25 feb 2012
Ten years before the Bosnian Genocide, ethnic cleansing and massacres of Palestinian civilians shocked the entire World. To this day, the Sabra and Shatila massacre hold a special place in the pages of dark history, outlining mans’ inhumanity to man.
The Sabra and Shatila massacre took place in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, Lebanon between September 16 and September 18, 1982, during the Lebanese civil war. Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were massacred in the camps by Christian Lebanese Phalangists while the camp was surrounded by the Israel Defense Force. In that period of time, Israel was at war with the PLO in Lebanon. Israeli forces occupied Beirut, controlled the entrances to the refugee camps of Palestinians and controlled the entrance to the city.
On December 16, 1982, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the Sabra and Shatila massacre and declared it to be an act of Genocide. There is no precise number of victims, but estimates range from 700–800 to 3,500 in a single massacre (depending on the source). The text of the UN resolution follows:
December 16, 1982.
The General Assembly of the United Nations,
Recalling its resolution 95 (I) of 11 December, 1946,
Recalling also its resolution 96 (I) of 11 December, 1946, in which it, inter alia, affirmed that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices – whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds – are punishable,
Referring to the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December, 1948,6/
Recalling the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August, 1949,2/
Appalled at the large-scale massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps situated at Beirut,
Recognizing the universal outrage and condemnation of that massacre,
Recalling its resolution ES-7/9 of 24 September, 1982,
1. Condemns in the strongest terms the large-scale massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps;
2. Resolves that the massacre was an act of genocide.
The Sabra and Shatila massacre took place in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, Lebanon between September 16 and September 18, 1982, during the Lebanese civil war. Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were massacred in the camps by Christian Lebanese Phalangists while the camp was surrounded by the Israel Defense Force. In that period of time, Israel was at war with the PLO in Lebanon. Israeli forces occupied Beirut, controlled the entrances to the refugee camps of Palestinians and controlled the entrance to the city.
On December 16, 1982, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the Sabra and Shatila massacre and declared it to be an act of Genocide. There is no precise number of victims, but estimates range from 700–800 to 3,500 in a single massacre (depending on the source). The text of the UN resolution follows:
December 16, 1982.
The General Assembly of the United Nations,
Recalling its resolution 95 (I) of 11 December, 1946,
Recalling also its resolution 96 (I) of 11 December, 1946, in which it, inter alia, affirmed that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices – whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds – are punishable,
Referring to the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December, 1948,6/
Recalling the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August, 1949,2/
Appalled at the large-scale massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps situated at Beirut,
Recognizing the universal outrage and condemnation of that massacre,
Recalling its resolution ES-7/9 of 24 September, 1982,
1. Condemns in the strongest terms the large-scale massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps;
2. Resolves that the massacre was an act of genocide.
22 feb 2013
Archives shed light on the collapse of the Begin government
Ariel Sharon was blissfully oblivious of the reality when he tried to contain the damage in the First Lebanon War by going from an all-out war to a constantly simmering low-intensity conflict
The newly released Sabra and Shatila papers tell us nothing new about the military aspect, but do shed a cold light on then-defense minister, Ariel Sharon.
The Sabra and Shatila documents, released today for publication by the State Archives, are an important addition to public knowledge of the 1982 Lebanon War and the functioning of the Menahem Begin government of the time.
The papers do not shed new light on the massacre. Long passages, mostly quotes of Israeli Defense Force officials, remain censored, keeping alive the suspicion that Israel is still hiding some aspects of its part in the deaths.
Censorship is beyond the control of State Archives, but it casts a shadow on its welcome initiative, and some of the separate but energetic actions by the IDF archives, to reveal documents from the not-so-distant past, especially concerning wars.
But if these documents shed no light on security matters, they do on the disintegration of Menachem Begin's second government, the one without Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizmann and Yigael Yadin.
The main issue is Ariel Sharon's struggle to remain in office after the Commission for Inquiry of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, headed by former Justice Yitzhak Kahan, recommended that he be ousted from the Defense Ministry.
The commission's aim was to remove Sharon altogether from the government, but the legal formulation of the relevant clause enabled him to remain, though not at the Defense Ministry. Sharon's well-known yearning to return to his farm and to the tractor – he presented himself as a farmer – was not to be fulfilled. The guillotine that was prepared for him by his fellow ministers, as he put it, did not work. He was ousted from the Defense Ministry, but not from the government.
But Sharon's battle against the Kahan Commission proved to be Begin's downfall.
At the cabinet meetings, Sharon sounded ungrateful. Begin reminded him that it wasn't an easy decision to appoint him to the Defense Ministry (in the summer of 1981), after he was forced to be satisfied with the Agriculture Ministry in Begin's first government. After Weizmann resigned from the post, Begin himself served as Defense Minster for a year and held many "consultations" – meaning that he was advised against it – until he finally succumbed to Sharon's wish.
Sharon in response broadly hinted that Begin's personal integrity and his direct responsibility for the IDF's inaction as the Christian Phalangist militia entered the Beirut refugee camps and committed the massacre would be internationally condemned if the government were to adopt the Kahan Commission's recommendations.
In order to scare the government and force it to reject the Commission's report, Sharon inflated the Commission's assertions. He argued that they might be used to accuse Israel – or in fact, the Begin government – of being party to a genocide.
The transparent ploy failed thanks to a direct attack by other ministers, led by the National Religious Party's Yosef Burg (who called Sharon "a minister who carries weight"), and assisted by the attorney general, Yitzhak Zamir.
In many ways, the transcription of the meeting where the decision finally fell to oust Sharon from the Defense Ministry, reads like a comedy sketch starring three attorneys: one, who actually practiced law – the attorney general – and two others who had studied law, but engaged in different fields. Begin too, who was sometimes coined a "Polish attorney," is humble and declines to describe himself as professional man of law.
The legal aspect was important, since the politicians hoped to find a legal loophole from the mess. In September 1982, Begin caved in to public pressure, and did exactly what the Golda Meir government did in November 1973, also under Begin's pressure, after the Yom Kippur War. The precedent of the Agranat Comission, headed by the president of the Supreme Court and with the participation of another Supreme Court justice, ultimately led to Begin and the Likud replacing Golda Meir and the Labor party in government.
Sharon tried to argue that the Agranat Commission had five members as opposed to three in the Kahan Commission. The ministers ignored this point.
The Agranat Commission had leveled blame at the army chief of staff and other senior officers but had mercy on the politicians. The Kahan Commission on the other hand added the defense minister to the list of culprits which included the chief of staff, the director of Military Intelligence, and a certain division commander. Thus the Agranat Commission indirectly caused a problem for Sharon in particular, and the Begin government as a whole.
Zamir could have prevented the Lebanon war if he had only seriously handled a complaint concerning Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan's deviations from authority – together with two major generals and two colonels. That was a mistake for which Yehudit Karp, his assistant at the time, expressed regret only last month. The attorney general offered no escape route for Sharon or the government.
Zamir unequivocally rejected all the formulations that would have the report, its findings and assertions – but not its recommendations – adopted. The ministers realized that the attorney general would not help them to present to the public a decision which was self-contradictory.
Sharon's efforts to deflect the debate to Eitan's and the other officers' military achievements were brushed aside, as was his quip at the commission members and the cabinet who had the luxury of reaching decisions "not on the roof of the command post, under fire."
Thus the Begin-Sharon alignment, with Eitan as a junior partner, which had managed to sink the IDF deep into the Lebanese quagmire, disintegrated.
Within six months Begin's condition deteriorated, culminating in his withdrawal, depression and resignation.
The only survivor of these meetings, who was still active in Netanyahu's last government, was Dan Meridor, who served at the time as government secretary.
Meridor who backed Begin against Sharon, doesn't need the State Archives to remind him who gained most by the unraveling of the plot. More than Moshe Arens, who returned from the Washington embassy to the Defense Ministry or Shimon Peres who was appointed prime minister a year and half later, it was the most silent of all ministers, during the massacre and the government debates, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Several months after these decisive government meetings, Shamir became prime minister, a post he held until 1984, and later, for six more years.
The newly released Sabra and Shatila papers tell us nothing new about the military aspect, but do shed a cold light on then-defense minister, Ariel Sharon.
The Sabra and Shatila documents, released today for publication by the State Archives, are an important addition to public knowledge of the 1982 Lebanon War and the functioning of the Menahem Begin government of the time.
The papers do not shed new light on the massacre. Long passages, mostly quotes of Israeli Defense Force officials, remain censored, keeping alive the suspicion that Israel is still hiding some aspects of its part in the deaths.
Censorship is beyond the control of State Archives, but it casts a shadow on its welcome initiative, and some of the separate but energetic actions by the IDF archives, to reveal documents from the not-so-distant past, especially concerning wars.
But if these documents shed no light on security matters, they do on the disintegration of Menachem Begin's second government, the one without Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizmann and Yigael Yadin.
The main issue is Ariel Sharon's struggle to remain in office after the Commission for Inquiry of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, headed by former Justice Yitzhak Kahan, recommended that he be ousted from the Defense Ministry.
The commission's aim was to remove Sharon altogether from the government, but the legal formulation of the relevant clause enabled him to remain, though not at the Defense Ministry. Sharon's well-known yearning to return to his farm and to the tractor – he presented himself as a farmer – was not to be fulfilled. The guillotine that was prepared for him by his fellow ministers, as he put it, did not work. He was ousted from the Defense Ministry, but not from the government.
But Sharon's battle against the Kahan Commission proved to be Begin's downfall.
At the cabinet meetings, Sharon sounded ungrateful. Begin reminded him that it wasn't an easy decision to appoint him to the Defense Ministry (in the summer of 1981), after he was forced to be satisfied with the Agriculture Ministry in Begin's first government. After Weizmann resigned from the post, Begin himself served as Defense Minster for a year and held many "consultations" – meaning that he was advised against it – until he finally succumbed to Sharon's wish.
Sharon in response broadly hinted that Begin's personal integrity and his direct responsibility for the IDF's inaction as the Christian Phalangist militia entered the Beirut refugee camps and committed the massacre would be internationally condemned if the government were to adopt the Kahan Commission's recommendations.
In order to scare the government and force it to reject the Commission's report, Sharon inflated the Commission's assertions. He argued that they might be used to accuse Israel – or in fact, the Begin government – of being party to a genocide.
The transparent ploy failed thanks to a direct attack by other ministers, led by the National Religious Party's Yosef Burg (who called Sharon "a minister who carries weight"), and assisted by the attorney general, Yitzhak Zamir.
In many ways, the transcription of the meeting where the decision finally fell to oust Sharon from the Defense Ministry, reads like a comedy sketch starring three attorneys: one, who actually practiced law – the attorney general – and two others who had studied law, but engaged in different fields. Begin too, who was sometimes coined a "Polish attorney," is humble and declines to describe himself as professional man of law.
The legal aspect was important, since the politicians hoped to find a legal loophole from the mess. In September 1982, Begin caved in to public pressure, and did exactly what the Golda Meir government did in November 1973, also under Begin's pressure, after the Yom Kippur War. The precedent of the Agranat Comission, headed by the president of the Supreme Court and with the participation of another Supreme Court justice, ultimately led to Begin and the Likud replacing Golda Meir and the Labor party in government.
Sharon tried to argue that the Agranat Commission had five members as opposed to three in the Kahan Commission. The ministers ignored this point.
The Agranat Commission had leveled blame at the army chief of staff and other senior officers but had mercy on the politicians. The Kahan Commission on the other hand added the defense minister to the list of culprits which included the chief of staff, the director of Military Intelligence, and a certain division commander. Thus the Agranat Commission indirectly caused a problem for Sharon in particular, and the Begin government as a whole.
Zamir could have prevented the Lebanon war if he had only seriously handled a complaint concerning Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan's deviations from authority – together with two major generals and two colonels. That was a mistake for which Yehudit Karp, his assistant at the time, expressed regret only last month. The attorney general offered no escape route for Sharon or the government.
Zamir unequivocally rejected all the formulations that would have the report, its findings and assertions – but not its recommendations – adopted. The ministers realized that the attorney general would not help them to present to the public a decision which was self-contradictory.
Sharon's efforts to deflect the debate to Eitan's and the other officers' military achievements were brushed aside, as was his quip at the commission members and the cabinet who had the luxury of reaching decisions "not on the roof of the command post, under fire."
Thus the Begin-Sharon alignment, with Eitan as a junior partner, which had managed to sink the IDF deep into the Lebanese quagmire, disintegrated.
Within six months Begin's condition deteriorated, culminating in his withdrawal, depression and resignation.
The only survivor of these meetings, who was still active in Netanyahu's last government, was Dan Meridor, who served at the time as government secretary.
Meridor who backed Begin against Sharon, doesn't need the State Archives to remind him who gained most by the unraveling of the plot. More than Moshe Arens, who returned from the Washington embassy to the Defense Ministry or Shimon Peres who was appointed prime minister a year and half later, it was the most silent of all ministers, during the massacre and the government debates, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Several months after these decisive government meetings, Shamir became prime minister, a post he held until 1984, and later, for six more years.
21 feb 2013
Ariel Sharon feared genocide charges over Israel's role in Sabra and Shatila
Ariel Sharon, center, Rafael Eitan and Amir Drori in the First Lebanon War, 1982
Notes from 1983 cabinet meeting show former defense minister was concerned that the entire government, including Prime Minister Menachem Begin, would be accused of genocide in the massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon if the Kahan commission's findings were accepted.
Ariel Sharon feared charges of genocide and demands for compensation following the first Lebanon War, state archives have revealed.
The State Archives has just released the protocol of the cabinet meeting in February 1983, in which the commission’s findings were discussed. The protocol reveals some fascinating quotations from the former prime minister, who served as defense minister during that invasion and would return and lead the country two decades later.
Sharon worried that if the government were to accept some of the conclusions of the Kahan commission of inquiry set up to investigate the 1982 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, it would expose itself to charges of war crimes.
Arriving late at the cabinet meeting, held on February 10, 1983, Sharon launched into a speech outlining his response to the commission’s report. “I’ve had a chance to read it thoroughly, and there are definitely some parts of it which we should embrace. However, there are sections in it that we cannot accept,” he said in his opening comments. “I’ve concluded that some sections must be emphatically rejected by the cabinet. There are portions in the report that we, as Jews and citizens of Israel, as ministers of the Israeli government, cannot accept.”
Sharon lashed out in particular at the commission’s determination that the country’s civilian and military leaders had ignored the risks of such a massacre taking place. “This goes well beyond the personal issue on everyone’s mind, of whether I stay or go,” added Sharon. “The report’s words ‘ignored’ imply that this was done knowingly. That includes all of us sitting around this table who appeared before the commission, including you, Prime Minister [Menachem Begin]. The commission has specifically said that not only was there a risk of a massacre, but that all of us knew this yet ignored it.”
Sharon raised the concern that if the cabinet accepted that they knew of the risk, it would thus set into motion demands for reparations based on acts of genocide.
“People wishing us ill, and I’ve already heard this, will say that what occurred in those camps was genocide. I’ve heard this from Rashad al-Shawa, the former mayor of Gaza. He stated that such claims are appropriate, linking the massacres to genocide,” Sharon warned.
Sharon read out to the cabinet the 1950 statute against genocide, and warned that in his interpretation they could all be considered accomplices to the massacre, according to the letter of the law. To illustrate this, he elaborated on the roles of accomplices.
“We all urged this, we all enabled it, by asking them (the Phalangist Christian militias) to enter the camps. We were present, we lit up the area and we evacuated casualties. It is common knowledge that we were in the area to keep the opposition away, and we did not isolate it from other areas. We kept forces in the area to ensure the mission was carried out, and in case they ran into trouble and needed help getting out.”
Based on this interpretation, Sharon asked the cabinet to reject this portion of the report. “Shouldn’t this section shock us? The commission did not hesitate to compare Israel to indirect supporters of pogroms, who committed atrocities against our people. I am revolted by any hint of such an accusation,” he said.
“I reject the conclusion that there was a constant threat of bloodshed wherever the Phalangists were present. It was accepted among us that during the earlier Peace for Galilee operation, in which they operated alongside our forces, they had behaved appropriately."
Sharon stressed that nobody could have foreseen how drastically things would deteriorate.
“I take no issue with the Mossad or with Military Intelligence. Their assessments included no such eventuality. All their experts, as well as civilian and army top brass, swore under oath that they had not foreseen such a risk."
Referring to the commission’s arguments against him personally, Sharon said that he saw no error in his decision to protect the lives of Israel Defense Forces soldiers.
“I want to say something about my alleged errors," he says in the report. "The most serious allegation was that I did not anticipate what would happen when the militias went in. The commission tried to put themselves into my shoes and understand my actions. They explained that by considering saving IDF lives by letting the militias in, I was distracted and disregarded the possible consequences. Honorable Prime Minister, I don’t consider taking action to save our soldiers’ lives a mistake. This should be our primary consideration. I cannot accept that this could ever not be so. I would repeat this again to each one of you individually, before you chop my head off.”
Sharon called on the cabinet to fire him if that was their decision, but said he would not willingly resign. “You can cut off my head any way you choose. You won’t hear a peep from me, but do you wish to force me to do it myself?”
Sharon closed with some firm and caustic words. “I’m willing to volunteer, if necessary, to go and fight to defend Jews anywhere in the world, but don’t ask me to commit suicide. You can chop my head off, and continue to enjoy the spinach and cheese bourekas on this table tomorrow as well. It’s great to sit around this table. You’ll still be here next week, but I’ll be working on my farm. It’s high time people worked in this country, instead of busying themselves with the stock market.”
The cabinet ultimately adopted the Kahan commission’s report against Sharon’s recommendation, and he was ousted from his position as minister of defense. Two decades later, he returned as prime minister.
During the meeting, the ministers could clearly hear the vocal protest demonstration held outside the Prime Minister’s Office by the Peace Now movement, which was calling for Ariel Sharon to be fired.
The real drama occurred when the Prime Minister’s military aide, Lt. Col. Azriel Nevo, interrupted the meeting to announce that an explosive device had gone off amid the demonstrators and had caused injuries. He later added that a hand grenade had been thrown and that there was a lot of commotion, but the police were taking control of the situation.
Sharon said that demonstrators were trying to break through the gate, but were being rebuffed. Chief of Staff Refael Eitan pointed out that there were enough policemen to handle the situation.
Subsequently, Begin again interrupted the discussion, yelling, “Someone is dead! A dead Jew! Azriel, how could this have happened? Is one camp lobbing grenades at the other?"
Nevo replied that this was the assumption, but nothing was confirmed yet.
The cabinet discussion continued. Minister Yosef Burg spoke, not knowing that his son Avrum was among the injured. Nevo interrupted again, saying that a grenade had been thrown, killing one demonstrator and injuring three others. Two policemen were also injured.
The fatality was Emil Grunzweig, a teacher and peace activist. This week marked the 30th anniversary of his death.
Notes from 1983 cabinet meeting show former defense minister was concerned that the entire government, including Prime Minister Menachem Begin, would be accused of genocide in the massacres at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon if the Kahan commission's findings were accepted.
Ariel Sharon feared charges of genocide and demands for compensation following the first Lebanon War, state archives have revealed.
The State Archives has just released the protocol of the cabinet meeting in February 1983, in which the commission’s findings were discussed. The protocol reveals some fascinating quotations from the former prime minister, who served as defense minister during that invasion and would return and lead the country two decades later.
Sharon worried that if the government were to accept some of the conclusions of the Kahan commission of inquiry set up to investigate the 1982 massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, it would expose itself to charges of war crimes.
Arriving late at the cabinet meeting, held on February 10, 1983, Sharon launched into a speech outlining his response to the commission’s report. “I’ve had a chance to read it thoroughly, and there are definitely some parts of it which we should embrace. However, there are sections in it that we cannot accept,” he said in his opening comments. “I’ve concluded that some sections must be emphatically rejected by the cabinet. There are portions in the report that we, as Jews and citizens of Israel, as ministers of the Israeli government, cannot accept.”
Sharon lashed out in particular at the commission’s determination that the country’s civilian and military leaders had ignored the risks of such a massacre taking place. “This goes well beyond the personal issue on everyone’s mind, of whether I stay or go,” added Sharon. “The report’s words ‘ignored’ imply that this was done knowingly. That includes all of us sitting around this table who appeared before the commission, including you, Prime Minister [Menachem Begin]. The commission has specifically said that not only was there a risk of a massacre, but that all of us knew this yet ignored it.”
Sharon raised the concern that if the cabinet accepted that they knew of the risk, it would thus set into motion demands for reparations based on acts of genocide.
“People wishing us ill, and I’ve already heard this, will say that what occurred in those camps was genocide. I’ve heard this from Rashad al-Shawa, the former mayor of Gaza. He stated that such claims are appropriate, linking the massacres to genocide,” Sharon warned.
Sharon read out to the cabinet the 1950 statute against genocide, and warned that in his interpretation they could all be considered accomplices to the massacre, according to the letter of the law. To illustrate this, he elaborated on the roles of accomplices.
“We all urged this, we all enabled it, by asking them (the Phalangist Christian militias) to enter the camps. We were present, we lit up the area and we evacuated casualties. It is common knowledge that we were in the area to keep the opposition away, and we did not isolate it from other areas. We kept forces in the area to ensure the mission was carried out, and in case they ran into trouble and needed help getting out.”
Based on this interpretation, Sharon asked the cabinet to reject this portion of the report. “Shouldn’t this section shock us? The commission did not hesitate to compare Israel to indirect supporters of pogroms, who committed atrocities against our people. I am revolted by any hint of such an accusation,” he said.
“I reject the conclusion that there was a constant threat of bloodshed wherever the Phalangists were present. It was accepted among us that during the earlier Peace for Galilee operation, in which they operated alongside our forces, they had behaved appropriately."
Sharon stressed that nobody could have foreseen how drastically things would deteriorate.
“I take no issue with the Mossad or with Military Intelligence. Their assessments included no such eventuality. All their experts, as well as civilian and army top brass, swore under oath that they had not foreseen such a risk."
Referring to the commission’s arguments against him personally, Sharon said that he saw no error in his decision to protect the lives of Israel Defense Forces soldiers.
“I want to say something about my alleged errors," he says in the report. "The most serious allegation was that I did not anticipate what would happen when the militias went in. The commission tried to put themselves into my shoes and understand my actions. They explained that by considering saving IDF lives by letting the militias in, I was distracted and disregarded the possible consequences. Honorable Prime Minister, I don’t consider taking action to save our soldiers’ lives a mistake. This should be our primary consideration. I cannot accept that this could ever not be so. I would repeat this again to each one of you individually, before you chop my head off.”
Sharon called on the cabinet to fire him if that was their decision, but said he would not willingly resign. “You can cut off my head any way you choose. You won’t hear a peep from me, but do you wish to force me to do it myself?”
Sharon closed with some firm and caustic words. “I’m willing to volunteer, if necessary, to go and fight to defend Jews anywhere in the world, but don’t ask me to commit suicide. You can chop my head off, and continue to enjoy the spinach and cheese bourekas on this table tomorrow as well. It’s great to sit around this table. You’ll still be here next week, but I’ll be working on my farm. It’s high time people worked in this country, instead of busying themselves with the stock market.”
The cabinet ultimately adopted the Kahan commission’s report against Sharon’s recommendation, and he was ousted from his position as minister of defense. Two decades later, he returned as prime minister.
During the meeting, the ministers could clearly hear the vocal protest demonstration held outside the Prime Minister’s Office by the Peace Now movement, which was calling for Ariel Sharon to be fired.
The real drama occurred when the Prime Minister’s military aide, Lt. Col. Azriel Nevo, interrupted the meeting to announce that an explosive device had gone off amid the demonstrators and had caused injuries. He later added that a hand grenade had been thrown and that there was a lot of commotion, but the police were taking control of the situation.
Sharon said that demonstrators were trying to break through the gate, but were being rebuffed. Chief of Staff Refael Eitan pointed out that there were enough policemen to handle the situation.
Subsequently, Begin again interrupted the discussion, yelling, “Someone is dead! A dead Jew! Azriel, how could this have happened? Is one camp lobbing grenades at the other?"
Nevo replied that this was the assumption, but nothing was confirmed yet.
The cabinet discussion continued. Minister Yosef Burg spoke, not knowing that his son Avrum was among the injured. Nevo interrupted again, saying that a grenade had been thrown, killing one demonstrator and injuring three others. Two policemen were also injured.
The fatality was Emil Grunzweig, a teacher and peace activist. This week marked the 30th anniversary of his death.
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