18 jan 2010
Palestinian rights orgs demand gov't investigate Goldstone claims
Thirteen Palestinian human rights organizations and legal advocacy groups appealed to President Mahmoud Abbas and de facto Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in open letters, calling for the immediate commencement of internal investigations of the Goldstone report.
The groups, listed below, demanded the investigations be carried out in compliance with the UN General Assembly resolution.
The letter explained that on 5 February 2010 the UN Secretary-General is due to submit his report on the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution relating to investigations into allegations made in the Goldstone report. "As Palestinian and international non-governmental organisations, we urge both the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Gaza to immediately commence credible internal investigations in compliance with international standards and in accordance with the Report by the Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict."
Members of the Palestinian NGOs and human rights groups noted that the deadline to submit internal and credible investigations into allegations made in the report looms, and that all Palestinian authorities concerned must abide by the international community's call for such investigations. "We urge you [Abbas] to immediately take clear and public steps toward holding all those who prove to be responsible for the violations detailed in the Report to account."
The signatories noted that "we we wish to assert that we are concerned only with the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict ... "
"Israel has continued to reject the rule of law and their international humanitarian and human rights obligations by continuing its illegal practices, including the blockade of the Gaza Strip, and by condemning the Report of the Fact Finding Mission and rejecting its well-based findings on Israel's violations. For the Palestinians to continue to effectively struggle for their legitimate rights as a people, it is crucial that their leaders and representatives adopt an approach, centered on the rule of law and respect for human rights."
"We look forward to learning of your positive steps to take the necessary domestic measures to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and, where appropriate, to hold accountable those who prove to have committed these violations and to prosecute and punish them as recommended by the UN Fact Finding Mission."
The letter we recognized the efforts already made by the Palestinian side in seeking to achieve justice for the Palestinian people. "In order to ensure that the work of the PLO on guaranteeing endorsement of the Report at the UN level, is of lasting value further steps must now be taken to implement its recommendations and the above mentioned GA Resolution."
The signatories include:
Hassan Jabareen General Director of Adalah
Sahar Francis General Director of Addameer
Khalil Abu Shammala General Director of Al Dameer Association for Human Rights
Shawan Jabarin General Director of Al-Haq
Issam Younis General Director of Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights
Ingrid Jaradat Gassner General Director of Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights
Rifat Kassis General Director of Defence for Children International - Palestine Section
Mohammad Zeidan General Director of Arab Association for Human Rights
Shawqi Issa General Director of Ensan Center for Human Rights and Democracy
Issam Arouri General Director of Jerusalem Legal Aid Center
Maha Abu Dayieh General Director of Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling.
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=254254
Palestinian rights orgs demand gov't investigate Goldstone claims
Thirteen Palestinian human rights organizations and legal advocacy groups appealed to President Mahmoud Abbas and de facto Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in open letters, calling for the immediate commencement of internal investigations of the Goldstone report.
The groups, listed below, demanded the investigations be carried out in compliance with the UN General Assembly resolution.
The letter explained that on 5 February 2010 the UN Secretary-General is due to submit his report on the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution relating to investigations into allegations made in the Goldstone report. "As Palestinian and international non-governmental organisations, we urge both the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Gaza to immediately commence credible internal investigations in compliance with international standards and in accordance with the Report by the Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict."
Members of the Palestinian NGOs and human rights groups noted that the deadline to submit internal and credible investigations into allegations made in the report looms, and that all Palestinian authorities concerned must abide by the international community's call for such investigations. "We urge you [Abbas] to immediately take clear and public steps toward holding all those who prove to be responsible for the violations detailed in the Report to account."
The signatories noted that "we we wish to assert that we are concerned only with the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict ... "
"Israel has continued to reject the rule of law and their international humanitarian and human rights obligations by continuing its illegal practices, including the blockade of the Gaza Strip, and by condemning the Report of the Fact Finding Mission and rejecting its well-based findings on Israel's violations. For the Palestinians to continue to effectively struggle for their legitimate rights as a people, it is crucial that their leaders and representatives adopt an approach, centered on the rule of law and respect for human rights."
"We look forward to learning of your positive steps to take the necessary domestic measures to investigate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and, where appropriate, to hold accountable those who prove to have committed these violations and to prosecute and punish them as recommended by the UN Fact Finding Mission."
The letter we recognized the efforts already made by the Palestinian side in seeking to achieve justice for the Palestinian people. "In order to ensure that the work of the PLO on guaranteeing endorsement of the Report at the UN level, is of lasting value further steps must now be taken to implement its recommendations and the above mentioned GA Resolution."
The signatories include:
Hassan Jabareen General Director of Adalah
Sahar Francis General Director of Addameer
Khalil Abu Shammala General Director of Al Dameer Association for Human Rights
Shawan Jabarin General Director of Al-Haq
Issam Younis General Director of Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights
Ingrid Jaradat Gassner General Director of Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights
Rifat Kassis General Director of Defence for Children International - Palestine Section
Mohammad Zeidan General Director of Arab Association for Human Rights
Shawqi Issa General Director of Ensan Center for Human Rights and Democracy
Issam Arouri General Director of Jerusalem Legal Aid Center
Maha Abu Dayieh General Director of Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling.
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=254254
17 jan 2010
Report: Shin Bet told Abbas to defer Goldstone vote
President Mahmoud Abbas postponed the the vote on the Goldstone report after a meeting with head of the Shin Bet security services, Yuval Diskin, according to Israeli media reports on Sunday.
Diskin had reportedly told Abbas to defer the vote on the findings of last year's devastating war on Gaza or "Israel would turn the West Bank into a 'second Gaza'," the Israeli daily Haaretz said.
Among the threats included rescinding freedom of movement in the West Bank and the withdrawal of permission to operate the Wataniya mobile company by the Palestinian Authority, the daily said.
According to a PA official, Diskin, with a foreign diplomatic delegation, visited the presidential compound in Ramallah in October to make similar threats, the daily reported.
A Palestinian commission broadcast on Al-Watan TV revealed a convoluted timeline in the order of events leading up to the PA's deferral, after which Abbas claimed full responsibility for the decision, denying outside interference.
Suspicion was cast over Abbas' decision, given the emergence of the Wataniya mobile company coinciding with the deferral of the Goldstone report.
The PA delegation announced that it had agreed to defer the vote on the report until March 2010, which was originally backed by 33 of the UN council's 47 members. Tipped to be transferred from the UN General Assembly to the Security Council, the PA's decision to stay its vote came as a shock to the international community and Palestinians.
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=254620
Report: Shin Bet told Abbas to defer Goldstone vote
President Mahmoud Abbas postponed the the vote on the Goldstone report after a meeting with head of the Shin Bet security services, Yuval Diskin, according to Israeli media reports on Sunday.
Diskin had reportedly told Abbas to defer the vote on the findings of last year's devastating war on Gaza or "Israel would turn the West Bank into a 'second Gaza'," the Israeli daily Haaretz said.
Among the threats included rescinding freedom of movement in the West Bank and the withdrawal of permission to operate the Wataniya mobile company by the Palestinian Authority, the daily said.
According to a PA official, Diskin, with a foreign diplomatic delegation, visited the presidential compound in Ramallah in October to make similar threats, the daily reported.
A Palestinian commission broadcast on Al-Watan TV revealed a convoluted timeline in the order of events leading up to the PA's deferral, after which Abbas claimed full responsibility for the decision, denying outside interference.
Suspicion was cast over Abbas' decision, given the emergence of the Wataniya mobile company coinciding with the deferral of the Goldstone report.
The PA delegation announced that it had agreed to defer the vote on the report until March 2010, which was originally backed by 33 of the UN council's 47 members. Tipped to be transferred from the UN General Assembly to the Security Council, the PA's decision to stay its vote came as a shock to the international community and Palestinians.
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=254620
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On the morning of 15 January 2009, the field office compound of UNRWA, situated in the southern Rimal area of Gaza City, came under sustained shelling from the Israeli armed forces.
At least three high explosive shells and seven white phosphorous container shells struck the workshop and warehouse area of the compound causing massive damage as a result of ensuing fires. Five of the shells exploded in the compound including all three high explosive shells. Two complete container shells of white phosphorous were retrieved. Five additional white phosphorous shells were retrieved but not in their complete form. These five shells deposited large amounts of the phosphorus wedges contained in the shells into the compound, if not in fact all of the wedges. |
At least three shells hit the Gaza Training Centre and caused light injuries to one staff member. At the time of the attack there were between 600 and 700 civilians sheltering in the compound. The remaining shells hit the area in and around the fuel depot and workshop.
Richard Goldstone's UN mission inspected the site and interviewed several of the people who were present at the time. It has also had access to detailed written materials produced by the UNRWA office in relation to its inquiries into the incident. It has furthermore addressed questions to the Government of Israel regarding the use of white phosphorous munitions to strike within the UNRWA compound and the direct military advantage pursued by their use under the circumstances, but has received no reply.
The mission joined with others in noting the bravery of two staff members in particular in dealing with the white phosphorous in close proximity to thousands of litres of fuel stored in tankers. Had the fuel depot exploded, it would have caused untold deaths and damage. "The swift and courageous actions of these two people at huge personal risk may have prevented a disaster of gigantic proportions and their efforts should be so recognized," Goldstone's final report stated.
While examining the disaster zone, his team said its interest lay in what was known by the Israeli armed forces at the time, what steps were feasible to reduce the massive risk to civilian life and why were these steps not taken.
Shelling had been ongoing since the night of 14 January. The areas of Tal el-Hawa and southern Rimal had come under attack. There had been shelling close to the UNRWA compound at various points during the night. In the morning of 15 January staff in the UNRWA compound were instructed to remain inside as much as possible.
The UNRWA compound contained, among other things, a substantial fuel depot, which has an underground storage facility; it had about 120,000 litres of fuel. Fuel tankers parked above ground had around 49,000 litres of fuel in them. In addition to the obvious and immediate risk of fire in these circumstances, it also stored large quantities of medical supplies, food, clothing and blankets in the warehouses.
Conservative estimates suggest that between 600 and 700 civilians were taking shelter in the compound at that time.
The principal and immediate risk was, therefore, of what might have been a catastrophic fire caused by the ignition of the fuel in the direct vicinity of the site where hundreds of civilians had sought shelter directly in response to the Israeli warnings of 3 January 2009.
Factual finding
Richard Goldstone's UN mission inspected the site and interviewed several of the people who were present at the time. It has also had access to detailed written materials produced by the UNRWA office in relation to its inquiries into the incident. It has furthermore addressed questions to the Government of Israel regarding the use of white phosphorous munitions to strike within the UNRWA compound and the direct military advantage pursued by their use under the circumstances, but has received no reply.
The mission joined with others in noting the bravery of two staff members in particular in dealing with the white phosphorous in close proximity to thousands of litres of fuel stored in tankers. Had the fuel depot exploded, it would have caused untold deaths and damage. "The swift and courageous actions of these two people at huge personal risk may have prevented a disaster of gigantic proportions and their efforts should be so recognized," Goldstone's final report stated.
While examining the disaster zone, his team said its interest lay in what was known by the Israeli armed forces at the time, what steps were feasible to reduce the massive risk to civilian life and why were these steps not taken.
Shelling had been ongoing since the night of 14 January. The areas of Tal el-Hawa and southern Rimal had come under attack. There had been shelling close to the UNRWA compound at various points during the night. In the morning of 15 January staff in the UNRWA compound were instructed to remain inside as much as possible.
The UNRWA compound contained, among other things, a substantial fuel depot, which has an underground storage facility; it had about 120,000 litres of fuel. Fuel tankers parked above ground had around 49,000 litres of fuel in them. In addition to the obvious and immediate risk of fire in these circumstances, it also stored large quantities of medical supplies, food, clothing and blankets in the warehouses.
Conservative estimates suggest that between 600 and 700 civilians were taking shelter in the compound at that time.
The principal and immediate risk was, therefore, of what might have been a catastrophic fire caused by the ignition of the fuel in the direct vicinity of the site where hundreds of civilians had sought shelter directly in response to the Israeli warnings of 3 January 2009.
Factual finding
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Three high explosive shells hit the compound. Two landed on the Gaza Training Centre and one landed in the car park. Complete or substantial parts of seven white phosphorous container shells landed in the compound. The wedges in these container shells were either discharged totally or very substantially in the compound. One shell, which was seen directly by a senior international staff member with many years’ of active military service, detonated on impact or only a very short distance from the ground.
One high explosive shell struck the Gaza Training Centre’s yard and was witnessed by at least two guards and left a crater. Two high explosive shells landed on the roof of the education building. There are two large holes in the roof and shrapnel all around. A white phosphorous container shell struck the Project and Logistics Division Building. |
One white phosphorous container shell hit the back of a vehicle in the spare parts store, coming through a wall on the south side at a high point. This is believed to have caused the fire to start in the workshop area.
One white phosphorous container shell or a substantial part thereof came through a wire fence at the top of the southern boundary of the compound near the spare parts and workshop area, causing damage to a vehicle there.
One white phosphorous container shell landed in the workshop embedding itself in the concrete.
One white phosphorous container shell or a substantial part thereof came through the roof of the painting bay.
One white phosphorous container shell or a substantial part thereof struck a manhole cover near small warehouses storing food.
One white phosphorous container shell struck near a generator on concrete ground.
Seven of the ten strikes occurred in an area smaller than a standard football pitch. The whole area, including the three other strikes on or near the Gaza Training Centre, would be no more than two football pitches.
The precise moment when each of the strikes occurred cannot be stated with certainty but all occurred between 8 a.m. and 12 noon.
Communications and responses
For the purposes of liaison with the Israeli authorities, the counterpart of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS) is the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). This is a unit within the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
In Gaza the day-to-day liaison and coordination activity with COGAT is carried out by the Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA), located on the Israeli side of the Erez crossing. CLA is the military unit responsible for the coordination of access to and from Gaza in connection with the facilitation of civilian and humanitarian needs. DSS at the time routinely liaised with COGAT through CLA.
From 27 December until 2 January DSS communicated with COGAT/CLA by telephone and by e-mail. Goldstone's mission was in possession of the names of the Israeli officers with whom such contact was established and maintained. In the second phase of the conflict, COGAT intervention increased and new personnel added to their capacity. Two new contacts were added to those already established.
The most comprehensive list of relevant data was forwarded to COGAT/CLA on 3 April 2008, including all United Nations installations. As of 29 December 2008 COGAT/CLA had been provided with an updated list of the coordinates of all United Nations offices, international residences and pre-identified possible emergency shelters.
Throughout the military operations DSS was in almost daily communication, providing detailed information on coordinates of relevant emergency shelters and distributions centres. Goldstone was shown the relevant log of all such communications.
On the day in question DSS made at least seven phone calls to COGAT/CLA counterparts between 8.14 a.m. and 1.45 p.m. These conversations addressed, for instance, the proximity of Israeli fire, the damage done to UNRWA installations, requests that fire be redirected or withdrawn, and coordination for the removal of fuel tankers.
Despite calls beginning at 8.14 a.m., it does not appear that COGAT/CLA was able to confirm that contact had been established with the relevant brigade until 11.06 a.m.
Other information available to the Mission shows that the Deputy Director of Operations of UNRWA, who was in Jerusalem at the time was engaged in frequent calls to senior Israeli officials. He had received a call at 9 a.m. from John Ging, the Director of Operations at UNRWA, advising him of the shelling near the compound and had been asked to demand that the shelling be stopped by calling the Israeli armed forces’ Humanitarian Coordination Centre (HCC) in Tel Aviv.
He made a total of 26 calls to the head of HCC or to his assistant as well as to members of COGAT/CLA. He was assured on a number of occasions by the head of HCC that shelling had stopped, but it was clear when he relayed this message back to Gaza that shelling was continuing. The Deputy Director had warned of the immediate risk to the fuel depot and those seeking shelter.
Weapons used
Analysis of the shells used in the strikes that hit the UNRWA compound indicates clearly that at least seven shells were white phosphorous shells, three of which were complete and four of which were very substantial components of the shells. Military experts indicate that in all probability these shells were fired from a 155 mm Howitzer.
Three other missiles were determined clearly by UNRWA military experts to have been high explosive missiles.
The Israeli response
On 15 January the Israeli Defence Minister, Ehud Barak, said the attack had been a “grave error” and apologized, according to the United Nations Secretary–General, who had spoken with him earlier in a meeting in Tel Aviv. The same day the Israeli Prime Minister said that it was “absolutely true that we were attacked from that place, but the consequences are very sad and we apologize for it”. The Israeli Welfare and Social Services Minister made subsequent statements suggesting there had been gunfire directed at Israeli troops from adjacent premises. He said it was shrapnel from the return fire that entered the UNRWA compound causing the blaze.
On 22 April the summary of the conclusions of the Israeli armed forces’ investigations reported as follows:
… the IDF deployed a smoke screen in order to protect a tank force operating in the neighbourhood from Hamas anti-tank crews who had positioned themselves adjacent to the UNRWA headquarters. The smoke screen was intended to block the terrorists' field of view. Information received by the IDF shows that the smoke screen did assist in protecting the force and prevented precise anti-tank fire against IDF forces. The smoke projectiles were fired at an area a considerable distance from the UNRWA headquarters, and were not intended to cause damage to either person or property.
However, it appears that fragments of the smoke projectiles did hit a warehouse located in the headquarters, causing it to catch fire. During the incident, claims were also made that an explosive shell or shrapnel hit the UNRWA headquarters. The investigation showed that these were shells, or shell fragments that were fired at military targets within the battle zone.
The damage caused to the UNRWA headquarters during the fighting in the Tel El-Hawwa neighbourhood is the unfortunate result of the type of warfare that Hamas forced upon the IDF, involving combat in the Gaza Strip's urban spaces and adjacent to facilities associated with international organizations. These results could not be predicted.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the forces did not intend, at any stage, to hit a UN facility. Following UN complaints that an explosive shell had hit the headquarters, the forces were ordered to cease firing explosive shells in the region in question. Following the receipt of reports about the fire in the warehouse, all firing in the area was stopped. The entry of fire-fighting trucks to the area was coordinated with the IDF in order to assist in extinguishing the fire.
In its report of July 2009 on the military operations, the Israeli Government explains that the “primary rationale” for firing white phosphorous was to “produce a smokescreen to protect Israeli forces from the Hamas anti-tank crews operating adjacent to the UNRWA headquarters”.
The report goes on to assert:
The IDF sought to maintain a safety distance of several hundred metres from sensitive sites, including the UNRWA compound. Despite the maintenance of a safety distance, some felt wedges and other components of the projectiles apparently landed in the compound after the release of felt wedges in the air. The IDF neither anticipated not intended this outcome.
Goldstone's mission has a number of observations about the conclusions of the Israeli Government:
First, it does not share the circumspect or indeed understated representation of the nature and extent of the strikes in the compound. There were ten strikes: three high explosive shells landed and exploded in the compound; seven white phosphorous container shells discharged completely or very substantially in the confines of a very limited space around particularly vulnerable areas of the UNRWA compound.
"This is not a matter of a limited number of wedges falling inside the compound or shrapnel or parts of shells landing in the compound as the shells exploded elsewhere. It is important to emphasize that we are dealing with shells exploding or discharging inside the compound in areas where hazardous material was stored," the mission's final report states.
Secondly, the claim that this result was neither intended nor anticipated has to be reviewed carefully, it says. In the first place the mission affirms the result to be reviewed is not fragments and wedges landing in the compound but ten shells landing and exploding inside the compound. "It is difficult to accept that the consequences were not appreciated and foreseen by the Israeli armed forces."
"Those in the Israeli army who deploy white phosphorous, or indeed any artillery shells, are expertly trained to factor in the relevant complexities of targeting, including wind force and the earth’s curvature," according to the report. "They have to know the area they are firing at, possible obstacles in hitting the target and the other environmental factors necessary to ensure an effective strike.
"It is also clear that, having determined that it was necessary to establish a safety distance, the presence of the UNWRA installations was a factor present in the minds of those carrying out the shelling."
The question then becomes how specialists expertly trained in the complex issue of artillery deployment and aware of the presence of an extremely sensitive site can strike that site ten times while apparently trying to avoid it.
The mission's scepticism that the result was not anticipated is confirmed by the fact that from around 8 a.m. on 15 January UNRWA officials began a series of calls to a number of officials explaining precisely what was going on. These calls were made to the appropriate people at COGAT/CLA as a result of prearranged coordination and further reinforced by the numerous calls by the Deputy Director of UNRWA to senior Israeli military officials in Tel Aviv.
In particular, the Israeli military officials were informed that shells had indeed struck inside the compound by the series of phone calls made by UNRWA officials.
Goldstone's mission is in possession of information that indicates a senior UNRWA official called the head of HCC in Tel Aviv and a number of his immediate subordinates several times. In particular a call was made at 10.31 a.m. by the official to the Israeli armed forces to explain that white phosphorous had landed in the compound and had set fire to the warehouse.
He was told “by Tel Aviv” that the firing had stopped. To be clear, this means that by 10.30 a.m. at the latest channels of communication had been opened between Tel Aviv and those on the ground in Gaza City responsible for the firing of the shells, albeit not necessarily directly, but sufficient to be receiving reports of what was going on from Israeli troops on the ground.
At 10.30 a.m. staff at the UNRWA compound noted five white phosphorous container shells had discharged in the confines of the compound. At 10.40 a.m. the UNRWA official was again in direct communication with Tel Aviv explaining specifically that “the targeting is taking place in the vicinity of the workshop” and requiring that the Israeli armed forces desist immediately. In particular, he pointed out that what was required was a cessation of the firing for a sustained period of time to allow staff to bring the fire under control.
At 11.17 a.m. the same senior UNRWA official was informed in a phone call from UNRWA staff in the compound that a further two rounds had impacted “within the last ten minutes”.
At 11.53 a.m., in a further telephone call, the senior UNRWA official indicated to the COGAT/CLA contact person that the firing had been unforgivable and unacceptable. He noted that efforts had been made since 09.30 a.m. to get the firing to stop and that UNRWA had been told in several calls that the firing had been ordered to be stopped at higher levels, yet it continued. The UNRWA official noted that it was incomprehensible that, with the amount of surveillance and geographic positioning system (GPS) information, the most vulnerable part of the compound had been repeatedly struck.
"In all the circumstances the Mission rejects the Israeli armed forces’ assertion to the effect that it was not anticipated that the shells would land in the compound," Goldsone's report states. "The Israeli armed forces were told what was happening. It no longer had to anticipate it. The Israeli armed forces’ responses in Tel Aviv and in COGAT/CLA indicate quite clearly that they understood the nature and scale of what was happening. Their responses in particular indicate that orders had been given to stop the firing."
Factual and legal findings
Goldstone's mission considers that Israeli armed forces had all of the information necessary to appreciate the danger they were creating as a result of their firing at the UNRWA installations, in particular the fuel depot, and to the civilians gathered there. Orders were said to have been issued to cease firing in the vicinity of the UNWRA premises.
The Israeli Government’s report cites with approval a passage from the report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in relation to the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1998. The Mission has also considered that report. On the issue of intent it states:
Attacks which are not directed against military objectives (particularly attacks directed against the civilian population) and attacks which cause disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence of unlawful attack under article 3 of the ICTY Statute. The mens rea for the offence is intention or recklessness, not simple negligence. In determining whether or not the mens rea requirement has been met, it should be borne in mind that commanders deciding on an attack have duties:
To do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military objectives;
(b) To take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means of warfare with a view to avoiding or in any event to minimizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage; and
(c) To refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
"The Mission agrees that this passage correctly reflects both the nature of the intent required and the relevant duties of a commander," the mission states. Thus, even if the Israeli armed forces were under fire from anti-tank missiles from Palestinian armed groups at the time, all of the information referred to above indicates that the commanders in question did not take all feasible precautions in the choice of methods and means of warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event, to minimizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
"The Mission is not attempting to second-guess with hindsight the decisions of commanders. The fact is that the events in question continued over a period of some three hours. In these circumstances the Israeli armed forces were not confronted by surprise fire to which they had to respond with whatever materiel was available to them at the time. If they were faced with anti-tank missiles, that was hardly something of which they had been unaware for an appreciable time.
"Statements made to the Mission by senior UNRWA international staff indicate that they were unaware of any sustained fire at the relevant time from anywhere in the nearby areas. The Mission notes that official statements made on 15 January by Israel’s Prime Minister had indicated with complete certainty that firing by Palestinian armed groups had occurred from within the UNRWA compound. This was later contradicted and corrected to state that the armed groups occupied positions near to but outside the compound. The Mission considers it important to record that the initial allegation was incorrect and this appears now to be accepted as such by the Israeli.
"The Mission concludes that the Israeli commanders knew of the location of the UNRWA premises and indeed of the layout of the compound in terms of the most vulnerable areas and especially the fuel depot before the shelling took place around 8 a.m.
"Even if the Israeli Government’s position regarding the position of Palestinian armed groups is taken at face value, the Mission concludes that, given the evident threat of substantial damage to several hundred civilian lives and to civilian property in using white phosphorous in that particular line of fire, the advantage gained from using white phosphorous to screen Israeli armed forces’ tanks from anti-tank fire from armed opposition groups could not be deemed proportionate.
"Having been fully alerted not to the risks but to the actual consequences of the course of action, Israeli armed forces continued with precisely the same conduct as a result of which further shells hit the compound. Such conduct, in the Mission’s view, reflects a reckless disregard for the consequences of the choice of the means adopted in combating the anti-tank fire the Israeli authorities claim they were facing. The decision to continue using the same means in the face of such knowledge compounds that recklessness. It deprived the UNRWA staff of the ability to contain the fires that had been caused and led to millions of dollars worth of damage that could have been avoided. It also put in danger some 700 lives, including staff and sheltering civilians.
"The Mission, therefore, concludes on the basis of the information it received and in the absence of any credible refuting evidence that Israeli armed forces violated the customary international law requirement to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method of attack with a view to avoiding and in any event minimizing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects as reflected in article 57 (2) (ii) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions."
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=253374
One white phosphorous container shell or a substantial part thereof came through a wire fence at the top of the southern boundary of the compound near the spare parts and workshop area, causing damage to a vehicle there.
One white phosphorous container shell landed in the workshop embedding itself in the concrete.
One white phosphorous container shell or a substantial part thereof came through the roof of the painting bay.
One white phosphorous container shell or a substantial part thereof struck a manhole cover near small warehouses storing food.
One white phosphorous container shell struck near a generator on concrete ground.
Seven of the ten strikes occurred in an area smaller than a standard football pitch. The whole area, including the three other strikes on or near the Gaza Training Centre, would be no more than two football pitches.
The precise moment when each of the strikes occurred cannot be stated with certainty but all occurred between 8 a.m. and 12 noon.
Communications and responses
For the purposes of liaison with the Israeli authorities, the counterpart of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS) is the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). This is a unit within the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
In Gaza the day-to-day liaison and coordination activity with COGAT is carried out by the Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA), located on the Israeli side of the Erez crossing. CLA is the military unit responsible for the coordination of access to and from Gaza in connection with the facilitation of civilian and humanitarian needs. DSS at the time routinely liaised with COGAT through CLA.
From 27 December until 2 January DSS communicated with COGAT/CLA by telephone and by e-mail. Goldstone's mission was in possession of the names of the Israeli officers with whom such contact was established and maintained. In the second phase of the conflict, COGAT intervention increased and new personnel added to their capacity. Two new contacts were added to those already established.
The most comprehensive list of relevant data was forwarded to COGAT/CLA on 3 April 2008, including all United Nations installations. As of 29 December 2008 COGAT/CLA had been provided with an updated list of the coordinates of all United Nations offices, international residences and pre-identified possible emergency shelters.
Throughout the military operations DSS was in almost daily communication, providing detailed information on coordinates of relevant emergency shelters and distributions centres. Goldstone was shown the relevant log of all such communications.
On the day in question DSS made at least seven phone calls to COGAT/CLA counterparts between 8.14 a.m. and 1.45 p.m. These conversations addressed, for instance, the proximity of Israeli fire, the damage done to UNRWA installations, requests that fire be redirected or withdrawn, and coordination for the removal of fuel tankers.
Despite calls beginning at 8.14 a.m., it does not appear that COGAT/CLA was able to confirm that contact had been established with the relevant brigade until 11.06 a.m.
Other information available to the Mission shows that the Deputy Director of Operations of UNRWA, who was in Jerusalem at the time was engaged in frequent calls to senior Israeli officials. He had received a call at 9 a.m. from John Ging, the Director of Operations at UNRWA, advising him of the shelling near the compound and had been asked to demand that the shelling be stopped by calling the Israeli armed forces’ Humanitarian Coordination Centre (HCC) in Tel Aviv.
He made a total of 26 calls to the head of HCC or to his assistant as well as to members of COGAT/CLA. He was assured on a number of occasions by the head of HCC that shelling had stopped, but it was clear when he relayed this message back to Gaza that shelling was continuing. The Deputy Director had warned of the immediate risk to the fuel depot and those seeking shelter.
Weapons used
Analysis of the shells used in the strikes that hit the UNRWA compound indicates clearly that at least seven shells were white phosphorous shells, three of which were complete and four of which were very substantial components of the shells. Military experts indicate that in all probability these shells were fired from a 155 mm Howitzer.
Three other missiles were determined clearly by UNRWA military experts to have been high explosive missiles.
The Israeli response
On 15 January the Israeli Defence Minister, Ehud Barak, said the attack had been a “grave error” and apologized, according to the United Nations Secretary–General, who had spoken with him earlier in a meeting in Tel Aviv. The same day the Israeli Prime Minister said that it was “absolutely true that we were attacked from that place, but the consequences are very sad and we apologize for it”. The Israeli Welfare and Social Services Minister made subsequent statements suggesting there had been gunfire directed at Israeli troops from adjacent premises. He said it was shrapnel from the return fire that entered the UNRWA compound causing the blaze.
On 22 April the summary of the conclusions of the Israeli armed forces’ investigations reported as follows:
… the IDF deployed a smoke screen in order to protect a tank force operating in the neighbourhood from Hamas anti-tank crews who had positioned themselves adjacent to the UNRWA headquarters. The smoke screen was intended to block the terrorists' field of view. Information received by the IDF shows that the smoke screen did assist in protecting the force and prevented precise anti-tank fire against IDF forces. The smoke projectiles were fired at an area a considerable distance from the UNRWA headquarters, and were not intended to cause damage to either person or property.
However, it appears that fragments of the smoke projectiles did hit a warehouse located in the headquarters, causing it to catch fire. During the incident, claims were also made that an explosive shell or shrapnel hit the UNRWA headquarters. The investigation showed that these were shells, or shell fragments that were fired at military targets within the battle zone.
The damage caused to the UNRWA headquarters during the fighting in the Tel El-Hawwa neighbourhood is the unfortunate result of the type of warfare that Hamas forced upon the IDF, involving combat in the Gaza Strip's urban spaces and adjacent to facilities associated with international organizations. These results could not be predicted.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the forces did not intend, at any stage, to hit a UN facility. Following UN complaints that an explosive shell had hit the headquarters, the forces were ordered to cease firing explosive shells in the region in question. Following the receipt of reports about the fire in the warehouse, all firing in the area was stopped. The entry of fire-fighting trucks to the area was coordinated with the IDF in order to assist in extinguishing the fire.
In its report of July 2009 on the military operations, the Israeli Government explains that the “primary rationale” for firing white phosphorous was to “produce a smokescreen to protect Israeli forces from the Hamas anti-tank crews operating adjacent to the UNRWA headquarters”.
The report goes on to assert:
The IDF sought to maintain a safety distance of several hundred metres from sensitive sites, including the UNRWA compound. Despite the maintenance of a safety distance, some felt wedges and other components of the projectiles apparently landed in the compound after the release of felt wedges in the air. The IDF neither anticipated not intended this outcome.
Goldstone's mission has a number of observations about the conclusions of the Israeli Government:
First, it does not share the circumspect or indeed understated representation of the nature and extent of the strikes in the compound. There were ten strikes: three high explosive shells landed and exploded in the compound; seven white phosphorous container shells discharged completely or very substantially in the confines of a very limited space around particularly vulnerable areas of the UNRWA compound.
"This is not a matter of a limited number of wedges falling inside the compound or shrapnel or parts of shells landing in the compound as the shells exploded elsewhere. It is important to emphasize that we are dealing with shells exploding or discharging inside the compound in areas where hazardous material was stored," the mission's final report states.
Secondly, the claim that this result was neither intended nor anticipated has to be reviewed carefully, it says. In the first place the mission affirms the result to be reviewed is not fragments and wedges landing in the compound but ten shells landing and exploding inside the compound. "It is difficult to accept that the consequences were not appreciated and foreseen by the Israeli armed forces."
"Those in the Israeli army who deploy white phosphorous, or indeed any artillery shells, are expertly trained to factor in the relevant complexities of targeting, including wind force and the earth’s curvature," according to the report. "They have to know the area they are firing at, possible obstacles in hitting the target and the other environmental factors necessary to ensure an effective strike.
"It is also clear that, having determined that it was necessary to establish a safety distance, the presence of the UNWRA installations was a factor present in the minds of those carrying out the shelling."
The question then becomes how specialists expertly trained in the complex issue of artillery deployment and aware of the presence of an extremely sensitive site can strike that site ten times while apparently trying to avoid it.
The mission's scepticism that the result was not anticipated is confirmed by the fact that from around 8 a.m. on 15 January UNRWA officials began a series of calls to a number of officials explaining precisely what was going on. These calls were made to the appropriate people at COGAT/CLA as a result of prearranged coordination and further reinforced by the numerous calls by the Deputy Director of UNRWA to senior Israeli military officials in Tel Aviv.
In particular, the Israeli military officials were informed that shells had indeed struck inside the compound by the series of phone calls made by UNRWA officials.
Goldstone's mission is in possession of information that indicates a senior UNRWA official called the head of HCC in Tel Aviv and a number of his immediate subordinates several times. In particular a call was made at 10.31 a.m. by the official to the Israeli armed forces to explain that white phosphorous had landed in the compound and had set fire to the warehouse.
He was told “by Tel Aviv” that the firing had stopped. To be clear, this means that by 10.30 a.m. at the latest channels of communication had been opened between Tel Aviv and those on the ground in Gaza City responsible for the firing of the shells, albeit not necessarily directly, but sufficient to be receiving reports of what was going on from Israeli troops on the ground.
At 10.30 a.m. staff at the UNRWA compound noted five white phosphorous container shells had discharged in the confines of the compound. At 10.40 a.m. the UNRWA official was again in direct communication with Tel Aviv explaining specifically that “the targeting is taking place in the vicinity of the workshop” and requiring that the Israeli armed forces desist immediately. In particular, he pointed out that what was required was a cessation of the firing for a sustained period of time to allow staff to bring the fire under control.
At 11.17 a.m. the same senior UNRWA official was informed in a phone call from UNRWA staff in the compound that a further two rounds had impacted “within the last ten minutes”.
At 11.53 a.m., in a further telephone call, the senior UNRWA official indicated to the COGAT/CLA contact person that the firing had been unforgivable and unacceptable. He noted that efforts had been made since 09.30 a.m. to get the firing to stop and that UNRWA had been told in several calls that the firing had been ordered to be stopped at higher levels, yet it continued. The UNRWA official noted that it was incomprehensible that, with the amount of surveillance and geographic positioning system (GPS) information, the most vulnerable part of the compound had been repeatedly struck.
"In all the circumstances the Mission rejects the Israeli armed forces’ assertion to the effect that it was not anticipated that the shells would land in the compound," Goldsone's report states. "The Israeli armed forces were told what was happening. It no longer had to anticipate it. The Israeli armed forces’ responses in Tel Aviv and in COGAT/CLA indicate quite clearly that they understood the nature and scale of what was happening. Their responses in particular indicate that orders had been given to stop the firing."
Factual and legal findings
Goldstone's mission considers that Israeli armed forces had all of the information necessary to appreciate the danger they were creating as a result of their firing at the UNRWA installations, in particular the fuel depot, and to the civilians gathered there. Orders were said to have been issued to cease firing in the vicinity of the UNWRA premises.
The Israeli Government’s report cites with approval a passage from the report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in relation to the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1998. The Mission has also considered that report. On the issue of intent it states:
Attacks which are not directed against military objectives (particularly attacks directed against the civilian population) and attacks which cause disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence of unlawful attack under article 3 of the ICTY Statute. The mens rea for the offence is intention or recklessness, not simple negligence. In determining whether or not the mens rea requirement has been met, it should be borne in mind that commanders deciding on an attack have duties:
To do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military objectives;
(b) To take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means of warfare with a view to avoiding or in any event to minimizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage; and
(c) To refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
"The Mission agrees that this passage correctly reflects both the nature of the intent required and the relevant duties of a commander," the mission states. Thus, even if the Israeli armed forces were under fire from anti-tank missiles from Palestinian armed groups at the time, all of the information referred to above indicates that the commanders in question did not take all feasible precautions in the choice of methods and means of warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event, to minimizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
"The Mission is not attempting to second-guess with hindsight the decisions of commanders. The fact is that the events in question continued over a period of some three hours. In these circumstances the Israeli armed forces were not confronted by surprise fire to which they had to respond with whatever materiel was available to them at the time. If they were faced with anti-tank missiles, that was hardly something of which they had been unaware for an appreciable time.
"Statements made to the Mission by senior UNRWA international staff indicate that they were unaware of any sustained fire at the relevant time from anywhere in the nearby areas. The Mission notes that official statements made on 15 January by Israel’s Prime Minister had indicated with complete certainty that firing by Palestinian armed groups had occurred from within the UNRWA compound. This was later contradicted and corrected to state that the armed groups occupied positions near to but outside the compound. The Mission considers it important to record that the initial allegation was incorrect and this appears now to be accepted as such by the Israeli.
"The Mission concludes that the Israeli commanders knew of the location of the UNRWA premises and indeed of the layout of the compound in terms of the most vulnerable areas and especially the fuel depot before the shelling took place around 8 a.m.
"Even if the Israeli Government’s position regarding the position of Palestinian armed groups is taken at face value, the Mission concludes that, given the evident threat of substantial damage to several hundred civilian lives and to civilian property in using white phosphorous in that particular line of fire, the advantage gained from using white phosphorous to screen Israeli armed forces’ tanks from anti-tank fire from armed opposition groups could not be deemed proportionate.
"Having been fully alerted not to the risks but to the actual consequences of the course of action, Israeli armed forces continued with precisely the same conduct as a result of which further shells hit the compound. Such conduct, in the Mission’s view, reflects a reckless disregard for the consequences of the choice of the means adopted in combating the anti-tank fire the Israeli authorities claim they were facing. The decision to continue using the same means in the face of such knowledge compounds that recklessness. It deprived the UNRWA staff of the ability to contain the fires that had been caused and led to millions of dollars worth of damage that could have been avoided. It also put in danger some 700 lives, including staff and sheltering civilians.
"The Mission, therefore, concludes on the basis of the information it received and in the absence of any credible refuting evidence that Israeli armed forces violated the customary international law requirement to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and method of attack with a view to avoiding and in any event minimizing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects as reflected in article 57 (2) (ii) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions."
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=253374
Turkish human rights group Mazlumder has demanded that a warrant be issued for the arrest of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Israeli media reported Thursday.
According to a statement issued by Mazlumder on Wednesday night, the request is based on international criminal law that calls for all accused of perpetrating war crimes to be tried in accordance with universal jurisdiction and Turkish law.
The call for his arrest is anchored in accusations put forward in the Goldstone report relating to Barak's involvement in Operation Cast Lead, Israel's assault on Gaza last winter, the statement added, quoted by the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth.
Barak is due to visit Turkey in the coming days, the Hebrew-language daily added.
"Israel perpetrated genocide and crimes against humanity. IDF forces bombed the UN building, hospitals, and schools. As was proven by lab tests performed by Turkish universities, they also used phosphorous bombs, which are forbidden. It is known that Israel used an assortment of ammunitions that caused physiological and psychological diseases among the Gazan population," the statement added.
The request has been made in the past, the newspaper added, noting that Turkish Minister of Justice Mehmet Ali Shahin had previously rejected one such request.
"We know that Barak will arrive in Turkey on the 17th of the month … [we] need to put him trial and prevent every other Israeli who is responsible for war crimes from entering Turkey freely. We remind the Turkish prosecution of its role. We remind them that Britain has already decided to arrest Tzipi Livni when she was slated to arrive in the country."
"We remind them that Shimon Peres and Ehud Olmert must also be arrested according to Article CMK-98 of the Turkish law, which grants us the right to try them."
In December, a similar arrest warrant was issued against Tzipi Livni for her involvement in last winter's war, prompting British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to affect a change in law, granting the general attorney a veto power over the issuance of arrest warrants for internationals accused of war crimes visiting the UK.
In February 2009, a request to issue arrest warrants for then Prime Minister Ehud Barack, Livni and President Shimon Peres was called for in Turkey, which were then rejected by the Ankara general prosecutor.
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=254094
According to a statement issued by Mazlumder on Wednesday night, the request is based on international criminal law that calls for all accused of perpetrating war crimes to be tried in accordance with universal jurisdiction and Turkish law.
The call for his arrest is anchored in accusations put forward in the Goldstone report relating to Barak's involvement in Operation Cast Lead, Israel's assault on Gaza last winter, the statement added, quoted by the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth.
Barak is due to visit Turkey in the coming days, the Hebrew-language daily added.
"Israel perpetrated genocide and crimes against humanity. IDF forces bombed the UN building, hospitals, and schools. As was proven by lab tests performed by Turkish universities, they also used phosphorous bombs, which are forbidden. It is known that Israel used an assortment of ammunitions that caused physiological and psychological diseases among the Gazan population," the statement added.
The request has been made in the past, the newspaper added, noting that Turkish Minister of Justice Mehmet Ali Shahin had previously rejected one such request.
"We know that Barak will arrive in Turkey on the 17th of the month … [we] need to put him trial and prevent every other Israeli who is responsible for war crimes from entering Turkey freely. We remind the Turkish prosecution of its role. We remind them that Britain has already decided to arrest Tzipi Livni when she was slated to arrive in the country."
"We remind them that Shimon Peres and Ehud Olmert must also be arrested according to Article CMK-98 of the Turkish law, which grants us the right to try them."
In December, a similar arrest warrant was issued against Tzipi Livni for her involvement in last winter's war, prompting British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to affect a change in law, granting the general attorney a veto power over the issuance of arrest warrants for internationals accused of war crimes visiting the UK.
In February 2009, a request to issue arrest warrants for then Prime Minister Ehud Barack, Livni and President Shimon Peres was called for in Turkey, which were then rejected by the Ankara general prosecutor.
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=254094
