24 jan 2017
In light of the Security Cabinet's charged deliberations during the operation, the state comptroller's subcommittee to postpone the publication of the complete report; bereaved parents: 'The publication is our children's unwritten will'; former Minister Peri: 'Everyone did their duty.'
The top-secret State Control subcommittee convened to approve the findings of the state comptroller's report for Operation Protective Edge, including the parts dealing with the Security Cabinet's performance during the operation, but decided to postpone the vote due to "security issues."
The discussion was conducted on the backdrop of Yedioth Aharonoth's exposure of the Cabinet's transcripts from the operation.
Several bereaved parents held a press conference where they demanded the publication of the comptroller's findings. Some of these parents spoke at the conference: Avi Yaacobi, Staff Sgt. Gilad Yaccobi's father, Shmuel Lavie, Capt. Liad Lavie's father, and Orit Chai, Staff Sgt. Omer Chai's mother.
"Two years have passed since the end of Operation Protective Edge, and we stand here for the first time to ask for the publication of the operation's report", said the parents. "We would like to clarify that the petition was signed by over 50 bereaved parents. We do not have, nor have we ever had any political affinity with the various parties. We ask to have the report published in its entirety. We are certain that the comptroller and his team have done a professional job in examining the different aspects of the campaign".
The bereaved parents also said that "now that the report was submitted to the MKs, we would like to ensure that its conclusions are fully applied in preparation for Israel's future campaigns, hoping there are none. We ask the State Control's subcommittee to recommend the publication of the report, with the exception of censored segments classified by the Military Censor as senisitive to national security. We perceive this to be your moral, national obligation.
The publication of this report is our children's unwritten will. We went on a just war. There was no other choice. Obviously, there are faults in war. It is important to us that they are amended. Any idiot shooting a missile can start a war here, which is why we must prepare for the next war by learning our lessons. We will be following the committee's deliberations and decisions, the implementation of the lessons. If the government does not apply the committee's recommendations, we will continue to fight until they are. We are not here to haunt anyone. We want transparency".
Following the exposure of the Cabinet's charged deliberations during Protective Edge, Ilan Sagi, Sgt. Erez Sagi's father, who was also among the fallen in a Gaza operation, told Ynet, "We were aware of this on the day we were told of the horrible disaster that had befallen us. This is why a large number of bereaved parents are fighting to have the comptroller's report published in full, and that if there are any conclusions, that the lessons are implemented and applied".
He also said, "it feels like a mockery is being made of our children's lives, and that is something that we cannot ignore or overlook. We are not looking to overthrow or reinstate governments; we are here to amend the situation so that those future soldiers continue to be our soldiers instead of just a name in a bereaved family".
Sagi was asked whether he could imagine that the military's command centers would not be prepared when sending his son to the operation, he said: "No, I never could, and I'm sure neither could Erez. Since he was 15, Erez was devoted to the IDF, he believed in the IDF. When I refused his request to be sent to a military academy, he said to me, 'Dad, in the military academy I will be able to contribute more than going to a regular high school.' He loved the uniform and always said 'there is nothing quite like the IDF'. If he were here, the situation would have truly saddened him".
Former Minister Peri: "The transcripts are essential"
Former head of the Shin Bet, MK Yaakov Peri (Yesh Atid), also addressed the publication in an interview to Ynet. Peri, who was the Minister of Science and a Cabinet Observer at the time, stated regarding the transcripts that "they only reflect reality, even though the deliberations were long. The transcripts reflect some piquant bits, but they are also essential, especially the ones concerning the tunnels; the military's level of preparation regarding its dealing with the tunnels, and of course it reflects all sides in the matter".
He also said that dealing with the tunnels is "nothing new, the Comptroller said in previous reports. It was known that eventually the prime minister's comments regarding the tunnels being discussed in many prior Cabinet meetings are far from true. The military had the intelligence on the existence of border-crossing tunnels but they did not come prepared with a full operational plan, with alternatives or timetables for the Cabinet, and all of this took place in the midst of aerial attacks or the beginning of Protective Edge".
In response to the question whether the military leadership misfired on the subject of the tunnels, Peri stated "I am not sure misfired is correct. I think that at the end of the day, the assessment, which we now can clearly define as erroneous, regarding how much of an actual threat, or strategic threat, some people would say, the tunnels are to Israeli security, is critical. This was proven in the first few days of the operation, when terrorist cells infiltrated through the tunnels and initiated attacks; Moreover, the size, length and number of tunnels proved they are indeed a strategic threat and that this assessment was lacking".
Peri also said that "the battles, if one may call them that in reference to the Cabinet, the relationship between Liberman, the prime minister, Bennett, Ya'alon were not quite amicable. At the same time, it seems like someone was trying to misappropriate his duty. Everyone did their jobs including the IDF, the Shin Bet and other intelligence officials, and we must understand that the main problem is that the operation culminated in nothing. We lost our best sons, and we have yet to rehabilitate, demilitarize, advance politically, strategically or internationally".
On the exchange between Bennett and Ya'alon, Peri said "there were some harsh exchanges. The exchange stemmed from the fact that Bennett started his own information gathering operation by directly contacting field officers, which is usually not done, but in order to justify his actions, Bennett said 'since I am not getting accurate reports from you, I need to gather them myself'. I don't think self gathering is the right thing to do. I also don't think Bogie was untruthful.
The unwillingness to be more aggressive and commence a ground offensive undoubtedly garnered debate and the kind of expressions that are somewhat inappropriate for such a forum".
The top-secret State Control subcommittee convened to approve the findings of the state comptroller's report for Operation Protective Edge, including the parts dealing with the Security Cabinet's performance during the operation, but decided to postpone the vote due to "security issues."
The discussion was conducted on the backdrop of Yedioth Aharonoth's exposure of the Cabinet's transcripts from the operation.
Several bereaved parents held a press conference where they demanded the publication of the comptroller's findings. Some of these parents spoke at the conference: Avi Yaacobi, Staff Sgt. Gilad Yaccobi's father, Shmuel Lavie, Capt. Liad Lavie's father, and Orit Chai, Staff Sgt. Omer Chai's mother.
"Two years have passed since the end of Operation Protective Edge, and we stand here for the first time to ask for the publication of the operation's report", said the parents. "We would like to clarify that the petition was signed by over 50 bereaved parents. We do not have, nor have we ever had any political affinity with the various parties. We ask to have the report published in its entirety. We are certain that the comptroller and his team have done a professional job in examining the different aspects of the campaign".
The bereaved parents also said that "now that the report was submitted to the MKs, we would like to ensure that its conclusions are fully applied in preparation for Israel's future campaigns, hoping there are none. We ask the State Control's subcommittee to recommend the publication of the report, with the exception of censored segments classified by the Military Censor as senisitive to national security. We perceive this to be your moral, national obligation.
The publication of this report is our children's unwritten will. We went on a just war. There was no other choice. Obviously, there are faults in war. It is important to us that they are amended. Any idiot shooting a missile can start a war here, which is why we must prepare for the next war by learning our lessons. We will be following the committee's deliberations and decisions, the implementation of the lessons. If the government does not apply the committee's recommendations, we will continue to fight until they are. We are not here to haunt anyone. We want transparency".
Following the exposure of the Cabinet's charged deliberations during Protective Edge, Ilan Sagi, Sgt. Erez Sagi's father, who was also among the fallen in a Gaza operation, told Ynet, "We were aware of this on the day we were told of the horrible disaster that had befallen us. This is why a large number of bereaved parents are fighting to have the comptroller's report published in full, and that if there are any conclusions, that the lessons are implemented and applied".
He also said, "it feels like a mockery is being made of our children's lives, and that is something that we cannot ignore or overlook. We are not looking to overthrow or reinstate governments; we are here to amend the situation so that those future soldiers continue to be our soldiers instead of just a name in a bereaved family".
Sagi was asked whether he could imagine that the military's command centers would not be prepared when sending his son to the operation, he said: "No, I never could, and I'm sure neither could Erez. Since he was 15, Erez was devoted to the IDF, he believed in the IDF. When I refused his request to be sent to a military academy, he said to me, 'Dad, in the military academy I will be able to contribute more than going to a regular high school.' He loved the uniform and always said 'there is nothing quite like the IDF'. If he were here, the situation would have truly saddened him".
Former Minister Peri: "The transcripts are essential"
Former head of the Shin Bet, MK Yaakov Peri (Yesh Atid), also addressed the publication in an interview to Ynet. Peri, who was the Minister of Science and a Cabinet Observer at the time, stated regarding the transcripts that "they only reflect reality, even though the deliberations were long. The transcripts reflect some piquant bits, but they are also essential, especially the ones concerning the tunnels; the military's level of preparation regarding its dealing with the tunnels, and of course it reflects all sides in the matter".
He also said that dealing with the tunnels is "nothing new, the Comptroller said in previous reports. It was known that eventually the prime minister's comments regarding the tunnels being discussed in many prior Cabinet meetings are far from true. The military had the intelligence on the existence of border-crossing tunnels but they did not come prepared with a full operational plan, with alternatives or timetables for the Cabinet, and all of this took place in the midst of aerial attacks or the beginning of Protective Edge".
In response to the question whether the military leadership misfired on the subject of the tunnels, Peri stated "I am not sure misfired is correct. I think that at the end of the day, the assessment, which we now can clearly define as erroneous, regarding how much of an actual threat, or strategic threat, some people would say, the tunnels are to Israeli security, is critical. This was proven in the first few days of the operation, when terrorist cells infiltrated through the tunnels and initiated attacks; Moreover, the size, length and number of tunnels proved they are indeed a strategic threat and that this assessment was lacking".
Peri also said that "the battles, if one may call them that in reference to the Cabinet, the relationship between Liberman, the prime minister, Bennett, Ya'alon were not quite amicable. At the same time, it seems like someone was trying to misappropriate his duty. Everyone did their jobs including the IDF, the Shin Bet and other intelligence officials, and we must understand that the main problem is that the operation culminated in nothing. We lost our best sons, and we have yet to rehabilitate, demilitarize, advance politically, strategically or internationally".
On the exchange between Bennett and Ya'alon, Peri said "there were some harsh exchanges. The exchange stemmed from the fact that Bennett started his own information gathering operation by directly contacting field officers, which is usually not done, but in order to justify his actions, Bennett said 'since I am not getting accurate reports from you, I need to gather them myself'. I don't think self gathering is the right thing to do. I also don't think Bogie was untruthful.
The unwillingness to be more aggressive and commence a ground offensive undoubtedly garnered debate and the kind of expressions that are somewhat inappropriate for such a forum".
Transcripts of the charged cabinet discussions in the days leading up to, and during, the 2014 Operation Protective Edge show the IDF was unprepared to deal with the tunnel threat, the clashes with the military command and the heated arguments between the ministers.
The final State Comptroller report on the 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, which will be likely released to the public soon, will reveal everything that has happened in the months and years that preceded the military campaign, which was the bloodiest Israel has seen since the Second Lebanon War.
The minutes from the highly sensitive discussions, revealed here for the first time, show what happened in the moment of truth, when decisions were being made: The fact the IDF was unprepared to deal with the tunnel threat, just how disconnected the members of cabinet were from what was happening on the ground, and the breadth of the outward expressions of hatred among the country's leaders.
It was the night of June 30, 2014, hours after the bodies of Naftali Frenkel, Gil-Ad Shaer and Eyal Yifrach—three Israeli teens kidnapped and murdered by Hamas in Gush Etzion--were found after an 18-day search.
The atmosphere in the Security Cabinet was tense. Operation Protective Edge hadn't begun, but the winds of war were already blowing in the cabinet.
"Our response to this attack has been weak and disgraceful so far," Minister Naftali Bennett said of the kidnapping. "There are dozens of tunnels in Gaza meant for kidnappings."
The tunnels, he said, "aren't sitting there just to rust away"—a snide remark paraphrasing a comment made by former defense minister Moshe Ya'alon, who said before the 2006 Second Lebanon War that Hezbollah's rockets will rust away in their weapons depots.
"We have to go on an offensive action on the frontline," Bennett added.
Bennett's proposal was met with a sweeping objection from the cabinet.
"The tunnels are a real threat to the State of Israel and they could change the balance (of power) between us and (Hamas)," Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said. "Bogie (Ya'alon), I ask that you present a plan (of action) tomorrow, including taking over the tunnel openings."
"Such a plan exists," Ya'alon responded.
"I'm not familiar with it," Netanyahu said.
July 1, 2014: 'The goal is to contain'
The kidnapped teenagers were laid to rest, while the hunt for their abductors was still underway.
While Bennett was calling to launch an offensive posthaste, then-defense minister Ya'alon was urging caution.
"Hamas has no intentions to initiate an attack through the tunnels," he said. "We need to be wary of miscalculations."
"Did they have such intentions when they kidnapped Gilad Shalit?" Bennett asked.
"No," Ya'alon responded.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, made it clear that at that point, his intentions were to lead a policy of restraint. "The goal right now is to contain."
Bennett kept pushing for an offensive: "You think if we do nothing, they would show restraint?"
"Yes," Ya'alon responded.
Minister Gilad Erdan then challenged Ya'alon on whether the defense establishment was prepared to deal with the tunnel threat. "You presented a plan to conquer Gaza, but not one regarding the tunnels," he said.
"We did present one," Ya'alon responded.
Then-IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz shared Ya'alon and Netanyahu's opinion in favor of restraint. "Hamas doesn't want to act. They already said on their radio, 'We've made a mistake with the kidnapping.'"
July 2, 2014: 'Hamas doesn't want a conflict'
The body of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu Khdeir was found after he was burned to death, leading to serious clashes in east Jerusalem.
In the cabinet, an argument was heating up over whether to launch a ground offensive to deal with the Hamas tunnels in Gaza.
Defense Minister Ya'alon stressed that such a move could lead to devastating results.
"I'm against taking actions against the tunnel entrances," Ya'alon said. "It could drag us in (to Gaza)."
Aviv Kochavi, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate at the time, shared Ya'alon's views. "There are many indications Hamas does not want a conflict," he said.
IDF Chief Gantz added, "I recommend we strategically expose Hamas's tunnels project."
Bennett, meanwhile, was pushing for a practical work plan. "How long would a ground operation to deal with the tunnels take?"
"Two-three days," Gantz replied.
The ground operation that was later launched lasted 19 days.
July 3, 2014: Warnings from the IDF chief
Dozens of rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at Israel, prompting the Israeli government to threaten forceful action if the rocket fire does not stop immediately.
Meanwhile, the arguments in the cabinet continued. Israel had information on the existence of a massive border-crossing tunnel near Kerem Shalom and was sending messages to Hamas on the matter.
Prime Minister Netanyahu questioned IDF chief Gantz on one possible course of action: "Will bombing the entrance to the tunnel neutralize the threat?"
"I don't know," Gantz said. "It might disrupt it."
"Could this stop us from entering the tunnels?" Netanyahu asked.
"The effectiveness of a bombing is very low," the IDF chief answered. "It's likely such an action against the tunnels will lead to (Israel having to) conquer all of Gaza."
Defense Minister Ya'alon kept urging caution. "We're living under quite a few developing threats. I suggest we don't launch an operation against the tunnels."
July 7, 2014: 'I recommend we act'
Operation Protective Edge was launched, and the cabinet authorized drawing up 1,500 reservists.
During the time between the discovery of the bodies of the three teens to the beginning of the operation, the Israel Air Force was carry out airstrikes against targets in Gaza, while armed Palestinian groups began shooting rockets from the strip into Israeli population centers. Hamas wasn't involved at this stage, but did give moral support to those firing the rockets.
Yet on July 7, this changed when Hamas launched several hundred rockets into Israel. Consequently, Operation Protective Edge was given the green light.
Ya'alon kept trying to lower the flames. "We can reach a ceasefire," he said. "We shouldn't get to where we're striping them of their tunnels. We need to take full advantage of Egyptian mediation."
Bennett didn't agree. "I recommend that we take action to neutralize the tunnels," he said.
"If we're able to ensure three years of quiet without destroying the tunnels, what's the problem?" Ya'alon asked.
"And if we get hit by a strategic attack, it will be like the Gilad Shalit incident, but times 100. It's better that we prevent this from happening in advance. I haven't seen any plans on how to prevent this from happening," Bennett said.
"And they won't build new ones after you go in?" Ya'alon wondered.
July 8, 2014: 'Conquer Gaza'
Hamas launched rockets that hit from Hadera to Gadera, while the cabinet authorized drawing up 40,000 reservists.
The cabinet ministers demanded a more firm offensive action.
"We need to conquer Gaza and remove all threats," Minister Yuval Steinitz said.
"We can't get too worked up," Minister Tzipi Livni cautioned.
"The Military Intelligence Directorate has so far erred in their assessments. We need to conquer Gaza," Minister Avigdor Lieberman determined.
"I'm opposed to a ground operation (in Gaza)," Minister Yair Lapid stated.
July 10, 2014: 'The problem won't be resolved now'
The cabinet was discussing a limited military operation, while government officials warned: "There's no escaping a ground operation."
The GOC Southern Command at the time, Sami Turgeman, joined the cabinet meeting in an effort to convince the ministers to execute a plan called "Frontal Defense," which is meant to neutralize the tunnels located up to one kilometer from the border fence.
Defense Minister Ya'alon and IDF Chief Gantz were against the plan, and the cabinet did not approve it.
The ground operation was eventually launched eight days late, on July 18, after the IDF stopped an attempt by dozens of Hamas militants to infiltrate Israel through a tunnel in Kerem Shalom.
"There is a strategic threat that can be launched against us at any moment," Turgeman said. "There are at least nine cross-border tunnels."
"Do we have to continue fire (aerial bombing) or go on a ground offensive?" Netanyahu asked.
"I oppose a ground offensive," Gantz declared. "We've had great achievements so far: Hamas is beaten, the tunnels are a reasonable risk to take."
Bennett inquired about the proposed plan. "How wide scale would the operation against the tunnels be?"
"It will include friction, but we know how to deal with that," Turgeman answered.
"If you were in our place, what would you have done?" Bennett asked Turgeman.
"He's not in your shoes, he's a wild horse racing forward," Ya'alon chimed in.
"So not in our shoes, in your shoes," Bennett amended.
"In my shoes and in yours, I'd go in (to Gaza) with three brigade combat teams to neutralize the tunnel threat," Turgeman replied.
"There are conditions to creating deterrence," Military Intelligence chief Kochavi added.
"I'm looking at the tunnel threat as an unresolved issue that we're not going to resolve it in this instance either," Ya'alon said.
"Go for a wide scale operation in Gaza," Lieberman urged. "But if it's between taking action against the tunnels or a ceasefire, go for a ceasefire."
July 27, 2014: 'Lazy bulls'
Dozens of soldiers were killed in the ground offensive. The United States demanded an immediate ceasefire.
At this point, the battles waged around the cabinet table were no longer polite, and tensions were running high, on the verge of explosion.
Ya'alon accused Bennett of undermining him by contacting senior IDF officers who were on the ground behind his back.
"You won't run the army instead of me," Ya'alon said in anger. "You won't come from the field and tell me to do this or not do that, you hear?"
"I will, if we don't get truthful reports," Bennett answered.
"I do provide truthful reports," Ya'alon countered.
"Until now, we didn't know about the ceasefire," Bennett said.
"Do I need to answer to you?" Ya'alon retorted.
"Of course," Bennett replied.
Bennett then directed his fire towards IDF chief Gantz, "I expect you to arrive to cabinet meetings with operational plans and offensive policy. I'm not the one who's supposed to present plans to destroy the tunnels. Be wild horses, not lazy bulls."
August 1, 2014: A strike during a ceasefire
The ceasefire was broken by Hamas in an attack that claimed the lives of three soldiers: Maj. Benaya Sarel, Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Liel Gidoni.
Minister Erdan demanded answers from the IDF chief and the head of Military Intelligence: Why were orders given to Givati soldiers that limited their actions during that ceasefire and put them in danger?
"If I had known this would be the situation during ceasefires, I would've opposed them," Erdan said.
The final State Comptroller report on the 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, which will be likely released to the public soon, will reveal everything that has happened in the months and years that preceded the military campaign, which was the bloodiest Israel has seen since the Second Lebanon War.
The minutes from the highly sensitive discussions, revealed here for the first time, show what happened in the moment of truth, when decisions were being made: The fact the IDF was unprepared to deal with the tunnel threat, just how disconnected the members of cabinet were from what was happening on the ground, and the breadth of the outward expressions of hatred among the country's leaders.
It was the night of June 30, 2014, hours after the bodies of Naftali Frenkel, Gil-Ad Shaer and Eyal Yifrach—three Israeli teens kidnapped and murdered by Hamas in Gush Etzion--were found after an 18-day search.
The atmosphere in the Security Cabinet was tense. Operation Protective Edge hadn't begun, but the winds of war were already blowing in the cabinet.
"Our response to this attack has been weak and disgraceful so far," Minister Naftali Bennett said of the kidnapping. "There are dozens of tunnels in Gaza meant for kidnappings."
The tunnels, he said, "aren't sitting there just to rust away"—a snide remark paraphrasing a comment made by former defense minister Moshe Ya'alon, who said before the 2006 Second Lebanon War that Hezbollah's rockets will rust away in their weapons depots.
"We have to go on an offensive action on the frontline," Bennett added.
Bennett's proposal was met with a sweeping objection from the cabinet.
"The tunnels are a real threat to the State of Israel and they could change the balance (of power) between us and (Hamas)," Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said. "Bogie (Ya'alon), I ask that you present a plan (of action) tomorrow, including taking over the tunnel openings."
"Such a plan exists," Ya'alon responded.
"I'm not familiar with it," Netanyahu said.
July 1, 2014: 'The goal is to contain'
The kidnapped teenagers were laid to rest, while the hunt for their abductors was still underway.
While Bennett was calling to launch an offensive posthaste, then-defense minister Ya'alon was urging caution.
"Hamas has no intentions to initiate an attack through the tunnels," he said. "We need to be wary of miscalculations."
"Did they have such intentions when they kidnapped Gilad Shalit?" Bennett asked.
"No," Ya'alon responded.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, made it clear that at that point, his intentions were to lead a policy of restraint. "The goal right now is to contain."
Bennett kept pushing for an offensive: "You think if we do nothing, they would show restraint?"
"Yes," Ya'alon responded.
Minister Gilad Erdan then challenged Ya'alon on whether the defense establishment was prepared to deal with the tunnel threat. "You presented a plan to conquer Gaza, but not one regarding the tunnels," he said.
"We did present one," Ya'alon responded.
Then-IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz shared Ya'alon and Netanyahu's opinion in favor of restraint. "Hamas doesn't want to act. They already said on their radio, 'We've made a mistake with the kidnapping.'"
July 2, 2014: 'Hamas doesn't want a conflict'
The body of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu Khdeir was found after he was burned to death, leading to serious clashes in east Jerusalem.
In the cabinet, an argument was heating up over whether to launch a ground offensive to deal with the Hamas tunnels in Gaza.
Defense Minister Ya'alon stressed that such a move could lead to devastating results.
"I'm against taking actions against the tunnel entrances," Ya'alon said. "It could drag us in (to Gaza)."
Aviv Kochavi, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate at the time, shared Ya'alon's views. "There are many indications Hamas does not want a conflict," he said.
IDF Chief Gantz added, "I recommend we strategically expose Hamas's tunnels project."
Bennett, meanwhile, was pushing for a practical work plan. "How long would a ground operation to deal with the tunnels take?"
"Two-three days," Gantz replied.
The ground operation that was later launched lasted 19 days.
July 3, 2014: Warnings from the IDF chief
Dozens of rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at Israel, prompting the Israeli government to threaten forceful action if the rocket fire does not stop immediately.
Meanwhile, the arguments in the cabinet continued. Israel had information on the existence of a massive border-crossing tunnel near Kerem Shalom and was sending messages to Hamas on the matter.
Prime Minister Netanyahu questioned IDF chief Gantz on one possible course of action: "Will bombing the entrance to the tunnel neutralize the threat?"
"I don't know," Gantz said. "It might disrupt it."
"Could this stop us from entering the tunnels?" Netanyahu asked.
"The effectiveness of a bombing is very low," the IDF chief answered. "It's likely such an action against the tunnels will lead to (Israel having to) conquer all of Gaza."
Defense Minister Ya'alon kept urging caution. "We're living under quite a few developing threats. I suggest we don't launch an operation against the tunnels."
July 7, 2014: 'I recommend we act'
Operation Protective Edge was launched, and the cabinet authorized drawing up 1,500 reservists.
During the time between the discovery of the bodies of the three teens to the beginning of the operation, the Israel Air Force was carry out airstrikes against targets in Gaza, while armed Palestinian groups began shooting rockets from the strip into Israeli population centers. Hamas wasn't involved at this stage, but did give moral support to those firing the rockets.
Yet on July 7, this changed when Hamas launched several hundred rockets into Israel. Consequently, Operation Protective Edge was given the green light.
Ya'alon kept trying to lower the flames. "We can reach a ceasefire," he said. "We shouldn't get to where we're striping them of their tunnels. We need to take full advantage of Egyptian mediation."
Bennett didn't agree. "I recommend that we take action to neutralize the tunnels," he said.
"If we're able to ensure three years of quiet without destroying the tunnels, what's the problem?" Ya'alon asked.
"And if we get hit by a strategic attack, it will be like the Gilad Shalit incident, but times 100. It's better that we prevent this from happening in advance. I haven't seen any plans on how to prevent this from happening," Bennett said.
"And they won't build new ones after you go in?" Ya'alon wondered.
July 8, 2014: 'Conquer Gaza'
Hamas launched rockets that hit from Hadera to Gadera, while the cabinet authorized drawing up 40,000 reservists.
The cabinet ministers demanded a more firm offensive action.
"We need to conquer Gaza and remove all threats," Minister Yuval Steinitz said.
"We can't get too worked up," Minister Tzipi Livni cautioned.
"The Military Intelligence Directorate has so far erred in their assessments. We need to conquer Gaza," Minister Avigdor Lieberman determined.
"I'm opposed to a ground operation (in Gaza)," Minister Yair Lapid stated.
July 10, 2014: 'The problem won't be resolved now'
The cabinet was discussing a limited military operation, while government officials warned: "There's no escaping a ground operation."
The GOC Southern Command at the time, Sami Turgeman, joined the cabinet meeting in an effort to convince the ministers to execute a plan called "Frontal Defense," which is meant to neutralize the tunnels located up to one kilometer from the border fence.
Defense Minister Ya'alon and IDF Chief Gantz were against the plan, and the cabinet did not approve it.
The ground operation was eventually launched eight days late, on July 18, after the IDF stopped an attempt by dozens of Hamas militants to infiltrate Israel through a tunnel in Kerem Shalom.
"There is a strategic threat that can be launched against us at any moment," Turgeman said. "There are at least nine cross-border tunnels."
"Do we have to continue fire (aerial bombing) or go on a ground offensive?" Netanyahu asked.
"I oppose a ground offensive," Gantz declared. "We've had great achievements so far: Hamas is beaten, the tunnels are a reasonable risk to take."
Bennett inquired about the proposed plan. "How wide scale would the operation against the tunnels be?"
"It will include friction, but we know how to deal with that," Turgeman answered.
"If you were in our place, what would you have done?" Bennett asked Turgeman.
"He's not in your shoes, he's a wild horse racing forward," Ya'alon chimed in.
"So not in our shoes, in your shoes," Bennett amended.
"In my shoes and in yours, I'd go in (to Gaza) with three brigade combat teams to neutralize the tunnel threat," Turgeman replied.
"There are conditions to creating deterrence," Military Intelligence chief Kochavi added.
"I'm looking at the tunnel threat as an unresolved issue that we're not going to resolve it in this instance either," Ya'alon said.
"Go for a wide scale operation in Gaza," Lieberman urged. "But if it's between taking action against the tunnels or a ceasefire, go for a ceasefire."
July 27, 2014: 'Lazy bulls'
Dozens of soldiers were killed in the ground offensive. The United States demanded an immediate ceasefire.
At this point, the battles waged around the cabinet table were no longer polite, and tensions were running high, on the verge of explosion.
Ya'alon accused Bennett of undermining him by contacting senior IDF officers who were on the ground behind his back.
"You won't run the army instead of me," Ya'alon said in anger. "You won't come from the field and tell me to do this or not do that, you hear?"
"I will, if we don't get truthful reports," Bennett answered.
"I do provide truthful reports," Ya'alon countered.
"Until now, we didn't know about the ceasefire," Bennett said.
"Do I need to answer to you?" Ya'alon retorted.
"Of course," Bennett replied.
Bennett then directed his fire towards IDF chief Gantz, "I expect you to arrive to cabinet meetings with operational plans and offensive policy. I'm not the one who's supposed to present plans to destroy the tunnels. Be wild horses, not lazy bulls."
August 1, 2014: A strike during a ceasefire
The ceasefire was broken by Hamas in an attack that claimed the lives of three soldiers: Maj. Benaya Sarel, Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Liel Gidoni.
Minister Erdan demanded answers from the IDF chief and the head of Military Intelligence: Why were orders given to Givati soldiers that limited their actions during that ceasefire and put them in danger?
"If I had known this would be the situation during ceasefires, I would've opposed them," Erdan said.
Naftali Bennett
Following publication in Yedioth Ahronoth of transcripts from cabinet meetings during Operation Protective Edge, reflecting ministerial and military infighting, Bennett scolds the ‘rigidity of the state leaders which is the root cause of the failure’; Ya’alon, who directed the incursion, strikes back, accusing Bennett of political point scoring and crossing red lines.
Education Minister Naftali Bennett (Bayit Yehudi) scolded the decision making process during Operation Protective Edge Tuesday morning, prompting Moshe Ya’alon, who served as the defense minister during the operation’s execution in 2014, to issue a scathing rebuttal, implying that Bennett was merely interested in political point scoring.
“Leadership doesn’t do politics at the same time as military evaluations,” Ya’alon said during a conference at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). “I see once again this morning politicians who have no red line.”
Speaking in Hebrew and in English before Ya’alon, Education Minister Bennett praised the recent decision to publish a report on Protective Edge, saying that it while it constituted a “security earthquake”, it also represented an opportunity.
The comments came in the wake of of a transcript of cabinet meetings during the incursion published in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ynet’s sister print publication.
The report, Bennett said, created a clear picture. “The rigidity of the thinking of the state leaders is the root of the failure,” Bennett declared. “We need to say directly that the rigid security conception crashed, and we need to start thinking about security in a new way. We don’t need more rigidity and shuffling but rather victory—clear and absolute victory. Victory that does not necessitate explanations and excuses. Victory that does not necessitate public relations, but rather which speaks for itself without words.”
Bennett warned against conducting wars or operations lasting 50 days which conclude in a stalemate or draw.
Reiterating the need for the security apparatus to detach itself from the rigidity which he says governs its decision-making process, he urged new initiatives.
“We need to give the IDF a clear objective of victory. When that is what is required, that is what we will do. Victory is not just an empty word. Victory is the sole objective of the army that enters the battlefield,” he continued.
The security of Israeli civilians is depends on Israel’s ability to emerge victorious once again, Bennett said before calling on Prime Minister Netanyahu to convene a security cabinet session in order to discuss the lessons to be drawn from the operation.
The minutes of the cabinet meeting published in Yedioth Ahronoth demonstrate a general lack of preparedness for the tunnel threat, squabbling among the military echelons and serious feuds between ministers.
Speaking immediately after Bennett, Moshe Ya’alon went on the offensive, insisting that leadership is not concerned with the possible publication of reports, including those heaping criticism on decisions. “Leadership is not led by polls,” he declared.
Admitting that decision-making and evaluations during Protective Edge were difficult, just like in all wars, and lamenting the loss of life and irreparable changes to people's lives in its aftermath, the former defense minister insisted that “We were ready to thwart the serious attacks that were planned by Hamas against our civilians.”
The ceasefire was achieved, he said, on Israeli terms. “Since then Hamas has been weakened and deterred, the south has enjoyed unprecedented quiet for the past two-and-a-half years since the operation,” Ya’alon continued in an attempt to list the achievements of a war of which he directed.
“This is an example of responsible and considered leadership,” he said before implying that politicians had no red lines.
He also stated his opposition to the leaked quotes from the cabinet meetings. “Whoever did this is not suited for leadership. Leadership is saying and deciding what is the correct thing to do rather than what is popular at the time.”
Following publication in Yedioth Ahronoth of transcripts from cabinet meetings during Operation Protective Edge, reflecting ministerial and military infighting, Bennett scolds the ‘rigidity of the state leaders which is the root cause of the failure’; Ya’alon, who directed the incursion, strikes back, accusing Bennett of political point scoring and crossing red lines.
Education Minister Naftali Bennett (Bayit Yehudi) scolded the decision making process during Operation Protective Edge Tuesday morning, prompting Moshe Ya’alon, who served as the defense minister during the operation’s execution in 2014, to issue a scathing rebuttal, implying that Bennett was merely interested in political point scoring.
“Leadership doesn’t do politics at the same time as military evaluations,” Ya’alon said during a conference at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). “I see once again this morning politicians who have no red line.”
Speaking in Hebrew and in English before Ya’alon, Education Minister Bennett praised the recent decision to publish a report on Protective Edge, saying that it while it constituted a “security earthquake”, it also represented an opportunity.
The comments came in the wake of of a transcript of cabinet meetings during the incursion published in Yedioth Ahronoth, Ynet’s sister print publication.
The report, Bennett said, created a clear picture. “The rigidity of the thinking of the state leaders is the root of the failure,” Bennett declared. “We need to say directly that the rigid security conception crashed, and we need to start thinking about security in a new way. We don’t need more rigidity and shuffling but rather victory—clear and absolute victory. Victory that does not necessitate explanations and excuses. Victory that does not necessitate public relations, but rather which speaks for itself without words.”
Bennett warned against conducting wars or operations lasting 50 days which conclude in a stalemate or draw.
Reiterating the need for the security apparatus to detach itself from the rigidity which he says governs its decision-making process, he urged new initiatives.
“We need to give the IDF a clear objective of victory. When that is what is required, that is what we will do. Victory is not just an empty word. Victory is the sole objective of the army that enters the battlefield,” he continued.
The security of Israeli civilians is depends on Israel’s ability to emerge victorious once again, Bennett said before calling on Prime Minister Netanyahu to convene a security cabinet session in order to discuss the lessons to be drawn from the operation.
The minutes of the cabinet meeting published in Yedioth Ahronoth demonstrate a general lack of preparedness for the tunnel threat, squabbling among the military echelons and serious feuds between ministers.
Speaking immediately after Bennett, Moshe Ya’alon went on the offensive, insisting that leadership is not concerned with the possible publication of reports, including those heaping criticism on decisions. “Leadership is not led by polls,” he declared.
Admitting that decision-making and evaluations during Protective Edge were difficult, just like in all wars, and lamenting the loss of life and irreparable changes to people's lives in its aftermath, the former defense minister insisted that “We were ready to thwart the serious attacks that were planned by Hamas against our civilians.”
The ceasefire was achieved, he said, on Israeli terms. “Since then Hamas has been weakened and deterred, the south has enjoyed unprecedented quiet for the past two-and-a-half years since the operation,” Ya’alon continued in an attempt to list the achievements of a war of which he directed.
“This is an example of responsible and considered leadership,” he said before implying that politicians had no red lines.
He also stated his opposition to the leaked quotes from the cabinet meetings. “Whoever did this is not suited for leadership. Leadership is saying and deciding what is the correct thing to do rather than what is popular at the time.”
Moshe Ya'alon
Turning to the unresolved crisis of Amona, Ya’alon said: “Leadership should have said to the residents of Amona that no law can pass that leaves you on the mountain peak.”
The media, he added, needed to conduct some self-reflection, particularly after the publication of alleged quotes of conversations between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yedioth Ahronoth owner and publisher Arnon Mozes. “Reliable public broadcasting is extremely important.”
In what appeared to be an implicit slight against Netanyahu, Ya’alon criticized scaremongering, as he continued to list what he believed to be the fundamental qualities for a leader.
“Leadership does not scare a nation about external threats. Leadership needs to unify a nation at the same time as integrating all elements of its society.”
He further expressed his dismay over the Israeli right being presented as racist and violent and the left’s portrayal as a treacherous entity.
Turning to the unresolved crisis of Amona, Ya’alon said: “Leadership should have said to the residents of Amona that no law can pass that leaves you on the mountain peak.”
The media, he added, needed to conduct some self-reflection, particularly after the publication of alleged quotes of conversations between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yedioth Ahronoth owner and publisher Arnon Mozes. “Reliable public broadcasting is extremely important.”
In what appeared to be an implicit slight against Netanyahu, Ya’alon criticized scaremongering, as he continued to list what he believed to be the fundamental qualities for a leader.
“Leadership does not scare a nation about external threats. Leadership needs to unify a nation at the same time as integrating all elements of its society.”
He further expressed his dismay over the Israeli right being presented as racist and violent and the left’s portrayal as a treacherous entity.
23 jan 2017
A subcommittee within the State Control Committee is expected to vote in favor of releasing the findings of the comptroller's report on Operation Protective Edge to the public; report is expected to be critical of the cabinet and government before and during the summer 2014 campaign.
A secret subcommittee within the State Control Committee is likely to vote in favor of revealing the findings of the State Comptroller's report regarding Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Ynet learned on Sunday.
The subcommittee is made of five members of Knesset including three from the governing coalition and two members of the opposition.
Despite a coalition majority on the subcommittee, it was revealed that members intend to vote to release the report and its findings to the public, as coalition considerations were not being taken into consideration.
"I am committed only to the bereaved families," said committee member MK Merav Ben Ari. "This is the only consideration that guides me in the vote and I think there is public interest and great importance to the publication of the report."
Ben Ari's statements indicate a majority in favor of publication as the two opposition members are also expected to vote for publishing the report as well.
This Tuesday, the subcommittee will also discuss sensitive matters related to the report, including the conduct of the cabinet before and during the operation.
The family of Lt. Hadar Goldin, who was kidnapped by Hamas in a Rafah tunnel during fighting, joined the demand of bereaved families to publish the report and called on the government to remove its objections to full publication of the comptroller's report.
"Everyone already knows that the government's favorite sentence 'the Israeli government is doing everything in its power,' is meaningless," the family said in a statement. "For two and a half years the Israeli government is abandoning Hadar and Oron (Shaul, another soldier whose body was snatched by Hamas) in Gaza and not doing anything for their return. We remind (Prime Minister) Netanyahu that Operation Protective Edge isn't over as long as Hadar and Oron are being held."
A secret subcommittee within the State Control Committee is likely to vote in favor of revealing the findings of the State Comptroller's report regarding Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Ynet learned on Sunday.
The subcommittee is made of five members of Knesset including three from the governing coalition and two members of the opposition.
Despite a coalition majority on the subcommittee, it was revealed that members intend to vote to release the report and its findings to the public, as coalition considerations were not being taken into consideration.
"I am committed only to the bereaved families," said committee member MK Merav Ben Ari. "This is the only consideration that guides me in the vote and I think there is public interest and great importance to the publication of the report."
Ben Ari's statements indicate a majority in favor of publication as the two opposition members are also expected to vote for publishing the report as well.
This Tuesday, the subcommittee will also discuss sensitive matters related to the report, including the conduct of the cabinet before and during the operation.
The family of Lt. Hadar Goldin, who was kidnapped by Hamas in a Rafah tunnel during fighting, joined the demand of bereaved families to publish the report and called on the government to remove its objections to full publication of the comptroller's report.
"Everyone already knows that the government's favorite sentence 'the Israeli government is doing everything in its power,' is meaningless," the family said in a statement. "For two and a half years the Israeli government is abandoning Hadar and Oron (Shaul, another soldier whose body was snatched by Hamas) in Gaza and not doing anything for their return. We remind (Prime Minister) Netanyahu that Operation Protective Edge isn't over as long as Hadar and Oron are being held."
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