7 Jan 2009
In the 12 days of Israel's war on Gaza, the shelling of a United Nations school on Tuesday has been the most shocking incident. More than 40 people were killed. Israel claims the school was a legitimate target because rockets were fired from it.
But the UN has vehemently denied those claims.
Al Jazeera is the only international news channel with correspondents on both sides of the border. Ayman Mohyeldin visited what's left of the school, and the families now in mourning.
In the 12 days of Israel's war on Gaza, the shelling of a United Nations school on Tuesday has been the most shocking incident. More than 40 people were killed. Israel claims the school was a legitimate target because rockets were fired from it.
But the UN has vehemently denied those claims.
Al Jazeera is the only international news channel with correspondents on both sides of the border. Ayman Mohyeldin visited what's left of the school, and the families now in mourning.
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7 Jan 2009
Gaza families mourn dead after UN school bombed |
6 jan 2009
"Not the conduct of a democratic state" |
5 Jan 2009
More children killed as war on Gaza continues
More children killed as war on Gaza continues
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2 Jan 2009
A week of Israel's war on Gaza 30 dec 2008
Gaza bombed by israel |
1 jan 2009
Israel kills senior Hamas figure in air attack 29 dec 2008
Israel pounds Gaza for a third consecutive day - 29 Dec 08 |
28 dec 2008
Israel plays for high stakes in Gaza attack
Ehud Barak
Less than 28 months after the end of Israel’s botched war in Lebanon, the country has launched another massive assault against a militant Islamist group in the region. This time, the enemy is Hamas not Hizbollah. And this time, Israelis are hoping fervently that their political and military leaders know what they are doing.
The government and army are at pains to stress that the lessons from the failed conflict in Lebanon have been learnt. Indeed, few question the military expertise of the defence minister, Ehud Barak, a former prime minister and Israel’s most decorated soldier, and the army chief-of-staff, Gabi Ashkenazi.
Israeli defence analysts have heaped praise on the military planners, describing the bombardment of targets across the Gaza Strip as an Israeli version of the “shock and awe” tactic that led to the swift US defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003.
Yet – in an uncomfortable echo of the two most recent wars in the Middle East – the weekend assault also raises a troubling question: will the use of overwhelming firepower bring Israel any closer to achieving its military and political objectives? Or will it merely strengthen support for Hamas and other militant groups, while adding to the instability of the volatile region as images of scores of dead and wounded Palestinians are beamed across the Arab world?
Israeli leaders have made clear the main aim of the assault is to stop Gaza-based militants from firing rockets and mortars on nearby Israeli towns. Removing Hamas from power in the Gaza Strip may be the ultimate desire but is not at this stage a military objective.
According to analysts, this marks a crucial difference from the botched 2006 war in Lebanon, when the government sought nothing less than the ousting of Hizbollah, the Shia group, from southern Lebanon. It was a goal Israel’s armed forces failed to achieve, dealing a severe blow to the country’s power of deterrence and throwing the government of Ehud Olmert into a crisis from which it never truly emerged.
“The aim of the operation is to force Hamas to come back to some form of ceasefire – but under different circumstances from the one agreed in June. That means a complete end to rocket fire and an end to smuggling of weapons,” said Ephraim Kam, deputy director of Israel’s Institute for National Strategic Studies.
But there are still nagging doubts over whether Israel can achieve even the more limited war goals it has set itself. The big uncertainty, according to Yossi Alpher, a former adviser to Mr Barak, is whether Israel is able and willing to do enough to bend Hamas’s will. “There is obviously no guarantee that Hamas will feel battered enough to sue for a ceasefire,” he said.
Judging by the group’s response to the current as well to earlier Israeli attacks, Hamas will not be in a rush to follow the Israeli playbook. All through the weekend, Hamas kept up a barrage of rocket attacks on Israel. Like other militant Islamist groups, Hamas celebrates martyrdom and has proved itself able to absorb a large number of casualties without losing the will to fight. It is, moreover, safely entrenched in its Gaza stronghold, and its small, flexible rocket units do not require complex military infrastructure to keep up the fire on Israel.
Many analysts believe air strikes alone will not be sufficient to stop the rocket fire, arguing that only a full-scale invasion of the strip can achieve this. Yet few believe Israel has the stomach for the bloody urban warfare that would accompany such a ground offensive, which would almost certainly lead to high Israeli casualties and expose the government to international condemnation.
But if Israel ends the campaign without fully achieving its goals, that will almost certainly enhance Hamas’s prestige among Palestinians, at the expense of the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas, whose conciliatory line towards Israel returns to haunt him every time Israel strikes at Gaza.
Arab diplomats and analysts were yesterday also voicing concern that Israel’s actions would further strengthen extremist forces. Mustafa Alani, analyst at the Dubai-based Gulf Research Centre, said: “What are we going to see? More recruitment of fighters for Hamas, for Hizbollah, for al-Qaeda – you name it.”
Hesham Youssef, a senior official at the Arab League, added: “We should not allow the situation to deteriorate to give further ammunition to the hardliners and those who would benefit from an unstable situation in the region.
Less than 28 months after the end of Israel’s botched war in Lebanon, the country has launched another massive assault against a militant Islamist group in the region. This time, the enemy is Hamas not Hizbollah. And this time, Israelis are hoping fervently that their political and military leaders know what they are doing.
The government and army are at pains to stress that the lessons from the failed conflict in Lebanon have been learnt. Indeed, few question the military expertise of the defence minister, Ehud Barak, a former prime minister and Israel’s most decorated soldier, and the army chief-of-staff, Gabi Ashkenazi.
Israeli defence analysts have heaped praise on the military planners, describing the bombardment of targets across the Gaza Strip as an Israeli version of the “shock and awe” tactic that led to the swift US defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003.
Yet – in an uncomfortable echo of the two most recent wars in the Middle East – the weekend assault also raises a troubling question: will the use of overwhelming firepower bring Israel any closer to achieving its military and political objectives? Or will it merely strengthen support for Hamas and other militant groups, while adding to the instability of the volatile region as images of scores of dead and wounded Palestinians are beamed across the Arab world?
Israeli leaders have made clear the main aim of the assault is to stop Gaza-based militants from firing rockets and mortars on nearby Israeli towns. Removing Hamas from power in the Gaza Strip may be the ultimate desire but is not at this stage a military objective.
According to analysts, this marks a crucial difference from the botched 2006 war in Lebanon, when the government sought nothing less than the ousting of Hizbollah, the Shia group, from southern Lebanon. It was a goal Israel’s armed forces failed to achieve, dealing a severe blow to the country’s power of deterrence and throwing the government of Ehud Olmert into a crisis from which it never truly emerged.
“The aim of the operation is to force Hamas to come back to some form of ceasefire – but under different circumstances from the one agreed in June. That means a complete end to rocket fire and an end to smuggling of weapons,” said Ephraim Kam, deputy director of Israel’s Institute for National Strategic Studies.
But there are still nagging doubts over whether Israel can achieve even the more limited war goals it has set itself. The big uncertainty, according to Yossi Alpher, a former adviser to Mr Barak, is whether Israel is able and willing to do enough to bend Hamas’s will. “There is obviously no guarantee that Hamas will feel battered enough to sue for a ceasefire,” he said.
Judging by the group’s response to the current as well to earlier Israeli attacks, Hamas will not be in a rush to follow the Israeli playbook. All through the weekend, Hamas kept up a barrage of rocket attacks on Israel. Like other militant Islamist groups, Hamas celebrates martyrdom and has proved itself able to absorb a large number of casualties without losing the will to fight. It is, moreover, safely entrenched in its Gaza stronghold, and its small, flexible rocket units do not require complex military infrastructure to keep up the fire on Israel.
Many analysts believe air strikes alone will not be sufficient to stop the rocket fire, arguing that only a full-scale invasion of the strip can achieve this. Yet few believe Israel has the stomach for the bloody urban warfare that would accompany such a ground offensive, which would almost certainly lead to high Israeli casualties and expose the government to international condemnation.
But if Israel ends the campaign without fully achieving its goals, that will almost certainly enhance Hamas’s prestige among Palestinians, at the expense of the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas, whose conciliatory line towards Israel returns to haunt him every time Israel strikes at Gaza.
Arab diplomats and analysts were yesterday also voicing concern that Israel’s actions would further strengthen extremist forces. Mustafa Alani, analyst at the Dubai-based Gulf Research Centre, said: “What are we going to see? More recruitment of fighters for Hamas, for Hizbollah, for al-Qaeda – you name it.”
Hesham Youssef, a senior official at the Arab League, added: “We should not allow the situation to deteriorate to give further ammunition to the hardliners and those who would benefit from an unstable situation in the region.
While the Western media remains silent and complicit, the Israeli Press (Haaretz) reveals the unspoken truth: the careful planning of a military operation entitled "Cast Lead" coupled with a media disinformation and diplomatic campaign. What we are witnessing is genocide. Let us be under no illusiions, this operation was implemented with the knowledge and approval of Israeli's allies.
Long-term planning, meticulous intelligence-gathering, secret discussions, visual deception tactics and disinformation preceded operation "Cast Lead" which the Israel Air Force launched yesterday in Gaza to take out Hamas targets in the Strip.
The disinformation effort, according to defense officials, took Hamas by surprise and served to significantly increase the number of its casualties in the strike.
Sources in the defense establishment said Defense Minister Ehud Barak instructed the Israel Defense Forces to prepare for the operation over six months ago, even as Israel was beginning to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with Hamas. According to the sources, Barak maintained that although the lull would allow Hamas to prepare for a showdown with Israel, the Israeli army needed time to prepare, as well. Advertisement
Barak gave orders to carry out a comprehensive intelligence-gathering drive which sought to map out Hamas' security infrastructure, along with that of other militant organizations operating in the Strip.
This intelligence-gathering effort brought back information about permanent bases, weapon silos, training camps, the homes of senior officials and coordinates for other facilities.
The plan of action that was implemented in Operation Cast Lead remained only a blueprint until a month ago, when tensions soared after the IDF carried out an incursion into Gaza during the ceasefire to take out a tunnel which the army said was intended to facilitate an attack by Palestinian militants on IDF troops.
On November 19, following dozens of Qassam rockets and mortar rounds which exploded on Israeli soil, the plan was brought for Barak's final approval. Last Thursday, on December 18, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak met at IDF Kiryat headquarters in central Tel Aviv to approve the operation.
However, they decided to put the mission on hold to see whether Hamas would hold its fire after the expiration of the ceasefire. They therefore put off bringing the plan for the cabinet's approval, but they did inform Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni of the developments.
That night, in speaking to the media, sources in the Prime Minister's Bureau said that "if the shooting from Gaza continues, the showdown with Hamas would be inevitable." On the weekend, several ministers in Olmert's cabinet inveighed against him and against Barak for not retaliating for Hamas' Qassam launches.
"This chatter would have made Entebe or the Six Day War impossible," Barak said in responding to the accusations. The cabinet was eventually convened on Wednesday, but the Prime Minister's Bureau misinformed the media in stating the discussion would revolve around global jihad. The ministers learned only that morning that the discussion would actually pertain to the operation in Gaza.
In its summary announcement for the discussion, the Prime Minister's Bureau devoted one line to the situation in Gaza, compared to one whole page that concerned the outlawing of 35 Islamic organizations.
What actually went on at the cabinet meeting was a five-hour discussion about the operation in which ministers were briefed about the various blueprints and plans of action. "It was a very detailed review," one minister said.
The minister added: "Everyone fully understood what sort of period we were heading into and what sort of scenarios this could lead to. No one could say that he or she did not know what they were voting on." The minister also said that the discussion showed that the lessons of the Winograd Committee about the performance of decision-makers during the 2006 Second Lebanon War were "fully internalized."
At the end of the discussion, the ministers unanimously voted in favor of the strike, leaving it for the prime minister, the defense minister and the foreign minister to work out the exact time.
While Barak was working out the final details with the officers responsible for the operation, Livni went to Cairo to inform Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak, that Israel had decided to strike at Hamas.
In parallel, Israel continued to send out disinformation in announcing it would open the crossings to the Gaza Strip and that Olmert would decide whether to launch the strike following three more deliberations on Sunday - one day after the actual order to launch the operation was issued.
"Hamas evacuated all its headquarter personnel after the cabinet meeting on Wednesday," one defense official said, "but the organization sent its people back in when they heard that everything was put on hold until Sunday."
The final decision was made on Friday morning, when Barak met with Chief of Staff General Gabi Ashkenazi, the head of the Shin Bet Security Service Yuval Diskin and the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Amos Yadlin. Barak sat down with Olmert and Livni several hours later for a final meeting, in which the trio gave the air force its orders.
On Friday night and on Saturday morning, opposition leaders and prominent political figures were informed about the impending strike, including Likud Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu, Yisrael Beuiteinu's Avigdor Liebermen, Haim Oron from Meretz and President Shimon Peres, along with Knesset Speaker Dalia Itzik.
Long-term planning, meticulous intelligence-gathering, secret discussions, visual deception tactics and disinformation preceded operation "Cast Lead" which the Israel Air Force launched yesterday in Gaza to take out Hamas targets in the Strip.
The disinformation effort, according to defense officials, took Hamas by surprise and served to significantly increase the number of its casualties in the strike.
Sources in the defense establishment said Defense Minister Ehud Barak instructed the Israel Defense Forces to prepare for the operation over six months ago, even as Israel was beginning to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with Hamas. According to the sources, Barak maintained that although the lull would allow Hamas to prepare for a showdown with Israel, the Israeli army needed time to prepare, as well. Advertisement
Barak gave orders to carry out a comprehensive intelligence-gathering drive which sought to map out Hamas' security infrastructure, along with that of other militant organizations operating in the Strip.
This intelligence-gathering effort brought back information about permanent bases, weapon silos, training camps, the homes of senior officials and coordinates for other facilities.
The plan of action that was implemented in Operation Cast Lead remained only a blueprint until a month ago, when tensions soared after the IDF carried out an incursion into Gaza during the ceasefire to take out a tunnel which the army said was intended to facilitate an attack by Palestinian militants on IDF troops.
On November 19, following dozens of Qassam rockets and mortar rounds which exploded on Israeli soil, the plan was brought for Barak's final approval. Last Thursday, on December 18, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak met at IDF Kiryat headquarters in central Tel Aviv to approve the operation.
However, they decided to put the mission on hold to see whether Hamas would hold its fire after the expiration of the ceasefire. They therefore put off bringing the plan for the cabinet's approval, but they did inform Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni of the developments.
That night, in speaking to the media, sources in the Prime Minister's Bureau said that "if the shooting from Gaza continues, the showdown with Hamas would be inevitable." On the weekend, several ministers in Olmert's cabinet inveighed against him and against Barak for not retaliating for Hamas' Qassam launches.
"This chatter would have made Entebe or the Six Day War impossible," Barak said in responding to the accusations. The cabinet was eventually convened on Wednesday, but the Prime Minister's Bureau misinformed the media in stating the discussion would revolve around global jihad. The ministers learned only that morning that the discussion would actually pertain to the operation in Gaza.
In its summary announcement for the discussion, the Prime Minister's Bureau devoted one line to the situation in Gaza, compared to one whole page that concerned the outlawing of 35 Islamic organizations.
What actually went on at the cabinet meeting was a five-hour discussion about the operation in which ministers were briefed about the various blueprints and plans of action. "It was a very detailed review," one minister said.
The minister added: "Everyone fully understood what sort of period we were heading into and what sort of scenarios this could lead to. No one could say that he or she did not know what they were voting on." The minister also said that the discussion showed that the lessons of the Winograd Committee about the performance of decision-makers during the 2006 Second Lebanon War were "fully internalized."
At the end of the discussion, the ministers unanimously voted in favor of the strike, leaving it for the prime minister, the defense minister and the foreign minister to work out the exact time.
While Barak was working out the final details with the officers responsible for the operation, Livni went to Cairo to inform Egypt's president, Hosni Mubarak, that Israel had decided to strike at Hamas.
In parallel, Israel continued to send out disinformation in announcing it would open the crossings to the Gaza Strip and that Olmert would decide whether to launch the strike following three more deliberations on Sunday - one day after the actual order to launch the operation was issued.
"Hamas evacuated all its headquarter personnel after the cabinet meeting on Wednesday," one defense official said, "but the organization sent its people back in when they heard that everything was put on hold until Sunday."
The final decision was made on Friday morning, when Barak met with Chief of Staff General Gabi Ashkenazi, the head of the Shin Bet Security Service Yuval Diskin and the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Amos Yadlin. Barak sat down with Olmert and Livni several hours later for a final meeting, in which the trio gave the air force its orders.
On Friday night and on Saturday morning, opposition leaders and prominent political figures were informed about the impending strike, including Likud Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu, Yisrael Beuiteinu's Avigdor Liebermen, Haim Oron from Meretz and President Shimon Peres, along with Knesset Speaker Dalia Itzik.
27 dec 2008
Israel launches air strikes on Gaza
Israel launches air strikes on Gaza
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