was that Israeli PR was doing too little too late.
"Because we wait with our announcements until the families who have serious casualties are notified, and they also have to pass through intelligence in order to keep from revealing methods. I don't like to say that I am satisfied, and there are a few lessons, but I think we have achieved these goals. The problem and this is my claim for the Israeli media is that it's always extreme. Either there's a scandal, and the entire military brass has to resign, or the people of Israel all stand up and give the IDF a round of applause."
http://bit.ly/a1Dmlo
And the lesson?
"International legitimacy is necessary. If you want a recent example, I was with the chief of staff in the US right when B'tselem published the story about the brigade commander in Naalin. We suddenly understood the force of this thing. You meet with the vice president and he keeps asking you about it. You go to the National Security Council and again, the same question. There is a huge effect to all of these stories on CNN on decision-makers."
Once flotilla left port, it won
Did this dictate the mode of operation on the flotilla, with the paint balls?
Alon: "I am not referring to the flotilla in a concrete manner. In principle, you can take mistakes and failures and make them into an ideology, but to say that this is the idea? I actually think the flotilla is the exception."
Meaning?
Alon: "These things are not mutually exclusive. We can climb a hill and prevent Katyusha fire from it without killing 300 civilians on the way. The understanding that we need to plan military missions with limitations is the essence of professionalism. Media, law, and legitimacy are not sub-objectives, they are components of the mission."
And there is another objective: Public refusal to accept casualties.
Alon: "That too, but it's from the same family."
From the same family as building public legitimacy?
Dangot: "During the First Lebanon War, the attack on Beirut and also later, it was a major factor affecting decisions. It's true that the commander's main office is to fight to lead the force to complete the mission but there's no doubt that his toolbox has been altered from the past."
During Cast Lead many Palestinians were hurt because efforts were made to limit our casualties.
"True. It's because of the proximity to the Second Lebanon War, in which there were many casualties. As an aide to the defense minister I saw the sensitivity of state officials to this issue."
Soldier gets beaten by activists on board 'Marmara' flotilla ship
And that of investigation committees.
Benayahu: "The advocate general expressed this at his testimony before the Turkel committee, and there is really a feeling in the army that no matter what we do we somehow fall prey to some investigation."
Mandelblit: "It is the right of the state to probe as deeply as they need to. There was public pressure after the Yom Kippur War, after Sabra and Shatila, and even after the Second Lebanon War. But to establish a committee because of outside pressure?"
Benayahu: "Looking back on all of these investigations we can see that the army always played rather a small part in decision-making but a large part in taking responsibility, though I don't feel this emasculates commanders, in the meantime.
"On the matter of the flotilla you have to understand that once it had left the port, it won. Conflict with the IDF at sea was its goal, and all the rest is just damage control. We never thought for a moment to charter planes with 'Free Gilad Shalit' written on them, or put stickers on our ships and send them out with girls from the Navy dressed in white and carrying flowers. This is not what we do.
"Our goal was to stop this thing. By the way, even where the media was concerned, we succeeded within hours to turn the 'peace activists' into terrorists. The footage on Al-Jazeera, which showed our soldiers being beaten, are our legitimacy for the casualties on deck. If not for this footage, live, in color, I would have had a hard time achieving legitimacy for the necessary actions of our soldiers."
The feeling was that Israeli PR was doing too little too late.
"Because we wait with our announcements until the families who have serious casualties are notified, and they also have to pass through intelligence in order to keep from revealing methods. I don't like to say that I am satisfied, and there are a few lessons, but I think we have achieved these goals. The problem and this is my claim for the Israeli media is that it's always extreme. Either there's a scandal, and the entire military brass has to resign, or the people of Israel all stand up and give the IDF a round of applause."
http://bit.ly/a1Dmlo
8 sept 2010
IDF expects flood of civil suits over Cast Lead
Civil suits against the Israel Defense Forces must be filed within two years of the operation that caused damage, which means the deadline is in four months.
The defense establishment is bracing itself for a flood of lawsuits from Palestinian civilians seeking financial compensation over Operation Cast Lead.
Civil suits against the Israel Defense Forces must be filed within two years of the operation that caused damage, which means the deadline is in four months.
Human rights organizations say about 40,000 Palestinian homes in Gaza were destroyed during the fighting in late 2008 and early 2009. Factories, public buildings and farms also sustained extensive damage.
In its response to the Goldstone report on the war, the IDF said civilian homes were destroyed when the army believed Palestinian militants were operating out of the buildings, using them to store weapons or had booby-trapped them.
While the IDF decided in the wake of its investigations not to prosecute soldiers or officers who took part in destructive operations, Palestinian civilians may still file civil damage claims.
A few dozen such suits have been submitted to the courts, but hundreds and perhaps thousands more are expected over the next few months. Palestinians may file for compensation for damage from IDF operations up to two years after the event, as long as they submit notice of intent to sue within 60 days.
Defense and justice ministry officials believe the attorneys handling these claims intentionally delayed filing suits for more than a year and a half and intend to submit them en masse shortly before the two-year deadline expires.
One legal official in the defense establishment said the assumption is that these lawyers are working with European human rights group to "flood" the system with hundreds of claims. The aim, the source said, is to exhaust the State Prosecutor's Office in the hope of obtaining more generous settlements for their clients.
In preparation for submitting claims, Palestinian attorneys and humanitarian organizations in Gaza deposed witnesses and gathered material evidence immediately after the end of Operation Cast Lead.
Officials in the judicial system said they are prepared for a large number of lawsuits from Gazan civilians.
They do not intend to hire additional attorneys to handle the claims, and the plaintiffs will simply have to wait because claims are still being processed from Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, they said.
http://fwd4.me/0vxU
IDF expects flood of civil suits over Cast Lead
Civil suits against the Israel Defense Forces must be filed within two years of the operation that caused damage, which means the deadline is in four months.
The defense establishment is bracing itself for a flood of lawsuits from Palestinian civilians seeking financial compensation over Operation Cast Lead.
Civil suits against the Israel Defense Forces must be filed within two years of the operation that caused damage, which means the deadline is in four months.
Human rights organizations say about 40,000 Palestinian homes in Gaza were destroyed during the fighting in late 2008 and early 2009. Factories, public buildings and farms also sustained extensive damage.
In its response to the Goldstone report on the war, the IDF said civilian homes were destroyed when the army believed Palestinian militants were operating out of the buildings, using them to store weapons or had booby-trapped them.
While the IDF decided in the wake of its investigations not to prosecute soldiers or officers who took part in destructive operations, Palestinian civilians may still file civil damage claims.
A few dozen such suits have been submitted to the courts, but hundreds and perhaps thousands more are expected over the next few months. Palestinians may file for compensation for damage from IDF operations up to two years after the event, as long as they submit notice of intent to sue within 60 days.
Defense and justice ministry officials believe the attorneys handling these claims intentionally delayed filing suits for more than a year and a half and intend to submit them en masse shortly before the two-year deadline expires.
One legal official in the defense establishment said the assumption is that these lawyers are working with European human rights group to "flood" the system with hundreds of claims. The aim, the source said, is to exhaust the State Prosecutor's Office in the hope of obtaining more generous settlements for their clients.
In preparation for submitting claims, Palestinian attorneys and humanitarian organizations in Gaza deposed witnesses and gathered material evidence immediately after the end of Operation Cast Lead.
Officials in the judicial system said they are prepared for a large number of lawsuits from Gazan civilians.
They do not intend to hire additional attorneys to handle the claims, and the plaintiffs will simply have to wait because claims are still being processed from Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, they said.
http://fwd4.me/0vxU
2 sept 2010
How the 600 pound gorilla in the room Richard Goldstone is making peace more difficult
When President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas try to make peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the 600 pound gorilla in the room will be Richard Goldstone. Although he was not invited to the meetings, his presence will be felt. It will send the following message to the Israeli government: If you end your military occupation of the West Bank, and the Palestinians use their new territory to launch rockets and other attacks against Israel, you will not be able to defend yourself, without Goldstone and the colleagues condemning you for taking actions in self defense.
This is a realistic threat, as evidenced by what happened after Israel ended its military occupation of the Gaza Strip. Hamas took over by military force and used the newly liberated lands not to build a civil society but to attack Israel. They fired nearly 1,000 rockets at Israeli civilians and made life impossible for nearly a million Israelis living in the south of Israel. After enduring these rockets for years, and futily seeking help from the international community, the Israelis did what any democracy would do: they defended their civilians against the war crimes being perpetrated by Hamas. But Hamas poses a difficult military target since it deliberately hides its fighters among civilians and fires its rockets from schoolyards, hospitals and mosques. Considering these difficulties, Israel did a commendable job at stopping most of the rockets while minimizing civilian casualties. As Former British Army Colonel Richard Kemp said:
I don't think there has ever been a time in the history of warfare when an army has made more efforts to reduce civilian casualties and deaths of innocent people than the IDF is doing today in Gaza."
Nonetheless, Richard Goldstone issued a blood libel against Israel, accusing its leaders of deliberately setting out to maximize civilian deaths. It also exculpated Hamas from the war crime of using civilians as human shields. The Palestinian Authority - yes the Palestinian Authority, not Hamas - filed formal charges against Israel in the International Criminal Court. This, despite the fact that President Abbas and his subordinates urged Israel to be even more aggressive against Hamas in Gaza so that the Palestinian Authority could regain its lawful power. Enemies of Israel throughout the world have used the notorious Goldstone report in an effort to delegitimize the Jewish state.
When I was recently in Israel for a month, I spoke to all of its political and military leaders. The Goldstone report was very much on their minds as they contemplated the possibility of withdrawal from the West Bank. I also discussed the Goldstone report with the Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who acknowledged to me that by demanding that criminal charges be brought against Israel in the International Criminal Court he was simply, "playing a card." Well, if there is to be an end of Israel's occupation of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority will have to stop playing the delegetimation card. It will have to work together with Israel to prevent a repeat in the West Bank of what happened in Gaza. The recent claim of responsibility by Hamas for the murder of four Israelis in the West Bank does not bode well for the peace process. It demonstrates that the Palestinian Authority has only limited control over Hamas, and that Hamas can play its "violence card" any time it chooses.
For the peace process to have any chance of success, the international community must categorically reject the Goldstone report and what it represents. It must reaffirm Israel's right to defend itself against attacks from territory it cedes to the Palestinians. To its credit, the Obama Administration has rejected the Goldstone report, but it must go even further. It must assure Israel - publically and unequivocally - that it will vigorously defend Israel's right to protect its civilians from rocket attacks, suicide bombings and roadside shootings. Barak Obama put it very well when, as a candidate, he visited the shelled Israeli city of Sderot and made the following statement:
The first job of any nation state is to protect its citizens... If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I'm going to do everything in my power to stop that. And I would expect Israel to do the same."
That statement must become a firm basis of American policy, if and when Israel leaves the West Bank.
So "thank you" Richard Goldstone for making peace more difficult. There are some who are proposing Goldstone for a Nobel Peace Prize. Were he to win it, he would be in the company of Yassir Arafat, who also won the prize, before he rejected the Clinton/Barak offer which would have created a Palestinian state, with its capital in Jerusalem and with a $35 billion reparation package for the so-called refugees. Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia was more prescient than the Nobel committee when he accused Arafat of committing a crime against peace and warning him that he was rejecting the best offer the Palestinians would ever get. Both Goldstone and Arafat deserve a prize, but it should be awarded by Hamas and Ahmadinejad rather than by the Nobel committee.
Let us hope that the barriers to peace erected by Richard Goldstone and Yassir Arafat can be overcome at the ongoing meetings convened by the Obama Administration. It won't be easy.
http://cgis.jpost.com/Blogs/dershowitz/entry/how_goldstone_is_making_peace
How the 600 pound gorilla in the room Richard Goldstone is making peace more difficult
When President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas try to make peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the 600 pound gorilla in the room will be Richard Goldstone. Although he was not invited to the meetings, his presence will be felt. It will send the following message to the Israeli government: If you end your military occupation of the West Bank, and the Palestinians use their new territory to launch rockets and other attacks against Israel, you will not be able to defend yourself, without Goldstone and the colleagues condemning you for taking actions in self defense.
This is a realistic threat, as evidenced by what happened after Israel ended its military occupation of the Gaza Strip. Hamas took over by military force and used the newly liberated lands not to build a civil society but to attack Israel. They fired nearly 1,000 rockets at Israeli civilians and made life impossible for nearly a million Israelis living in the south of Israel. After enduring these rockets for years, and futily seeking help from the international community, the Israelis did what any democracy would do: they defended their civilians against the war crimes being perpetrated by Hamas. But Hamas poses a difficult military target since it deliberately hides its fighters among civilians and fires its rockets from schoolyards, hospitals and mosques. Considering these difficulties, Israel did a commendable job at stopping most of the rockets while minimizing civilian casualties. As Former British Army Colonel Richard Kemp said:
I don't think there has ever been a time in the history of warfare when an army has made more efforts to reduce civilian casualties and deaths of innocent people than the IDF is doing today in Gaza."
Nonetheless, Richard Goldstone issued a blood libel against Israel, accusing its leaders of deliberately setting out to maximize civilian deaths. It also exculpated Hamas from the war crime of using civilians as human shields. The Palestinian Authority - yes the Palestinian Authority, not Hamas - filed formal charges against Israel in the International Criminal Court. This, despite the fact that President Abbas and his subordinates urged Israel to be even more aggressive against Hamas in Gaza so that the Palestinian Authority could regain its lawful power. Enemies of Israel throughout the world have used the notorious Goldstone report in an effort to delegitimize the Jewish state.
When I was recently in Israel for a month, I spoke to all of its political and military leaders. The Goldstone report was very much on their minds as they contemplated the possibility of withdrawal from the West Bank. I also discussed the Goldstone report with the Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who acknowledged to me that by demanding that criminal charges be brought against Israel in the International Criminal Court he was simply, "playing a card." Well, if there is to be an end of Israel's occupation of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority will have to stop playing the delegetimation card. It will have to work together with Israel to prevent a repeat in the West Bank of what happened in Gaza. The recent claim of responsibility by Hamas for the murder of four Israelis in the West Bank does not bode well for the peace process. It demonstrates that the Palestinian Authority has only limited control over Hamas, and that Hamas can play its "violence card" any time it chooses.
For the peace process to have any chance of success, the international community must categorically reject the Goldstone report and what it represents. It must reaffirm Israel's right to defend itself against attacks from territory it cedes to the Palestinians. To its credit, the Obama Administration has rejected the Goldstone report, but it must go even further. It must assure Israel - publically and unequivocally - that it will vigorously defend Israel's right to protect its civilians from rocket attacks, suicide bombings and roadside shootings. Barak Obama put it very well when, as a candidate, he visited the shelled Israeli city of Sderot and made the following statement:
The first job of any nation state is to protect its citizens... If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I'm going to do everything in my power to stop that. And I would expect Israel to do the same."
That statement must become a firm basis of American policy, if and when Israel leaves the West Bank.
So "thank you" Richard Goldstone for making peace more difficult. There are some who are proposing Goldstone for a Nobel Peace Prize. Were he to win it, he would be in the company of Yassir Arafat, who also won the prize, before he rejected the Clinton/Barak offer which would have created a Palestinian state, with its capital in Jerusalem and with a $35 billion reparation package for the so-called refugees. Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia was more prescient than the Nobel committee when he accused Arafat of committing a crime against peace and warning him that he was rejecting the best offer the Palestinians would ever get. Both Goldstone and Arafat deserve a prize, but it should be awarded by Hamas and Ahmadinejad rather than by the Nobel committee.
Let us hope that the barriers to peace erected by Richard Goldstone and Yassir Arafat can be overcome at the ongoing meetings convened by the Obama Administration. It won't be easy.
http://cgis.jpost.com/Blogs/dershowitz/entry/how_goldstone_is_making_peace