2 may 2015
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ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda addresses a press conference in the Ugandan capital city of Kampala, February 27, 2015
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has rejected Israel’s claims that the court may carry out a biased investigation into the Tel Aviv regime’s war crimes during its devastating military aggression against the Gaza Strip last summer. ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda told Israel’s Haaretz newspaper on Friday that The Hague-based court will launch an “unbiased” inquiry into the case. |
The court will consider evidence brought by Palestinians against Israel “independently and impartially without fear or favor,” Bensouda said, adding that her “office will be guided by a policy of investigating and prosecuting those most responsible for the commission of mass crimes.”
The Israeli regime launched a 50-day deadly war on Gaza last summer that ended in August 2014 with a truce. The aggression left about 2,200 Palestinians, including 577 children, dead and over 11,100 others injured.
In April, Palestinians formally joined the ICC, a membership that enabled them to bring war crimes charges against Israeli officials.
Tel Aviv reportedly claims that institutions like the ICC are biased against Israel and thus prone to unfairly target the regime. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the regime will not allow the Israeli soldiers to appear at the ICC and face potential war crime charges.
Joining the ICC also opens up the possibility for Palestinians to challenge Tel Aviv’s illegal settlement expansion in the occupied territories besides taking the regime to task for its war crimes during the 2014 military aggression against the Gaza Strip.
In January, the ICC opened a preliminary examination into Israel’s war crimes against Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister, however, denounced ICC’s decision as “absurd,” claiming that the move runs against the international law.
Manchester Jews' anger at Israel
The Israeli regime launched a 50-day deadly war on Gaza last summer that ended in August 2014 with a truce. The aggression left about 2,200 Palestinians, including 577 children, dead and over 11,100 others injured.
In April, Palestinians formally joined the ICC, a membership that enabled them to bring war crimes charges against Israeli officials.
Tel Aviv reportedly claims that institutions like the ICC are biased against Israel and thus prone to unfairly target the regime. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the regime will not allow the Israeli soldiers to appear at the ICC and face potential war crime charges.
Joining the ICC also opens up the possibility for Palestinians to challenge Tel Aviv’s illegal settlement expansion in the occupied territories besides taking the regime to task for its war crimes during the 2014 military aggression against the Gaza Strip.
In January, the ICC opened a preliminary examination into Israel’s war crimes against Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister, however, denounced ICC’s decision as “absurd,” claiming that the move runs against the international law.
Manchester Jews' anger at Israel
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This is while the Manchester Jews for Justice for Palestinians recently censured Israel for its war crimes against Palestinians and its continued occupation of their lands.
“It is well known how Israel has expelled the Palestinian population from their land and enforced a systematic, military and illegal occupation against those that remain,” said the pro-Palestinian group. It also lashed out at the British government over its complicity in Israeli war crimes against Palestinians through exporting weapons to Tel Aviv. “We deplore the UK’s complicity in Israeli war crimes, most recently the massacres and destruction of homes and livelihoods in Gaza last summer,” the group said in an open letter published on the blog Mondoweiss. |
In November 2014, figures seen by the British daily The Independent revealed that the UK approved the sale of arms to Israel worth £7 million (USD10.5 million) in the six months before its deadly onslaught on Gaza.
1 may 2015
ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.
Fatou Bensouda tells Haaretz that 'it is in the interests of both Palestine and Israel to cooperate' in International Criminal Court's probe into Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, told Haaretz that if she decides to open an investigation of war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli soldiers of low- and middle-rank potentially could be investigated for the purpose of “bringing stronger cases against those most responsible.”
However, Bensouda emphasized that the court is now only examining whether such an investigation is warranted, and that if there is a decision to go forward with one, the investigation “will of course look into the alleged crimes committed by all sides to the conflict” beginning in June 2014, the eve of Operation Protective Edge.
In an exclusive interview conducted with Haaretz by email and completed Tuesday, Bensouda was asked whether the ICC’s strategic plan to investigate lower- and mid-level operatives means that every Israeli soldier who ever served in the West Bank and Gaza should be worried.
“If an investigation is opened in any given situation, my office will be guided by a policy of investigating and prosecuting those most responsible for the commission of mass crimes,” Bensouda wrote.
“That is the general rule. In accordance with my office’s new strategic plan, where appropriate, we may indeed investigate and prosecute notorious perpetrators whose conduct has been particularly egregious or a number of lower- or mid-level perpetrators, building upwards, and thereby bringing stronger cases against those most responsible."
How will you deal with the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian case is a political “hot potato”?
“While I am fully cognizant of the political complexities of this lingering conflict, mine is a legal mandate. All I can and will do is to apply the law in strict conformity with the Rome Statute [of the International Criminal Court], with full independence and impartiality as I have done with all our cases and situations to date. We operate in a highly political world where we will face reactions to the decisions we take based on our legal mandate.
"Let me reassure you that as prosecutor, political considerations have never, and will never form any part of my decision making. My duty firmly remains to simply apply the law to whatever situation is before the court.”
Israelis are very concerned with what they consider anti-Israel bias in international institutions. How would you assure the Israelis no such bias exists in the work of the ICC?
“As prosecutor of the ICC, I execute my mandate in accordance with the Rome Statute; independently and impartially without fear or favor. ... Our treatment of the situation in Palestine will be no different.”
“International humanitarian law and international criminal law are not designed to handicap national defense, but to ensure that conduct of hostilities and methods and means of warfare used by warring parties to an armed conflict are legal and regulated to minimize suffering, in particular among civilians, and to deter mass crimes through investigations and prosecutions. As such, international law and national defense are not antagonistic; on the contrary, the former reinforces the latter.
“At this stage, we are not investigating, as a decision on whether to open an investigation in the situation of Palestine has not been made. Rather we are conducting what we call in our parlance a preliminary examination over alleged crimes committed in Palestine. In January of this year, as you know, Palestine accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC for acts committed on its territory or by its nationals since June 2014. In the course of the preliminary examination, we will gather and assess information received from reliable sources from all sides, including from Israel, on alleged crimes committed by any party to the conflict.
“A preliminary examination is not an investigation. The purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. This requires an examination of jurisdiction, national proceedings, complementarity [the principle under which the ICC has no jurisdiction if the case is being genuinely investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over the case – A.G.], the gravity of the alleged crimes, and the interests of justice. There are no timelines provided in the Rome Statute for a decision on a preliminary examination.
“We will of course look into the alleged crimes committed by all sides to the conflict. I have made this clear to both Israeli and Palestinians officials.
Will investigations conducted within the Israeli army itself be considered as fulfilling the complimentary requirement?
“Complementarity is one of the core principles of the Rome Statute system. Under this system, national authorities of the Court’s 123 States Parties form the first line of defense to address mass crimes. They shoulder the primary responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of these crimes, through individual efforts and through mutual support. In the event that the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to conduct national investigations and prosecutions, the Rome Statute authorizes the ICC to step in, counting on the full support and cooperation of the ICC States Parties.
"The relationship between the Office of the Prosecutor and national prosecuting authorities – whether civilian or military – is not adversarial. On the contrary, it is complementary. The role of the Office is not to challenge the work of national investigators and prosecutors; it supports their work as long as it is genuine and meets other requirements stipulated by the Rome Statute. This is one of the major strengths of the system: its capacity to contribute to the fight against impunity either directly through the Court’s proceedings or by incentivizing and mobilizing action at the national level, through its preliminary examinations and investigations.
"During the course of this preliminary examination, any information given by the Israel and Palestinian governments related to complementarity efforts will be evaluated in order to determine whether nationals investigations and prosecutions are genuine, and bearing in mind the Office’s policy of focusing investigative efforts on those most responsible for the most serious crimes. The Office will also consider information gathered from other reliable sources, as well as open sources, in assessing complementarity.“
Here Bensouda refers me to her office’s Policy Paper on the topic, which emphasized that in assessing complementarity her office will examine whether there are or have been any relevant national investigations or prosecutions, whether such proceedings relate to potential cases being examined by the Office and in particular, whether the focus is on those most responsible for the most serious crimes committed.
If so, the Office shall then assess whether such national proceedings are vitiated by an unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out the proceedings. Proceedings which are being undertaken for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the ICC jurisdiction may be indicative of unwillingness to investigate or prosecute genuinely.
What about the Israeli argument that Palestine is not a state so it cannot confer jurisdiction?
“On the issue of statehood, the Office of the Prosecutor considers that since Palestine was granted observer state status by the United Nations General Assembly in November 2012, it must be considered a ‘state’ for the purposes of accession to the Rome Statute.
“For the Office, the focus of the inquiry into Palestine's ability to accede to the Rome Statute has consistently been the question of Palestine's status in the UN, given the United Nations Secretary General’s role as treaty depositary of the Statute”.
How will your office cope with expected lack of cooperation on behalf of Israel?
“We trust that all the state parties will continue to fully cooperate with the court. The preliminary examination process will proceed on the basis of available reliable information. We will be looking at all credible and reliable sources of information.
"Cooperation, in particular, from the parties most directly concerned in the situation – Palestine and Israel – will assist my office in arriving at a fully informed decision at the end of the preliminary examination process. It is in the interests of both Palestine and Israel to fully cooperate with my office’s preliminary examination into the situation. “
Will the Israel/Palestine case be one you find attractive as it does not deal with yet another African country on one hand, and not with a Security Council permanent member? Or will Israel’s ties with the United States make it seem too risky to deal with this case?
“We should guard against politicizing the court’s proceedings. Justice is not a pick and choose system. The ICC’s every decision and action, in every instance is applied in strict accordance with the legal framework of the Rome Statute. We independently and impartially apply the law without distinction, fear or favor, and we follow the mandate that has been given to us under the Statute.
“Our decisions on whether or not to conduct preliminary examinations or to open an investigation are not governed by regional or geographic considerations, but merely by our jurisdiction. In addition to our active cases in Africa, my office is also conducting preliminary examinations on four different continents – including in Ukraine, Honduras, Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, Georgia and now Palestine. Again, my office acts strictly within the four corners of the Rome Statute and undertakes its mandate without fear or favor. Any other interpretation of why, when or where we act betrays a lack of understanding of the court’s legal framework and jurisdiction. “
Bensouda's formative years
“We all have those moments in our lives; those decisive moments that leave a mark and help us determine our trajectory in life,” said Bensouda when asked how her background had influenced her life choices. “I am reminded of my formative years, when I served as a clerk in the courts of my native home, Gambia.
“As a young girl, I recall witnessing countless courageous women who were victims of rape as well as other forms of sexual and domestic violence relive their ordeals through the Gambian court system; their agony and suffering in the face of a judicial system and indeed society, which could not fully afford them the protective embrace of the law, are still vivid and etched in my memory. To this day, their plight and cries of injustice are one of the driving forces behind my firm commitment to the pursuit of justice.
“I knew from that moment that I desired, indeed that I had a duty to represent such women,” Bensouda said. “I knew from that moment that through the vector of the law, vulnerable groups in society and those whose rights have been trampled upon can and must be protected and afforded a measure of justice.”
Bensouda’s conviction that the law could be a tool of justice was bolstered during her stint at the special international criminal tribunal established in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, prior to her appointment as deputy prosecutor of the ICC and then, in 2012, as its prosecutor.
“My work [there] exposed me to the horrors that unfolded in Rwanda, including the mass rapes and murder of women as part of a deliberate campaign, as well as the unspeakable violence perpetrated against fellow human beings. What transpired in Rwanda in 1994 is in one of modern history’s most violent acts of criminality and mass murder.”
Bensouda said the Rwandan genocide left a permanent scar on the conscience of humanity, and that the world can no longer remain silent in the face of such atrocities.
“As prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, I have done my best and will continue to do whatever I can to help restore dignity to the shattered lives of victims of atrocities and to give breath to our common yearning for the international rule of law and international criminal justice, applied independently and impartially. My challenge and focus, is to bring justice to victims and to prevent future crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.”
But the road to realizing these goals isn’t easy.
“At the outset, it must be stressed,” Bensouda said, “that international criminal investigations and prosecutions are much more complex and face different challenges than those experienced at the national level. There are many reasons for this, not the least because we operate in live conflict or post-conflict situations.
“Additionally, we have an important statutory duty to protect people who would be at risk due to their interaction with the court. We, therefore, carefully strategize and reflect on how we can collect reliable information and evidence in a manner that doesn’t expose people in a way that we can’t manage.”
“Cooperation,” she emphasized, “is a key element. ICC has no police force or enforcement body. We rely on states to implement court decisions and to support our work. We need effective and timely cooperation from states, parties and others, for example to execute arrest warrants issued by the court, and to respond to our requests for assistance. To be meaningful, cooperation has to be timely and tangible; this is what we ask of states.”
“By nature of our activities,” she added, “the risk of politicization and misperceptions about the court will always remain a challenge. There is a continuous need to shield the Court from politicization at both the national and international levels. The court has to be allowed to carry out its mandate impartially and independently, without fear or favor. It is our collective duty to enhance understanding of the role and mandate of the court. I continue to seek to increase my Office’s engagement with all regions of the world, to explain and correct any misperceptions about the court.
“We must indeed remain unwavering in our resolve to create a world that seeks justice for atrocity crimes, universally and blindly applied. Awareness and increased support for the court are important contributions towards this goal. “We cannot do this alone. States, civil society, lawyers’ associations, and of course, the media all have a crucial role to play in this regard.”
Fatou Bensouda tells Haaretz that 'it is in the interests of both Palestine and Israel to cooperate' in International Criminal Court's probe into Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, told Haaretz that if she decides to open an investigation of war crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli soldiers of low- and middle-rank potentially could be investigated for the purpose of “bringing stronger cases against those most responsible.”
However, Bensouda emphasized that the court is now only examining whether such an investigation is warranted, and that if there is a decision to go forward with one, the investigation “will of course look into the alleged crimes committed by all sides to the conflict” beginning in June 2014, the eve of Operation Protective Edge.
In an exclusive interview conducted with Haaretz by email and completed Tuesday, Bensouda was asked whether the ICC’s strategic plan to investigate lower- and mid-level operatives means that every Israeli soldier who ever served in the West Bank and Gaza should be worried.
“If an investigation is opened in any given situation, my office will be guided by a policy of investigating and prosecuting those most responsible for the commission of mass crimes,” Bensouda wrote.
“That is the general rule. In accordance with my office’s new strategic plan, where appropriate, we may indeed investigate and prosecute notorious perpetrators whose conduct has been particularly egregious or a number of lower- or mid-level perpetrators, building upwards, and thereby bringing stronger cases against those most responsible."
How will you deal with the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian case is a political “hot potato”?
“While I am fully cognizant of the political complexities of this lingering conflict, mine is a legal mandate. All I can and will do is to apply the law in strict conformity with the Rome Statute [of the International Criminal Court], with full independence and impartiality as I have done with all our cases and situations to date. We operate in a highly political world where we will face reactions to the decisions we take based on our legal mandate.
"Let me reassure you that as prosecutor, political considerations have never, and will never form any part of my decision making. My duty firmly remains to simply apply the law to whatever situation is before the court.”
Israelis are very concerned with what they consider anti-Israel bias in international institutions. How would you assure the Israelis no such bias exists in the work of the ICC?
“As prosecutor of the ICC, I execute my mandate in accordance with the Rome Statute; independently and impartially without fear or favor. ... Our treatment of the situation in Palestine will be no different.”
“International humanitarian law and international criminal law are not designed to handicap national defense, but to ensure that conduct of hostilities and methods and means of warfare used by warring parties to an armed conflict are legal and regulated to minimize suffering, in particular among civilians, and to deter mass crimes through investigations and prosecutions. As such, international law and national defense are not antagonistic; on the contrary, the former reinforces the latter.
“At this stage, we are not investigating, as a decision on whether to open an investigation in the situation of Palestine has not been made. Rather we are conducting what we call in our parlance a preliminary examination over alleged crimes committed in Palestine. In January of this year, as you know, Palestine accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC for acts committed on its territory or by its nationals since June 2014. In the course of the preliminary examination, we will gather and assess information received from reliable sources from all sides, including from Israel, on alleged crimes committed by any party to the conflict.
“A preliminary examination is not an investigation. The purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. This requires an examination of jurisdiction, national proceedings, complementarity [the principle under which the ICC has no jurisdiction if the case is being genuinely investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over the case – A.G.], the gravity of the alleged crimes, and the interests of justice. There are no timelines provided in the Rome Statute for a decision on a preliminary examination.
“We will of course look into the alleged crimes committed by all sides to the conflict. I have made this clear to both Israeli and Palestinians officials.
Will investigations conducted within the Israeli army itself be considered as fulfilling the complimentary requirement?
“Complementarity is one of the core principles of the Rome Statute system. Under this system, national authorities of the Court’s 123 States Parties form the first line of defense to address mass crimes. They shoulder the primary responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of these crimes, through individual efforts and through mutual support. In the event that the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to conduct national investigations and prosecutions, the Rome Statute authorizes the ICC to step in, counting on the full support and cooperation of the ICC States Parties.
"The relationship between the Office of the Prosecutor and national prosecuting authorities – whether civilian or military – is not adversarial. On the contrary, it is complementary. The role of the Office is not to challenge the work of national investigators and prosecutors; it supports their work as long as it is genuine and meets other requirements stipulated by the Rome Statute. This is one of the major strengths of the system: its capacity to contribute to the fight against impunity either directly through the Court’s proceedings or by incentivizing and mobilizing action at the national level, through its preliminary examinations and investigations.
"During the course of this preliminary examination, any information given by the Israel and Palestinian governments related to complementarity efforts will be evaluated in order to determine whether nationals investigations and prosecutions are genuine, and bearing in mind the Office’s policy of focusing investigative efforts on those most responsible for the most serious crimes. The Office will also consider information gathered from other reliable sources, as well as open sources, in assessing complementarity.“
Here Bensouda refers me to her office’s Policy Paper on the topic, which emphasized that in assessing complementarity her office will examine whether there are or have been any relevant national investigations or prosecutions, whether such proceedings relate to potential cases being examined by the Office and in particular, whether the focus is on those most responsible for the most serious crimes committed.
If so, the Office shall then assess whether such national proceedings are vitiated by an unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out the proceedings. Proceedings which are being undertaken for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the ICC jurisdiction may be indicative of unwillingness to investigate or prosecute genuinely.
What about the Israeli argument that Palestine is not a state so it cannot confer jurisdiction?
“On the issue of statehood, the Office of the Prosecutor considers that since Palestine was granted observer state status by the United Nations General Assembly in November 2012, it must be considered a ‘state’ for the purposes of accession to the Rome Statute.
“For the Office, the focus of the inquiry into Palestine's ability to accede to the Rome Statute has consistently been the question of Palestine's status in the UN, given the United Nations Secretary General’s role as treaty depositary of the Statute”.
How will your office cope with expected lack of cooperation on behalf of Israel?
“We trust that all the state parties will continue to fully cooperate with the court. The preliminary examination process will proceed on the basis of available reliable information. We will be looking at all credible and reliable sources of information.
"Cooperation, in particular, from the parties most directly concerned in the situation – Palestine and Israel – will assist my office in arriving at a fully informed decision at the end of the preliminary examination process. It is in the interests of both Palestine and Israel to fully cooperate with my office’s preliminary examination into the situation. “
Will the Israel/Palestine case be one you find attractive as it does not deal with yet another African country on one hand, and not with a Security Council permanent member? Or will Israel’s ties with the United States make it seem too risky to deal with this case?
“We should guard against politicizing the court’s proceedings. Justice is not a pick and choose system. The ICC’s every decision and action, in every instance is applied in strict accordance with the legal framework of the Rome Statute. We independently and impartially apply the law without distinction, fear or favor, and we follow the mandate that has been given to us under the Statute.
“Our decisions on whether or not to conduct preliminary examinations or to open an investigation are not governed by regional or geographic considerations, but merely by our jurisdiction. In addition to our active cases in Africa, my office is also conducting preliminary examinations on four different continents – including in Ukraine, Honduras, Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, Georgia and now Palestine. Again, my office acts strictly within the four corners of the Rome Statute and undertakes its mandate without fear or favor. Any other interpretation of why, when or where we act betrays a lack of understanding of the court’s legal framework and jurisdiction. “
Bensouda's formative years
“We all have those moments in our lives; those decisive moments that leave a mark and help us determine our trajectory in life,” said Bensouda when asked how her background had influenced her life choices. “I am reminded of my formative years, when I served as a clerk in the courts of my native home, Gambia.
“As a young girl, I recall witnessing countless courageous women who were victims of rape as well as other forms of sexual and domestic violence relive their ordeals through the Gambian court system; their agony and suffering in the face of a judicial system and indeed society, which could not fully afford them the protective embrace of the law, are still vivid and etched in my memory. To this day, their plight and cries of injustice are one of the driving forces behind my firm commitment to the pursuit of justice.
“I knew from that moment that I desired, indeed that I had a duty to represent such women,” Bensouda said. “I knew from that moment that through the vector of the law, vulnerable groups in society and those whose rights have been trampled upon can and must be protected and afforded a measure of justice.”
Bensouda’s conviction that the law could be a tool of justice was bolstered during her stint at the special international criminal tribunal established in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, prior to her appointment as deputy prosecutor of the ICC and then, in 2012, as its prosecutor.
“My work [there] exposed me to the horrors that unfolded in Rwanda, including the mass rapes and murder of women as part of a deliberate campaign, as well as the unspeakable violence perpetrated against fellow human beings. What transpired in Rwanda in 1994 is in one of modern history’s most violent acts of criminality and mass murder.”
Bensouda said the Rwandan genocide left a permanent scar on the conscience of humanity, and that the world can no longer remain silent in the face of such atrocities.
“As prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, I have done my best and will continue to do whatever I can to help restore dignity to the shattered lives of victims of atrocities and to give breath to our common yearning for the international rule of law and international criminal justice, applied independently and impartially. My challenge and focus, is to bring justice to victims and to prevent future crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.”
But the road to realizing these goals isn’t easy.
“At the outset, it must be stressed,” Bensouda said, “that international criminal investigations and prosecutions are much more complex and face different challenges than those experienced at the national level. There are many reasons for this, not the least because we operate in live conflict or post-conflict situations.
“Additionally, we have an important statutory duty to protect people who would be at risk due to their interaction with the court. We, therefore, carefully strategize and reflect on how we can collect reliable information and evidence in a manner that doesn’t expose people in a way that we can’t manage.”
“Cooperation,” she emphasized, “is a key element. ICC has no police force or enforcement body. We rely on states to implement court decisions and to support our work. We need effective and timely cooperation from states, parties and others, for example to execute arrest warrants issued by the court, and to respond to our requests for assistance. To be meaningful, cooperation has to be timely and tangible; this is what we ask of states.”
“By nature of our activities,” she added, “the risk of politicization and misperceptions about the court will always remain a challenge. There is a continuous need to shield the Court from politicization at both the national and international levels. The court has to be allowed to carry out its mandate impartially and independently, without fear or favor. It is our collective duty to enhance understanding of the role and mandate of the court. I continue to seek to increase my Office’s engagement with all regions of the world, to explain and correct any misperceptions about the court.
“We must indeed remain unwavering in our resolve to create a world that seeks justice for atrocity crimes, universally and blindly applied. Awareness and increased support for the court are important contributions towards this goal. “We cannot do this alone. States, civil society, lawyers’ associations, and of course, the media all have a crucial role to play in this regard.”
30 apr 2015
Testimonies from three Golani soldiers charged with stealing $605 from home in Saja'iyya reveal they used Namer APC, sent to evacuate wounded, to take money out of neighborhood.
Testimonies of three Golani soldiers accused of stealing NIS 2,420 (roughly $605) from a home in Gaza City's Saja'iyya neighborhood during Operation Protective Edge showed Thursday that the soldiers had planned on using the stolen money to fund a social event for the unit's soldiers after the war ended.
"We agreed we would each take NIS 180. We talked about it after we left Gaza, and said that if something happened, everyone would take responsibility," said Staff Sergeant D. from Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion, one of the three soldiers accused of looting cash from a Palestinian home.
Last week, an indictment was filed against the three Golani soldiers at Haifa Military Court. The Saja'iyya neighborhood is considered to be one of Gaza's most dangerous neighborhoods, and where the IDF suffered the most casualties during the operation.
The incidents detailed in the indictment refer to soldiers serving in the Golani 51st Battalion, who the indictment says stole money, prayer beads and keffiyehs during their searches of the neighborhood. The home from which the soldiers stole the cash was later hit by an anti-tank missile, wounding several soldiers.
Detailing the system the soldiers used to loot the homes, Staff Sergeant D said: "We entered a home in Saja'iyya at 4 am on Saturday night, and began searching for weapons. We had to block the windows to protect us from gunfire, using beds and furniture to do so. Another soldier and I moved the closet to block a window when a box fell out of the closet.
He opened it and we saw money, about NIS 2,400. He gave me the money and I put it in my trouser pocket. I wasn't thinking about anything at that moment." Several hours later, the incident took a potentially deadly turn when a missile was fired at the home.
"The house was filled with smoke and fire, including the room where we had been. Some of the soldiers suffered from smoke inhalation and we had to evacuate them using a Namer APC. I gave the money to the driver and we took the wounded to Nahal Oz. I saw another soldier there, and took the money from the driver and gave it to a soldier in Nahal Oz – and then we returned to Saja'iyya."
The defendant also admitted to stealing other items from different homes in the neighborhood.
"We went to other homes in Saja'iyya, and some of them contained prayer beads and keffiyehs. We took some of them and played with them, but I don't remember how many I took because they got mixed together with my grandfather's prayer beads, but it was a small number," he said, adding that he also took "two keffiyehs".
The soldiers' testimonies reveal that they had taken cash from other homes as well, but returned it after feeling guilty. Those involved in the case said they intended to use the money to pay for a social gathering after the war ended.
Testimonies of three Golani soldiers accused of stealing NIS 2,420 (roughly $605) from a home in Gaza City's Saja'iyya neighborhood during Operation Protective Edge showed Thursday that the soldiers had planned on using the stolen money to fund a social event for the unit's soldiers after the war ended.
"We agreed we would each take NIS 180. We talked about it after we left Gaza, and said that if something happened, everyone would take responsibility," said Staff Sergeant D. from Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion, one of the three soldiers accused of looting cash from a Palestinian home.
Last week, an indictment was filed against the three Golani soldiers at Haifa Military Court. The Saja'iyya neighborhood is considered to be one of Gaza's most dangerous neighborhoods, and where the IDF suffered the most casualties during the operation.
The incidents detailed in the indictment refer to soldiers serving in the Golani 51st Battalion, who the indictment says stole money, prayer beads and keffiyehs during their searches of the neighborhood. The home from which the soldiers stole the cash was later hit by an anti-tank missile, wounding several soldiers.
Detailing the system the soldiers used to loot the homes, Staff Sergeant D said: "We entered a home in Saja'iyya at 4 am on Saturday night, and began searching for weapons. We had to block the windows to protect us from gunfire, using beds and furniture to do so. Another soldier and I moved the closet to block a window when a box fell out of the closet.
He opened it and we saw money, about NIS 2,400. He gave me the money and I put it in my trouser pocket. I wasn't thinking about anything at that moment." Several hours later, the incident took a potentially deadly turn when a missile was fired at the home.
"The house was filled with smoke and fire, including the room where we had been. Some of the soldiers suffered from smoke inhalation and we had to evacuate them using a Namer APC. I gave the money to the driver and we took the wounded to Nahal Oz. I saw another soldier there, and took the money from the driver and gave it to a soldier in Nahal Oz – and then we returned to Saja'iyya."
The defendant also admitted to stealing other items from different homes in the neighborhood.
"We went to other homes in Saja'iyya, and some of them contained prayer beads and keffiyehs. We took some of them and played with them, but I don't remember how many I took because they got mixed together with my grandfather's prayer beads, but it was a small number," he said, adding that he also took "two keffiyehs".
The soldiers' testimonies reveal that they had taken cash from other homes as well, but returned it after feeling guilty. Those involved in the case said they intended to use the money to pay for a social gathering after the war ended.
29 apr 2015
Deputy Head of Hamas political bureau, Ismail Haneyya, on Wednesday dubbed a UN report condemning the Israeli occupation for committing war crimes in Gaza, another proof of Israel’s terrorism and violation of international laws.
Haneyya urged, in his exclusive statements to the PIC, the Palestinian Authority to take advantage of the report and file a complaint with the International Criminal Court.
“The PA should be careful not to use the report as a bargaining chip for political maneuvers aimed at resuming negotiations,” he said.
Haneyya’s statements were released on the sidelines of an issue of a petition, said to be the largest of its kind, against illegal settlement and separation wall.
The petition, set to be submitted to the UN sometime soon, was signed by several political, national, and Islamic leaders, along with representatives of popular and civil organizations.
“We are here today to prove that Palestine is ours; that our rights are legitimate; and that the people of Gaza are keen on restoring Jerusalem and the other occupied Palestinian territories.”
“True, Gaza is blockaded; but it is free,” Haneyya said as he harked back to the victory achieved by the Palestinian resistance in last summer’s offensive on the besieged coastal enclave.
Haneyya urged, in his exclusive statements to the PIC, the Palestinian Authority to take advantage of the report and file a complaint with the International Criminal Court.
“The PA should be careful not to use the report as a bargaining chip for political maneuvers aimed at resuming negotiations,” he said.
Haneyya’s statements were released on the sidelines of an issue of a petition, said to be the largest of its kind, against illegal settlement and separation wall.
The petition, set to be submitted to the UN sometime soon, was signed by several political, national, and Islamic leaders, along with representatives of popular and civil organizations.
“We are here today to prove that Palestine is ours; that our rights are legitimate; and that the people of Gaza are keen on restoring Jerusalem and the other occupied Palestinian territories.”
“True, Gaza is blockaded; but it is free,” Haneyya said as he harked back to the victory achieved by the Palestinian resistance in last summer’s offensive on the besieged coastal enclave.
28 apr 2015
44 displaced persons killed, 227 injured
Attacks to be considered of "extreme severity toward those who looked to them for protection and sought refuge and were granted shelter there, had their hope and trust denied”, according to a recent statement by the United Nations.
A UN girl's school was hit 88 times by mortar shells; another was torn by an anti-tank missile.
PNN reports that the investigation of the United Nations on "Operation Protective Edge", launched by Israel against the Gaza Strip last summer, is revealing its first accusations against the Israeli army.
For a brief but concise chronology of events leading up to the assault, see 10/25/14 10 O'clock In Jerusalem & All Is Not Well
The first major Israeli airstrikes in the region began as early as June of 2014.
The first results of the independent UN commission, headed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, investigating on 10 incidents during the 50 days of the operation, led Israeli military prosecutors to put under investigation three soldiers accused of robberies against Palestinians.
"Two soldiers - said a statement released yesterday by the Israeli army - are accused of looting of money in the amount of 2,420 shekels ($ 620, € 565) from a building in Al Shuja'eyya [one of the areas destroyed by the bombing] where the troops were stationed, and another is accused of aiding and abetting the crime."
In addition to this indictment, which is looked into by Tel Aviv military prosecution, the UN report highlights other crimes committed by the Israeli army.
The investigation's accusation is that the troops under orders from Tel Aviv have conducted seven deadly attacks against UN structures used as shelter by the population fleeing the bombing. In the raid on UN schools, as stated in the investigation, 44 people died and 227 were injured.
Investigations have revealed also some crimes committed by Palestinian resistance fighters, who reportedly hid weapons in three of the seven UN schools damaged by bombing, thought by the armies to be abandoned.
In two cases, moreover, the commission ruled that the Palestinian armed factions have "probably" fired at Israeli forces from the same schools. Although the facilities were not used as evacuation centers, Ban Ki-Moon has called these actions "unacceptable". The full report is to be published, with 207 pages of recommendations.
See also: 04/20/15 DCI-Palestine: Israel Willfully Targeted & Murdered Gaza Children for further info and links.
Attacks to be considered of "extreme severity toward those who looked to them for protection and sought refuge and were granted shelter there, had their hope and trust denied”, according to a recent statement by the United Nations.
A UN girl's school was hit 88 times by mortar shells; another was torn by an anti-tank missile.
PNN reports that the investigation of the United Nations on "Operation Protective Edge", launched by Israel against the Gaza Strip last summer, is revealing its first accusations against the Israeli army.
For a brief but concise chronology of events leading up to the assault, see 10/25/14 10 O'clock In Jerusalem & All Is Not Well
The first major Israeli airstrikes in the region began as early as June of 2014.
The first results of the independent UN commission, headed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, investigating on 10 incidents during the 50 days of the operation, led Israeli military prosecutors to put under investigation three soldiers accused of robberies against Palestinians.
"Two soldiers - said a statement released yesterday by the Israeli army - are accused of looting of money in the amount of 2,420 shekels ($ 620, € 565) from a building in Al Shuja'eyya [one of the areas destroyed by the bombing] where the troops were stationed, and another is accused of aiding and abetting the crime."
In addition to this indictment, which is looked into by Tel Aviv military prosecution, the UN report highlights other crimes committed by the Israeli army.
The investigation's accusation is that the troops under orders from Tel Aviv have conducted seven deadly attacks against UN structures used as shelter by the population fleeing the bombing. In the raid on UN schools, as stated in the investigation, 44 people died and 227 were injured.
Investigations have revealed also some crimes committed by Palestinian resistance fighters, who reportedly hid weapons in three of the seven UN schools damaged by bombing, thought by the armies to be abandoned.
In two cases, moreover, the commission ruled that the Palestinian armed factions have "probably" fired at Israeli forces from the same schools. Although the facilities were not used as evacuation centers, Ban Ki-Moon has called these actions "unacceptable". The full report is to be published, with 207 pages of recommendations.
See also: 04/20/15 DCI-Palestine: Israel Willfully Targeted & Murdered Gaza Children for further info and links.
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The UN finally investigated the Palestinian storing of rockets in UNRWA schools and their use of the schools to launch rockets against Israel, all of which constitute grave violations of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law.
Key findings gleaned from the UN report: [PDF]
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- Hamas and/or Islamic Jihad stored rockets in schools that were in active use by children. During the war, former PLO lawyer Diana Buttu famously said on Al Jazeera that “the rockets that were found in the schools in UNRWA were schools that are not being used by anybody—school is out, I’ll have you know.” However, in the UNRWA Gaza Beach Elementary Co-educational “B” School, on 16 July 2014, the UN Board of Inquiry notes that the school gate was unlocked during the period leading up to the incident “in order to allow children access to the schoolyard.” School was out, but UNRWA was inviting the children back in to play.
- Hamas and/or Islamic Jihad fired rockets from UNRWA schools. In the Jabalia school listed above, the board found that “it was highly likely that an unidentified Palestinian armed group could have used the school premises to launch attacks on or around 14 July.” Similarly, concerning weaponry stored at the UNRWA Nuseirat Preparatory Co- educational “B” School, the UN inquiry found that “the premises could have been used for an unknown period of time by members of a Palestinian armed group” — and that “it was likely that such a group may have fired the mortar from within the premises of the school.”
Extracts [PDF] from the UN report on rockets stored in and fired from UNRWA facilities
Incident (h): Presence of weaponry at the UNRWA Gaza Beach Elementary Co- educational “B” School on 16 July 2014
49. Gaza Beach Elementary Co-educational “B” School is located in the heart of the Beach refugee camp, in the midst of a densely populated area of Gaza city. Four other UNRWA schools and an UNRWA health centre are located on the opposite side of the street. The school buildings are enclosed by a wall and there is one main gate. On two of its four sides, the schoolyard is surrounded by houses, which are built on the school’s boundary wall. These houses have windows opening on to the schoolyard on their lower floors; and one house connects with the schoolyard through a gate. Also next to the school, adjacent to the house with the connecting gate, is a private building, whose main gate is located next to the school’s gate. This house was bombed during Operation Protective Edge, prior to the incident.
50. Due to the summer vacation, the school was not in use at the time of Operation Protective Edge, nor was it used as a designated emergency shelter.
51. The Board was informed that two UNRWA school attendants were looking arier the school prior to and on the day of the incident. One worked the morning shift and the other, the afternoon. Five guards hired as part of UNRWA’s Job Creation Programme (JCP) were also assigned to the school, one worldng the morning shift and the other four sharing the night shift in pairs of two. In addition, the school principal inspected all the classrooms on some days.
52. The Board was informed that one of the school attendants had testified that he had performed his normal duties prior to and on the day of the incident. The other had testified that, for safety reasons, he was told to stay away fi’om the school and to relocate to the health centre across the street and watch the school from there. Prior to and on the day of the incident, the JCP guards were also not at the school, but at the health centre, in accordance with the same instruction. The Board was informed that an UNRWA official had issued this instruction for fear that the building next door to the school would be shelled again.
53. The Board was informed that the school gate was unlocked during the period leading up to the incident in order to allow children access to the schoolyard. It was also informed that there were two sets of keys to the classrooms, one for the morning shift and the other for the afternoon. One set of keys was kept in the school principal’s office. It was unclear where the other set was kept.
54. A team of Operations Support Officers (OSO) had inspected the school on 2 June as part of a regular inspection programme for all UNRWA facilities, designed to prevent breaches of their “neutrality”. No weapons or signs of militant activity had been reported by the team during that inspection. No further inspections had been conducted by OSO teams after that date due to the declaration by UNRWA’s Gaza Field Office of a state of emergency on 8 July. The OSO teams had then ceased to operate and their members been assigned to other, emergency-related functions.
55. On 16 July 2015, a 120 MM mortar tube, a mortar bipod and twenty 120 MM mortar-round containers, with ammunition, were discovered under a blanket in the corner of a locked classroom. The weapom’y was photographed.
56. UNRWA senior management notified the local authorities in Gaza and asked that the weapons be removed. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) contacted the Special Protection Unit (SPU) of the local police and also asked that the weapons be removed, apparently through the local police’s explosive ordnance detachment. The SPU asked that the United Nations guarantee that the IDF would not strike while the weapons were being removed and that a United Nations vehicle be used to remove the weapons. DSS refused.
57. The Board was informed that UNRWA had received testimony that two individuals identifying themselves as policemen had come to the school, alleged that they knew who was responsible for the cache of weapons and left a telephone number. Upon being contacted, one of these individuals stated that the weapons would be removed fi’om the school in the early morning. The Board was further informed that, early in the morning of 17 July, the door to the classroom in question was found locked, with no signs of forced entry or exit, and that it was noted that the weapons had been removed.
58. On 17 July, UNRWA informed Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the finding of the weapons and their subsequent disappearance. In the afternoon of 17 July, UNRWA issued a press release stating that a cache of approximately 20 rockets (sic) had been found hidden in a vacant school. Under a misapprehension that the explosive ordnance detachment of the local police had removed the weapom’y, the press release stated that UNRWA had informed the relevant parties and had successfully taken all necessary measures for the removal of the objects in order to preserve the safety and security of the school.
59. The Board found that, in the light of the situation in the vicinity, the security measures at the school were weak prior to and on the day of the incident, partly due to the fact that the personnel charged with the school’s security were subject to life-threatening circumstances. It also found that an unidentified Palestinian armed group had used the school premises to hide the weaponry.
Incident (i): Presence of weaponry at the UNRWA Jabalia Elementary “C” and Ayyobiya Boys School on 22 July 2014
60. The Jabalia Elementary “C” and Ayyobiya Boys School is one in a row of five schools situated in an urban area to the east of the Jabalia refugee camp. Behind the school is a large open area with small-scale agricultural land. The Board was informed that this area was known for its use as a firing site for armed groups and that it had been targeted by the IDF in past conflicts.
61. The school was never identified in UNRWA’s emergency management plan as a potential shelter due to security and safety concerns. At the time of the incident, it was in recess for the summer.
62. The Board was informed that the school normally employed four school attendants, but that, at the time of the incident, ttu’ee of them were absent. One school attendant resided at the school, but was on leave at the time and, afraid, spent most of his time indoors. In addition, the Board was informed that five guards hired as part of UNRWA’s Job Creation Programme (JCP) had been assigned to the school and were scheduled to work there from evening to morning. However, at the time of the incident, none of them was at the school. The school has one main gate, which, the Board was informed, was not usually locked. The school wall is not high enough to prevent intruders from climbing into the school.
63. A team of Operations Support Officers (OSO) had inspected the school on 12 May as part of the regular inspection programme for all UNRWA facilities described above.
No issues had been identified that compromised the neutrality of the premises. No further inspections had been conducted by OSO teams after that date for the reasons outlined above.
64. However, following the discovery of weaponry at the Gaza Beach Elementary Co-educational “B” School on 16 July, UNRWA management issued an instruction on 17 July that daily inspections be conducted of all UNRWA schools, including those that were not being used as shelters, to ensure that no weapons were being stored in them and that they were not being abused. Two UNRWA staff members were then tasked to conduct daily inspections of all schools in the area concerned. School attendants present at the schools were instructed to ensure that the daily inspections were conducted. The Board was informed that the school had been inspected on 19 July and that nothing unusual had been found, though not every part of the premises had been checked.
65. The area behind the school wall was known at the time for being used by militants, including for the firing of projectiles. The Board accordingly noted the dangerous nature of the inspection of the premises and found that, although a thorough inspection of the premises should have been conducted, such inspection could only have taken place in the presence of qualified security personnel.
66. In the morning of 22 July 2014, a crowd of approximately 300 persons arrived at the school gate and entered the schoolyard. Heavy shelling was occurring at the time in the area of Beit Hanoun, near Jabalia, and the IDF had dropped leaflets over Beit Hanoun warning the civilian population to evacuate the area. This had created a mass movement of people seeking shelter.
67. UNRWA management was alerted to the arrival of the displaced persons and sent an official to the school to ascertain whether it could be opened as a designated emergency shelter. Upon arrival, the official was immediately alerted by the displaced persons to the presence of an object, seemingly a weapon. Other UNRWA officials then came to the school to inspect the premises. They saw an object, seemingly a weapon, covered with a piece of cloth, in an area under the cover of some trees behind the toilet block and near the boundary wall separating the school from the open area behind it. No one approached the object to confirm whether it was a weapon. No photographs of it were taken; and, for this reason, the Board was unable to confirm with certainty what type of weapon may have been hidden at the school. However, it concluded that it was highly likely that a Palestinian armed group might have used the premises to hide weapons.
68. The area was immediately evacuated and the UNRWA officials went to the neighbouring schools to determine whether any of them would be suitable to shelter the hundreds of displaced persons an’iving in the area. About an hour later, they returned to the school, to be informed by the displaced persons that the object had been removed. They then confirmed that the object was no longer at the rear of the school.
69. Following the finding of the object, UNRWA officials contacted the local authorities in Gaza, Israel’s Coordination and Liaison Administa’ation (CLA) and Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the evening of 22 July, UNRWA issued a press release stating that rockets (sic) had been found hidden in a vacant school in Gaza and that UNRWA was pursuing all possible measures for their removal in order to preserve the safety and security of the school. The Board was informed that, at the time, UNRWA senior officials understood that the suspected weapon or weapons were still at the school. The following morning, the Deputy Commissioner General informed Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the plan to remove the suspected weapon or weapons. Later that same day, having learned of their disappearance, she informed the Ministry of this. The Board found that communications within UNRWA may have been confusing at critical times during the management of the incident. However, it also noted the enormous pressure under which UNRWA staff were operating, often handling multiple complex and life-threatening situations.
70. The Government of Israel showed the Board a video, which the Board concluded was authentic, showing the launching of a projectile from within the school premises on 14 July. The Government also provided a document which was said to identify the places close to the school from which rockets had been launched, together with the dates of those launches. The Board concluded that it was highly likely that an unidentified Palestinian armed group could have used the school premises to launch attacks on or around 14 July.
Incident (j): Presence of weaponry at the UNRWA Nuseirat Preparatory Co- educational “B” School on 29 July 2014 and on 17 August 2014
71. The UNRWA Nuseirat Preparatory Co-educational “B” School is located in a semi- rural area, northwest of the Nuseirat Camp, south of Gaza city. Two houses and a mosque are located less than one metre from the school wall and an apartment building, less than a hundred metres away. The school is enclosed by a wall. There is one main gate and a small pedestrian door adjacent to it and one secondary gate in a side wall.
72. The school was on recess at the time of the incident. It was not used as a designated emergency shelter.
73. The Board was informed that the main gate was locked during the recess, but not the adjacent pedestrian gate. The secondary gate was kept locked. Students would regularly climb up the front wall and enter the school. At the time of the incident, none of the classrooms were locked.
74. The school had only two attendants, who worked the morning shift on alternate days. One did not attend some days because of the security situation and the shelling. In addition, five guards hired as part of UNRWA’s Job Creation Programme (JCP) were assigned to the school, one on the afternoon shift and the others, in pairs of two, on the night shift. There was evidence that, on several occasions, the JCP guards were not present at the school when the school attendant an’ived in the morning, including the day of the incident.
75. A team of Operations Support Officers (OSO) had inspected the school on 19 May as part of the regular inspection programme for all UNRWA facilities described above. The team reported no weapons or signs of militant activity. No further inspections had been conducted by OSO teams after that date for the reasons set out above. As of the discovery of weapons at the Gaza Beach Elementary Co-educational “B” School on 16 July, the school attendants were instructed to inspect the school daily. However, the Board was informed that one of the attendants did not do so. The last inspection was carried out on 27 July. The day after was Eid al-Fitr and there was no school attendant at the school, though the JCP guards were present.
76. On 29 July, a 120 MM mortal” tube, a 120 MM mortar bipod and three 120 MM mortar containers were found, covered by a blanket, behind a locked internal gate leading to a stairwell. The weapons were photographed.
77. That same day, UNRWA officials informed the Israeli authorities and the local authorities in Gaza. In accordance with guidance provided by United Nations Headquarters, a mission was arranged for later that day to verify the weapons and render them safe. However, it was later called off because of the security situation in the vicinity of the school. In the evening, UNRWA issued a press release reporting that rockets (sic) had been found in an UNRWA school, that all parties had been informed and that United Nations munitions experts had been unable to access the school because of the security situation, but would do so once it improved.
78. On 30 July, UNRWA officials went to the school, ahead of a visit by United Nations munitions experts. They found no school attendants or JCP guards at the premises and that the lock of the gate to the stairwell had been broken and the weapons had disappeared.
79. The Board was informed that, between 30 July and 17 August, security at the school may have been compromised at least on one occasion by the presence of unidentified individuals and, possibly, of mortar weaponry.
80. On 17 August, a 120 MM mortar tube, a 120 MM mortar bipod and twenty 120 MM mortar containers were found in a small room under a stairwell. Water,
lubricant-oil bottles and boards apparently used as beds were also found, as well as writing in Arabic on a blackboard, seemingly depicting military operations. At the rear of the school, a mortar base plate was found, embedded in the sand. These items were photographed. The mortar cases, mortar tube, bipod and base plate were removed from the school and rendered safe.
81. The Board was informed that UNRWA officials contacted the Israeli authorities and explained that the weapons were in the possession of the United Nations and that they would not be handed over to any party. The Deputy Prime Minister of the Palestinian Govermnent of National Consensus was also informed.
82. The Board found that, in light of the security situation around the school at the time, the security measures at the school were weak, both prior to and on the days of the two incidents, partly due to the fact that the personnel charged with security at the school were subject to life-tba’eatening circumstances. The Board also found that the presence of weapons and other evidence found in the school indicated that the premises could have been used for an unknown period of time by members of a Palestinian armed group and that it was likely that such a group may have fired the mortar from within the premises of the school.
Incident (h): Presence of weaponry at the UNRWA Gaza Beach Elementary Co- educational “B” School on 16 July 2014
49. Gaza Beach Elementary Co-educational “B” School is located in the heart of the Beach refugee camp, in the midst of a densely populated area of Gaza city. Four other UNRWA schools and an UNRWA health centre are located on the opposite side of the street. The school buildings are enclosed by a wall and there is one main gate. On two of its four sides, the schoolyard is surrounded by houses, which are built on the school’s boundary wall. These houses have windows opening on to the schoolyard on their lower floors; and one house connects with the schoolyard through a gate. Also next to the school, adjacent to the house with the connecting gate, is a private building, whose main gate is located next to the school’s gate. This house was bombed during Operation Protective Edge, prior to the incident.
50. Due to the summer vacation, the school was not in use at the time of Operation Protective Edge, nor was it used as a designated emergency shelter.
51. The Board was informed that two UNRWA school attendants were looking arier the school prior to and on the day of the incident. One worked the morning shift and the other, the afternoon. Five guards hired as part of UNRWA’s Job Creation Programme (JCP) were also assigned to the school, one worldng the morning shift and the other four sharing the night shift in pairs of two. In addition, the school principal inspected all the classrooms on some days.
52. The Board was informed that one of the school attendants had testified that he had performed his normal duties prior to and on the day of the incident. The other had testified that, for safety reasons, he was told to stay away fi’om the school and to relocate to the health centre across the street and watch the school from there. Prior to and on the day of the incident, the JCP guards were also not at the school, but at the health centre, in accordance with the same instruction. The Board was informed that an UNRWA official had issued this instruction for fear that the building next door to the school would be shelled again.
53. The Board was informed that the school gate was unlocked during the period leading up to the incident in order to allow children access to the schoolyard. It was also informed that there were two sets of keys to the classrooms, one for the morning shift and the other for the afternoon. One set of keys was kept in the school principal’s office. It was unclear where the other set was kept.
54. A team of Operations Support Officers (OSO) had inspected the school on 2 June as part of a regular inspection programme for all UNRWA facilities, designed to prevent breaches of their “neutrality”. No weapons or signs of militant activity had been reported by the team during that inspection. No further inspections had been conducted by OSO teams after that date due to the declaration by UNRWA’s Gaza Field Office of a state of emergency on 8 July. The OSO teams had then ceased to operate and their members been assigned to other, emergency-related functions.
55. On 16 July 2015, a 120 MM mortar tube, a mortar bipod and twenty 120 MM mortar-round containers, with ammunition, were discovered under a blanket in the corner of a locked classroom. The weapom’y was photographed.
56. UNRWA senior management notified the local authorities in Gaza and asked that the weapons be removed. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) contacted the Special Protection Unit (SPU) of the local police and also asked that the weapons be removed, apparently through the local police’s explosive ordnance detachment. The SPU asked that the United Nations guarantee that the IDF would not strike while the weapons were being removed and that a United Nations vehicle be used to remove the weapons. DSS refused.
57. The Board was informed that UNRWA had received testimony that two individuals identifying themselves as policemen had come to the school, alleged that they knew who was responsible for the cache of weapons and left a telephone number. Upon being contacted, one of these individuals stated that the weapons would be removed fi’om the school in the early morning. The Board was further informed that, early in the morning of 17 July, the door to the classroom in question was found locked, with no signs of forced entry or exit, and that it was noted that the weapons had been removed.
58. On 17 July, UNRWA informed Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the finding of the weapons and their subsequent disappearance. In the afternoon of 17 July, UNRWA issued a press release stating that a cache of approximately 20 rockets (sic) had been found hidden in a vacant school. Under a misapprehension that the explosive ordnance detachment of the local police had removed the weapom’y, the press release stated that UNRWA had informed the relevant parties and had successfully taken all necessary measures for the removal of the objects in order to preserve the safety and security of the school.
59. The Board found that, in the light of the situation in the vicinity, the security measures at the school were weak prior to and on the day of the incident, partly due to the fact that the personnel charged with the school’s security were subject to life-threatening circumstances. It also found that an unidentified Palestinian armed group had used the school premises to hide the weaponry.
Incident (i): Presence of weaponry at the UNRWA Jabalia Elementary “C” and Ayyobiya Boys School on 22 July 2014
60. The Jabalia Elementary “C” and Ayyobiya Boys School is one in a row of five schools situated in an urban area to the east of the Jabalia refugee camp. Behind the school is a large open area with small-scale agricultural land. The Board was informed that this area was known for its use as a firing site for armed groups and that it had been targeted by the IDF in past conflicts.
61. The school was never identified in UNRWA’s emergency management plan as a potential shelter due to security and safety concerns. At the time of the incident, it was in recess for the summer.
62. The Board was informed that the school normally employed four school attendants, but that, at the time of the incident, ttu’ee of them were absent. One school attendant resided at the school, but was on leave at the time and, afraid, spent most of his time indoors. In addition, the Board was informed that five guards hired as part of UNRWA’s Job Creation Programme (JCP) had been assigned to the school and were scheduled to work there from evening to morning. However, at the time of the incident, none of them was at the school. The school has one main gate, which, the Board was informed, was not usually locked. The school wall is not high enough to prevent intruders from climbing into the school.
63. A team of Operations Support Officers (OSO) had inspected the school on 12 May as part of the regular inspection programme for all UNRWA facilities described above.
No issues had been identified that compromised the neutrality of the premises. No further inspections had been conducted by OSO teams after that date for the reasons outlined above.
64. However, following the discovery of weaponry at the Gaza Beach Elementary Co-educational “B” School on 16 July, UNRWA management issued an instruction on 17 July that daily inspections be conducted of all UNRWA schools, including those that were not being used as shelters, to ensure that no weapons were being stored in them and that they were not being abused. Two UNRWA staff members were then tasked to conduct daily inspections of all schools in the area concerned. School attendants present at the schools were instructed to ensure that the daily inspections were conducted. The Board was informed that the school had been inspected on 19 July and that nothing unusual had been found, though not every part of the premises had been checked.
65. The area behind the school wall was known at the time for being used by militants, including for the firing of projectiles. The Board accordingly noted the dangerous nature of the inspection of the premises and found that, although a thorough inspection of the premises should have been conducted, such inspection could only have taken place in the presence of qualified security personnel.
66. In the morning of 22 July 2014, a crowd of approximately 300 persons arrived at the school gate and entered the schoolyard. Heavy shelling was occurring at the time in the area of Beit Hanoun, near Jabalia, and the IDF had dropped leaflets over Beit Hanoun warning the civilian population to evacuate the area. This had created a mass movement of people seeking shelter.
67. UNRWA management was alerted to the arrival of the displaced persons and sent an official to the school to ascertain whether it could be opened as a designated emergency shelter. Upon arrival, the official was immediately alerted by the displaced persons to the presence of an object, seemingly a weapon. Other UNRWA officials then came to the school to inspect the premises. They saw an object, seemingly a weapon, covered with a piece of cloth, in an area under the cover of some trees behind the toilet block and near the boundary wall separating the school from the open area behind it. No one approached the object to confirm whether it was a weapon. No photographs of it were taken; and, for this reason, the Board was unable to confirm with certainty what type of weapon may have been hidden at the school. However, it concluded that it was highly likely that a Palestinian armed group might have used the premises to hide weapons.
68. The area was immediately evacuated and the UNRWA officials went to the neighbouring schools to determine whether any of them would be suitable to shelter the hundreds of displaced persons an’iving in the area. About an hour later, they returned to the school, to be informed by the displaced persons that the object had been removed. They then confirmed that the object was no longer at the rear of the school.
69. Following the finding of the object, UNRWA officials contacted the local authorities in Gaza, Israel’s Coordination and Liaison Administa’ation (CLA) and Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the evening of 22 July, UNRWA issued a press release stating that rockets (sic) had been found hidden in a vacant school in Gaza and that UNRWA was pursuing all possible measures for their removal in order to preserve the safety and security of the school. The Board was informed that, at the time, UNRWA senior officials understood that the suspected weapon or weapons were still at the school. The following morning, the Deputy Commissioner General informed Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the plan to remove the suspected weapon or weapons. Later that same day, having learned of their disappearance, she informed the Ministry of this. The Board found that communications within UNRWA may have been confusing at critical times during the management of the incident. However, it also noted the enormous pressure under which UNRWA staff were operating, often handling multiple complex and life-threatening situations.
70. The Government of Israel showed the Board a video, which the Board concluded was authentic, showing the launching of a projectile from within the school premises on 14 July. The Government also provided a document which was said to identify the places close to the school from which rockets had been launched, together with the dates of those launches. The Board concluded that it was highly likely that an unidentified Palestinian armed group could have used the school premises to launch attacks on or around 14 July.
Incident (j): Presence of weaponry at the UNRWA Nuseirat Preparatory Co- educational “B” School on 29 July 2014 and on 17 August 2014
71. The UNRWA Nuseirat Preparatory Co-educational “B” School is located in a semi- rural area, northwest of the Nuseirat Camp, south of Gaza city. Two houses and a mosque are located less than one metre from the school wall and an apartment building, less than a hundred metres away. The school is enclosed by a wall. There is one main gate and a small pedestrian door adjacent to it and one secondary gate in a side wall.
72. The school was on recess at the time of the incident. It was not used as a designated emergency shelter.
73. The Board was informed that the main gate was locked during the recess, but not the adjacent pedestrian gate. The secondary gate was kept locked. Students would regularly climb up the front wall and enter the school. At the time of the incident, none of the classrooms were locked.
74. The school had only two attendants, who worked the morning shift on alternate days. One did not attend some days because of the security situation and the shelling. In addition, five guards hired as part of UNRWA’s Job Creation Programme (JCP) were assigned to the school, one on the afternoon shift and the others, in pairs of two, on the night shift. There was evidence that, on several occasions, the JCP guards were not present at the school when the school attendant an’ived in the morning, including the day of the incident.
75. A team of Operations Support Officers (OSO) had inspected the school on 19 May as part of the regular inspection programme for all UNRWA facilities described above. The team reported no weapons or signs of militant activity. No further inspections had been conducted by OSO teams after that date for the reasons set out above. As of the discovery of weapons at the Gaza Beach Elementary Co-educational “B” School on 16 July, the school attendants were instructed to inspect the school daily. However, the Board was informed that one of the attendants did not do so. The last inspection was carried out on 27 July. The day after was Eid al-Fitr and there was no school attendant at the school, though the JCP guards were present.
76. On 29 July, a 120 MM mortal” tube, a 120 MM mortar bipod and three 120 MM mortar containers were found, covered by a blanket, behind a locked internal gate leading to a stairwell. The weapons were photographed.
77. That same day, UNRWA officials informed the Israeli authorities and the local authorities in Gaza. In accordance with guidance provided by United Nations Headquarters, a mission was arranged for later that day to verify the weapons and render them safe. However, it was later called off because of the security situation in the vicinity of the school. In the evening, UNRWA issued a press release reporting that rockets (sic) had been found in an UNRWA school, that all parties had been informed and that United Nations munitions experts had been unable to access the school because of the security situation, but would do so once it improved.
78. On 30 July, UNRWA officials went to the school, ahead of a visit by United Nations munitions experts. They found no school attendants or JCP guards at the premises and that the lock of the gate to the stairwell had been broken and the weapons had disappeared.
79. The Board was informed that, between 30 July and 17 August, security at the school may have been compromised at least on one occasion by the presence of unidentified individuals and, possibly, of mortar weaponry.
80. On 17 August, a 120 MM mortar tube, a 120 MM mortar bipod and twenty 120 MM mortar containers were found in a small room under a stairwell. Water,
lubricant-oil bottles and boards apparently used as beds were also found, as well as writing in Arabic on a blackboard, seemingly depicting military operations. At the rear of the school, a mortar base plate was found, embedded in the sand. These items were photographed. The mortar cases, mortar tube, bipod and base plate were removed from the school and rendered safe.
81. The Board was informed that UNRWA officials contacted the Israeli authorities and explained that the weapons were in the possession of the United Nations and that they would not be handed over to any party. The Deputy Prime Minister of the Palestinian Govermnent of National Consensus was also informed.
82. The Board found that, in light of the security situation around the school at the time, the security measures at the school were weak, both prior to and on the days of the two incidents, partly due to the fact that the personnel charged with security at the school were subject to life-tba’eatening circumstances. The Board also found that the presence of weapons and other evidence found in the school indicated that the premises could have been used for an unknown period of time by members of a Palestinian armed group and that it was likely that such a group may have fired the mortar from within the premises of the school.
26 apr 2015
IDF say two soldiers indicted on suspicion they took about $605 from Palestinian's home in Gaza, while another accused of helping them during summer war with Hamas; additional cases of wrongful death of Palestinian being probed by IDF.
Three Golani soldiers have been accused on Sunday of stealing NIS 2,420 (roughly $605) from a home they took over in Gaza City's Saja'iyya neighborhood during Operation Protective Edge last summer.
The military said it tried to find the owner of the building and that the alleged looting took place in an area that saw some of the heaviest fighting in the 50-day Operation Protective Edge.
Two of three, who were removed from their combat positions after the theft was discovered during the operation, have also been indicted by the Military Prosecutor for obstruction of justice. The indictment was filed at the Haifa Military Court last week. During the investigation, the Military Prosecutor's Office tried unsuccessfully to recruit one of the accused as a state witness, a move that later turned out to be unnecessary.
The soldiers' commanders learned of the theft shortly after it occurred, and the battalion commander was quick to report the crime to military police. The stolen money was returned.
Black Friday
The Military Prosecutor's Office is still examining cases in which innocent civilian Palestinians were killed from IDF fire during the operation, and Chief Military Advocate General Danny Efroni is expected to decide whether to open criminal investigations into the incidents.
The most controversial case on Efroni's desk is the fighting on "Rafah's Black Friday" on August 1, 2014, when the IDF bombarded Rafah after a Hamas cell violated a humanitarian ceasefire, killing three soldiers and seizing the body of one of them - Hadar Goldin.
The Palestinians first claimed 150 people were killed in IDF bombardments that day and later amended the number to some 70. An IDF investigation found only about 40, roughly half of them armed terrorists.
Army officials said it is unlikely a criminal investigation will be launched against Givati commanders leading the fighting in Rafah, noting the firepower used was proportional and appropriate to the severity of the incident.
Meanwhile, investigations have also been opened in additional cases of criminal misconduct which resulted in the death of innocent Palestinians, the most prominent one case in which an IDF shelling of a UNRWA school which killed some 20 Palestinians. Another case in which a bound Palestinian was beaten, and another in which soldiers fired on a Palestinian ambulance, are also being investigated.
Operation Protective Edge was the third and bloodiest round of fighting since late 2008 between Israel and the Islamic terror group Hamas that rules Gaza. Some 2,200 people were killed on the Palestinian side and 72 on the Israeli side.
The lawyer for one of the three charged with looting said in response that the evidence does not unequivocally support the indictment: "This is a good soldier with no past disciplinary record who was sent to defend his country and risked his life. The decision to charge him is bizarre in light of the fact that he was unaware he was committing an offense at the time."
Three Golani soldiers have been accused on Sunday of stealing NIS 2,420 (roughly $605) from a home they took over in Gaza City's Saja'iyya neighborhood during Operation Protective Edge last summer.
The military said it tried to find the owner of the building and that the alleged looting took place in an area that saw some of the heaviest fighting in the 50-day Operation Protective Edge.
Two of three, who were removed from their combat positions after the theft was discovered during the operation, have also been indicted by the Military Prosecutor for obstruction of justice. The indictment was filed at the Haifa Military Court last week. During the investigation, the Military Prosecutor's Office tried unsuccessfully to recruit one of the accused as a state witness, a move that later turned out to be unnecessary.
The soldiers' commanders learned of the theft shortly after it occurred, and the battalion commander was quick to report the crime to military police. The stolen money was returned.
Black Friday
The Military Prosecutor's Office is still examining cases in which innocent civilian Palestinians were killed from IDF fire during the operation, and Chief Military Advocate General Danny Efroni is expected to decide whether to open criminal investigations into the incidents.
The most controversial case on Efroni's desk is the fighting on "Rafah's Black Friday" on August 1, 2014, when the IDF bombarded Rafah after a Hamas cell violated a humanitarian ceasefire, killing three soldiers and seizing the body of one of them - Hadar Goldin.
The Palestinians first claimed 150 people were killed in IDF bombardments that day and later amended the number to some 70. An IDF investigation found only about 40, roughly half of them armed terrorists.
Army officials said it is unlikely a criminal investigation will be launched against Givati commanders leading the fighting in Rafah, noting the firepower used was proportional and appropriate to the severity of the incident.
Meanwhile, investigations have also been opened in additional cases of criminal misconduct which resulted in the death of innocent Palestinians, the most prominent one case in which an IDF shelling of a UNRWA school which killed some 20 Palestinians. Another case in which a bound Palestinian was beaten, and another in which soldiers fired on a Palestinian ambulance, are also being investigated.
Operation Protective Edge was the third and bloodiest round of fighting since late 2008 between Israel and the Islamic terror group Hamas that rules Gaza. Some 2,200 people were killed on the Palestinian side and 72 on the Israeli side.
The lawyer for one of the three charged with looting said in response that the evidence does not unequivocally support the indictment: "This is a good soldier with no past disciplinary record who was sent to defend his country and risked his life. The decision to charge him is bizarre in light of the fact that he was unaware he was committing an offense at the time."
